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AFTER THE CATASTROPHE: DISASTER
RELIEF FOR HOSPITALS
ELIZABETH WEEKS*

Disasterplanningfor health careprovidersfollowing the September
11, 2001, terrorist attacks and, more recently, Hurricane Katrina,
focuses on preparing hospitals and other emergency services to
respond to victims' medical needs. But little attention has been paid
to the challenges that providers would face resuming normal
operations after the catastrophe. A large-scale disaster could create
unprecedented demand for health care and emergency services.
Hospitals already struggle to meet the high demand for and high
costs of emergency care, and they would face additional challenges
in the aftermath of a catastrophic event. Strained capacity and
financial reserves may force hospitals to close, just as occurred with
the two largest public hospitals in New Orleans following Katrina.
To prevent the initial terrorist-related or natural disaster from
spiraling into a lasting access-to-care crisis, this Article proposes a
government disaster relief plan to stabilize the health care industry
before the next catastrophe and prevent interruption of services
during the recovery.
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INTRODUCTION

Since September 11, 2001, policymakers have devoted substantial
resources to preparing the Nation's essential facilities to respond to
future catastrophes. Hurricane Katrina in September 2005 tragically
tested the shortcomings of those preparedness efforts and revealed
the substantial additional work that needs to be done. But even less
attention has been paid to ensuring that key industries and emergency
responders are able to resume normal operations after the crisis has
passed.
Hospitals, in particular, face considerable challenges
recovering payment and returning to normal operations after the
disaster victims are treated.
Contrary to the expected economic effect of increased demand
producing increased revenue, in the health care context, demand
surge could threaten providers' overall solvency. Hospitals could
anticipate delayed payment from private and government payers,
which face their own demand surge in processing the sudden,
unprecedented volume of claims; claims denials due to unusual
clinical presentation of patients; and increased levels of
uncompensated care costs as victims' private and government health
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coverage and personal finances are disrupted or lost in the disaster.'
Given typically thin financial reserves, existing emergency care
burdens, and other unique characteristics of health care financing,
hospitals may be unable to sustain those additional burdens. As a
result, they may be forced to close their doors, depriving already
ravaged communities of essential medical care. To prevent the initial
crisis of a terrorist attack or natural disaster from spiraling into a
lasting access-to-care crisis, this Article proposes a government
disaster relief plan to stabilize the health care industry before the next
catastrophe and prevent interruption of services during the recovery.
Hurricane Katrina left many challenges and troubles in its wake,
including a regional health care crisis.
That disaster amply
demonstrates the need to consider a relief plan for emergency
medical service providers before the next catastrophe. New Orleans's
two large public hospitals were severely damaged and closed
indefinitely after the storm.' Essential medical records have been lost
or destroyed. Pre-Katrina, fifty percent of the Gulf Coast population
lacked health insurance.4 The numbers of uninsured and destitute
1. See Sara Rosenbaum et al., New Models for Prevention Systems: Public Health
Emergencies and the Public Health/Managed Care Challenge, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 63,
65-67 (2002) (describing various private insurance payment challenges likely during a
public health emergency).
2. See Elizabeth Belmont et al., Disaster Checklist: Emergency Preparedness,
Response & Recovery Checklist: Beyond the Emergency Management Plan, 37 J. HEALTH
L. 503, 547 (2004) (noting that "[rlegardless of whether they are operated on a for-profit
or nonprofit basis, healthcare institutions depend upon regular cash flow to remain
operational" and anticipating difficulties from interruption in "usual revenue flow cycle"
during emergency).
3. See Two New Orleans Hospitals Beyond Help, CNN.com, Oct. 5, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/l0/05/neworleans.hospitals/index.html;
see
also
Sara
Rosenbaum, US Health Policy in the Aftermath of Katrina, 295 JAMA 437, 437 (2006)
(reporting that Charity Hospital was "devastated and dysfunctional, furloughing nearly
2600 employees as of November 7, 2005").
4. See Ruth E. Berggren & Tyler J. Curiel, After the Storm-Health Care
Infrastructure in Post-Katrina New Orleans, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1549, 1549 (2006)
(describing various concerns, namely that hospitals "have no surge capacity" and "must
deliver even greater amounts of uncompensated health care"); Claudia Kalb & Andrew
Murr, The Cost of the Katrina Effect, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 12, 2005, at 66, 66 (discussing
lasting health care crisis, including hospital closures); Todd Zwillich, Sens. Back Full
Katrina Medical Payments, United Press Int'l, Sept. 12, 2005, http://www.upi.com/archive/
view.php?archive=1&StoryID=20050912-044709-9283r
(describing public health and
health care delivery challenges and quoting National Governors Association director:
"We've got to go in and almost rebuild and [sic] entire infrastructure, a health
infrastructure, in that particular area."); New Orleans' Emergency Rooms Overtaxed
(National Public Radio broadcast Jan. 27, 2006) (transcript on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) (describing ongoing emergency care crisis in New Orleans); see also KAISER
COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., REPORT No.
7387, ADDRESSING THE HEALTH CARE IMPACT OF HURRICANE KATRINA 1-5 (2005),
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rose dramatically as many residents' employers were wiped out and,
with them, their employer health insurance.5 Without accessible
medical care or health insurance, residents may forego necessary

treatment. Untreated medical conditions may become worse and the
need for care even more acute.6 For health care providers, the impact
is not limited to physical destruction of facilities and buildings.
Increased demand for care and increased numbers of uninsured

patients create a severe financial strain, particularly for emergency
services.7 The financial strain extends beyond providers in the flood

zone to providers in neighboring states, which have taken in the
storm's victims. Those host states bear additional burdens caring for
destitute, newly uninsured patients and out-of-state health plan
enrollees.8
Even before Katrina, September 11, 2001, and biological threats
from anthrax, sudden acute respiratory syndrome ("SARS"), and
other agents tested the readiness of the Nation's hospitals and health
care financing system to respond to a major public health emergency. 9
Post-9/11 studies and response drills revealed a troubling lack of
preparedness.' ° Those reports prompted legislation, appropriations,
http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7387-2.pdf [hereinafter KAISER REPORT 7387]
(detailing poverty levels and levels of uninsured pre- and post-Katrina).
5. See KAISER REPORT 7387, supra note 4, at 1 (estimating 400,000 jobs lost,
meaning people lost not only income but also employer health insurance coverage).
6. See MICHAEL PERRY ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., REPORT NO. 7538,
VOICES OF THE STORM: HEALTH EXPERIENCES OF LOW-INCOME KATRINA SURVIVORS

7-13 (2005), http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7538.pdf [hereinafter KAISER REPORT
7538] (describing flood survivors' serious and persistent gaps in care and barriers to
accessing care).
7. See KAISER REPORT 7387, supra note 4, at 2 (noting closure of "Big Charity"
Hospital, the largest New Orleans public hospital and regional Level I trauma center).
8. See Rosenbaum, supra note 3, at 437-38 (discussing problems of uninsured and
lack of portability as major limitation to Medicaid); KAISER REPORT 7538, supra note 6, at
11-12 (discussing coverage and enrollment problems of uninsured); KAISER COMM'N ON
MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., REPORT NO. 7420, A
COMPARISON OF SEVENTEEN APPROVED KATRINA WAIVERS 1 (2006), http://

www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7420.pdf [hereinafter KAISER REPORT 7420] (noting that
displaced victims have to enroll in Medicaid and the State Child Health Insurance
Program in host states and that host state providers are not compensated by patients'
home states).
9. See, e.g., Rosenbaum et al., supra note 1, at 67-68 (discussing one private insurer's
experience with 2001 anthrax outbreak); id. at 65 (describing insurance and public health
conflicts during Milwaukee's 1980s measles outbreak).
10. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HOSPITAL PREPAREDNESS: MOST URBAN
HOSPITALS

HAVE

EMERGENCY

PLANS

BUT

LACK

CERTAIN

CAPACITIES

FOR

BIOTERRORISM RESPONSE 2 (2003) [hereinafter HOSPITAL PREPAREDNESS], available at

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03924.pdf (noting hospitals' deficiencies in response to
potential large-scale bioterrorism or mass casualty events); Phillip O'Connor, Crisis Could
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and other plans to improve hospitals' ability to fulfill their crucial
first-responder roles in treating victims and protecting the public's
health.
Emergency preparedness remains policymakers' focus, but the
financial aftermath and post-catastrophe return to normal operations
also needs to be considered."
Preparedness measures require
hospitals to create disaster contingency plans, staffing arrangements,
communication
systems,
and
stockpiles of supplies
and
pharmaceuticals. Those efforts increase hospitals' direct-care costs as
well as indirect recordkeeping, compliance, and administrative costs. 2
To the extent that policymakers have considered the issue of hospital
reimbursement for disaster response, they believe that existing
payment approaches would provide adequate and prompt
reimbursement. 3 Hospital administrators, however, anticipate that
unique payment difficulties that would likely follow a major disaster
and already are attempting to identify potential reimbursement
sources before the next disaster. 4

Swamp Hospitals Here; Medical Centers Look to FederalAid To Boost Their Ability To
Deal with Mass Casualties, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 25,2003, at Al ("[H]omeland
security experts view the health care system's inability to quickly handle a surge in patients
as one of the nation's major vulnerabilities in responding to a terrorist attack.").
11. See, e.g., Marc Santora, When a Bug Becomes a Monster, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21,
2005, at 29 (comparing possible avian flu outbreak to smallpox pandemic and noting that
"the most significant problem in 1918, as it would most likely be today, was the sheer
inability of hospitals to deal with a sudden surge in patient demand"); see also Jeffery N.
Rubin, Recurring Pitfalls in Hospital Preparedness and Response, J. HOMELAND
SECURITY, Jan. 2004, http://www.homelandsecurity.org/newjournal/articles/rubin.html
("[M]ost hospitals are still unprepared to effectively manage the results of a major
incident-whether due to mishap, terrorism, natural disaster, or infectious disease
outbreak ....
An incident ... will not only magnify hospital and shortcomings, it will
further hamper effective hospital response and hospital community recovery.").
12. See infra Part I.D (outlining preparedness statutes and model legislation).
13. See, e.g., infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text (describing post-Katrina
Medicaid waiver approach).
14. See, e.g., E-mail from John Casey, Hillcrest Health System, to Elizabeth Weeks,
Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law (Aug. 5, 2005, 09:50 CST)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (requesting assistance "to determine what
types of post event funding will be available, and what type of information will need to be
gathered during (and after) the event [in order to] develop an accounting system"); E-mail
from John Casey, Hillcrest Health System, to Elizabeth Weeks, Associate Professor of
Law, University of Kansas School of Law (Aug. 8, 2005, 09:22 CST) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) (noting dearth of literature "on recovery/returning to
normal operations" and difficulty advising "various organizations on what (and how)
information needs to be captured so that reimbursement will even by [sic] an option,"
concluding, "I applaud your efforts"). See generally Belmont et al., supra note 2, at 539
(listing a comprehensive checklist for emergency preparedness, response, and recovery,
including provisions related to documentation required "for insurance reimbursement,
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A catastrophic event could spiral into a lasting national health
care crisis if hospitals cannot remain operational and capable of
providing routine emergency care after the immediate crisis has
passed. The Article begins by explaining the need for government
intervention to support the health care system following a
catastrophe.
Next, the Article examines previous government
responses to industry-specific financial crises, including post-9/11
legislation designed to shore up the airline and insurance industries
and Medicare laws assuring payment for emergency care costs of
undocumented immigrants.15
Borrowing lessons from those
programs, the Article concludes by proposing the broad outlines of a
federal hospital relief plan.
The proposal has three parts: first, immediate cash assistance to
hospitals to cover operating costs during and immediately after the
crisis. Cash infusion would avert a secondary crisis in access to
medical services by ensuring that facilities remain open and able to
provide not only emergency but also routine care. Second, hospitals
would receive "loans" to sustain ongoing operations as they await
reimbursement from private insurers, government health care
programs, charitable donations, patients, and other sources. That
assistance would be loaned to the extent that providers would be
required to return any government payments for which
reimbursement from other sources is eventually recovered. Finally, a
federal backstop, similar to stop-loss insurance, would cover
hospitals' unusually high uncompensated care costs resulting from the
6
crisis.1
The Article proposes the broad outlines of a government relief
plan because estimating the precise financial requirements and
mechanics of the program would be impossible. Hospitals may be
called to respond to a range of scenarios, depending on the nature
and source of the disaster, geographic area affected, immediate or

subsequent loans, funding from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
payor funding, and/or other emergency funding").
15. See infra Part III (discussing four models for proposed methodology).
16. See Saul Levmore, Coalitionsand Quakes: DisasterRelief and Its Prevention,3 U.

CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 30-32 (1996) (comparing problem of uninsured emergency
care patients as argument in favor of ex ante approach); Sara Rosenbaum, New Directions
for Health Insurance Design: Implications for Public Health Policy and Practice, 31 J.L.

MED. & ETHICS 94, 95 (2003) ("How to assure the availability of accessible, timely and
quality medical care in the face of terrorism and other public health emergencies
represents an enormous public health challenge."). See generally VICTOR R. FUCHS, WHO
SHALL LIVE? HEALTH, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIAL CHOICE 13-14 (expanded ed. 1998)

(discussing access-to-care problems by various segments of society).
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sustained impact, and other factors.17 The variability in potential
disaster scenarios, however, does not counsel in favor of leaving the
entire issue to ex post legislation. An unfortunate lesson of Katrina is
the importance of immediate, unhesitating response to prevent the
initial crisis from worsening into a much broader, more severe
catastrophe. 18 Accordingly, an essential feature of the proposal is ex
ante assurance of government support for the Nation's health care
providers. 9
I. DEFINING THE PROBLEM

To make the case for federal hospital disaster relief, the Article
first explains why hospitals would likely face financial strain under a
large-scale disaster."z In defining the problem and explaining the
need for government intervention, this Part begins with a broad
overview of characteristic features of hospital financing. Next, the
Part explains the pressures that hospital emergency departments face
17. See infra Part II.A (comparing financial impact of various recent catastrophes).
18. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AGENCY: FACTORS FOR FUTURE SUCCESS AND ISSUES To CONSIDER

ORGANIZATIONAL PLACEMENT 2 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d06746t.pdf (describing FEMA's performance during Hurricane Katrina and
raising questions regarding the Agency's organizational placement); Letter from David M.
Walker, Comptroller Gen., to Thomas Davis, Chairman, Select Bipartisan Comm. To
Investigate the Preparation for & Response to Hurricane Katrina (Feb. 1, 2006)
[hereinafter Walker Letter], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06365r.pdf
(suggesting need for clear, decisive leadership, in single individual accountable to the
President); Pam Fessler, Fragmented Government Slowed Katrina Response (National
Public Radio Broadcast Feb. 1, 2006), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyld=5183478 (reporting on Comptroller Walker's GAO report).
19. For further justification for the ex ante approach, see infra Part IV.D (discussing
FOR

TRIA

analogy).

Compare

LLOYD

DIXON

&

RACHEL

KAGANOFF

STERN,

9/11 ATTACKS xxxii (2004) (discussing merits of
ex ante, ex post, or combined approach and noting that "[sletting up government
compensation programs in advance of a terrorist attack may encourage individuals and
firms to determine how they will cover losses that would not be covered by government
programs") with Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Defy Terrorist,Not Nature, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28,
2005, at A17 ("Sometimes a little moral hazard is a good thing. After Sept. 11, we didn't
want business and homeowners to reorganize their lives around the threat of terrorism.").
See also Posting of Saul Levmore to The Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. Faculty Blog,
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2006/01/katrina_a_cash_.html#more (Jan. 26, 2006
09:25 CST) (suggesting that post-disaster aid allocation "is likely to be more error prone,
politically difficult, and even corrupt"). See generally George L. Priest, The Government,
the Market, and the Problem of Catastrophic Loss, 12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 219, 219
(1996) ("Virtually all approaches to the problem of catastrophic loss conclude that the
magnitude and character of such losses compels some form of government solution,
whether in the form of ex post disaster assistance or ex ante regulation to reduce exposure
to the loss.").
20. See infra Part 1.A.
COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES FROM THE
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under normal operating conditions.2 1 The description of the complex
Medicare reimbursement methodology provides an illustration of the
existing approach to hospital reimbursement and suggests the need
for a less cumbersome, more streamlined approach following a
catastrophe. 22
Finally, the Part describes several post-9/11
preparedness laws that expand health care providers' responsibilities
in disaster response, further burdening the Nation's already strained
health care infrastructure.2 3
A.

Featuresof Hospital Financing

The increased demand for medical care resulting from a
catastrophic event seemingly would be a boon to health care
providers, at least to the extent that patients have insurance coverage
and insurers honor the claims. Hospitals typically provide medical
care to patients up front and seek payment from third-party payers
after the fact. 24 Higher demand for services should mean higher
collections. But due to a combination of factors discussed below,
including existing financial strain on hospital emergency departments,
higher-than-normal levels of uninsured patients, and claimssubmission challenges, a major disaster is more likely to produce
financial liabilities than lucrative revenue streams for hospitals.
In the current health care climate of declining reimbursement
and rising costs, many hospitals already teeter on the brink of
insolvency.25 According to one report, approximately thirty percent
21. See infra Part I.B.
22. See infra Part I.C.
23. See infra Part I.D.
24.

See DAVID DRANOVE, THE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN HEALTH

CARE 31-32 (2000) (describing third-party payment structure and noting that "[n]o one
should expect patients to consider the cost of medical care when insurance is paying for
it," and that they "will consent to almost any treatment recommendation"); SHERMAN
FOLLAND ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE 13 (2001) (noting

that over eighty percent of health care payments are from third-party payers); FUCHS,
supra note 16, at 81 (discussing reasons for expensive hospital care, including "[o]nly a
small fraction ... is paid for directly by patients; the bulk comes from so-called third
parties, of which the government is the most important, picking up over half the total
bill"); JOSEPH NEWHOUSE, PRICING THE PRICELESS 9-13 (2002) (describing patient

control over provider choice and minimal insurer control over price); Belmont et al., supra
note 2, at 547 ("The majority of income for most healthcare institutions comes from
patient insurance reimbursement."); Thomas Bodenheimer & Kevin Grumbach, Paying
for Health Care, 272 JAMA 631, 635-36 & fig.2 (1994) (describing third-party payment

structure).
25. See, e.g., James J. Unland, Can Community Hospitals Survive Without Large Scale
Health Reform? J. HEALTH CARE FIN., Spring 2004, at 49, 49 (noting community hospital

emergency services remain "too often, the last line of defense for people who are
uninsured or underinsured"); see also Seth Borenstein, GAO Calls U.S. Unready in Event
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of hospitals in the United States operate in the red, with many more
close to the edge of insolvency. 6 Hospital emergency rooms, in
particular, are squeezed by declining reimbursement and increased
utilization by uninsured patients seeking nonemergency care and
managed care enrollees circumventing gatekeepers.27 Federal law
requires hospitals to provide emergency care to patients regardless of
ability to pay.28 Health care consumers, even those with insurance,
but particularly the uninsured, often rely on emergency rooms for
primary care.2 9 As a result, emergency departments tend to be losing
cost centers.30 Hospitals typically employ a strategy of cost-shifting to
of SARS Outbreak, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Cal.), May 9, 2003, at 4 (quoting GAO health
care director's observation that "we're way behind" in terms of preparedness and

observing that "[e]mergency rooms are now near the breaking point"); Know When To
Visit ER, and When Not To, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 22, 2004, at AV2, available at 2004
WLNR 2852730 (discussing hospital overcrowding and long waits); O'Connor, supra note
10 (quoting homeland security expert as saying, "If you're the CEO of a hospital, you're
just struggling to keep your doors open"); Joe Stinebaker, Report Urges Overhaul of
Emergency Medicine; County Facing Healthcare "Collapse," HOUSTON CHRON., June 29,

2004, at 1 (quoting county emergency medical care report that "already overburdened
emergency system is likely to continue to decay to the point of collapse without corrective
action in the near term"); Tracy Wheeler, Bioterror Front Lines Not Funded, BEACON J.
(Akron, Ohio), Apr. 23, 2003, at B1 (quoting emergency room physician's observations
that emergency rooms "don't have the capacity to deal with day-to-day challenges ...so
how are they going to be ready for a biological attack?").
26. AM. HoSP. ASS'N, HOSPITAL PREPAREDNESS FOR MASS CASUALTIES, FINAL
REPORT 10 (2000); see also AM. HOSP. ASS'N, THE FRAGILE STATE OF HOSPITAL

FINANCES 2, http://www.ahapolicyforum.org/ahapolicyforum/resources/content/05fragile
hosps.pdf (last visited November 13, 2006) (noting that 60% of hospitals lose money on
patient-care costs and 30% lose money overall); MARSHA REGENSTEIN & JENNIFER
HUANG, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., REPORT NO. 7329, STRESSES TO THE SAFETY NET:

THE PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE 7 & nn.22-23 (2005), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/
upload/Stresses-to-the-Safety-Net.pdf [hereinafter KAISER REPORT 7329] (describing
public hospital safety net as "intact but endangered" and "fragile yet resilient").
27. See FOLLAND ET AL., supra note 24, at 408-09 (noting "growth of managed care
and the introduction of reimbursement methods that discourage inpatient care and long
lengths of stay"); KAISER REPORT 7329, supra note 26, at 14 (documenting "effects of
increasingly lower payments for underinsured patients or patients whose coverage
provides underpayment for care" and hospitals providing care to "extremely large
numbers of uninsured patients").
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000 & Supp. II 2003); see infra Part I.B (describing
EMTALA requirements).
29. See Rubin, supra note 11, at n.3 (citing S.M. Schneider et al., Emergency
Department Crowding: A Point in Time, 42 ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 167-72
EMTALA
(2003)); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMERGENCY CARE:
IMPLEMENTATION & ENFORCEMENT ISSUES 9 & nn.15-16 (2001) [hereinafter EMTALA
IMPLEMENTATION & ENFORCEMENT ISSUES], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/

d01747.pdf ("[Miany emergency department visits are for primary care services and
treatment of nonurgent conditions.").

30. See Bryan Ford, The Uncertain Case for Market Pricing of Health Insurance, 74
B.U. L. REV. 109, 130 (1994) ("Those without health insurance are often turned away by
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balance out revenue-losing departments against revenue-generating
Similarly, the cost of caring for uninsured or
departments.
underinsured patients is balanced out against increased charges31 to
private insurers and, to the extent allowable, government payers. If
uncompensated or under-reimbursed costs cannot be balanced or
shifted, hospitals could face insolvency.32
In addition, hospitals face substantial administrative burdens

complying with complex reimbursement systems from multiple
payment sources, insurers, and government programs. For Medicare
reimbursement alone, hospitals must comply with over 130,000 pages
of regulations. A recent study concluded that for every hour of
patient care, hospitals spend one-half hour completing paperwork.33
The task of collecting payment for the exceedingly high number of

claims likely to result from a terrorist attack, natural disaster, or other
public health emergency under existing payment methodologies
would severely strain hospital billing departments. In addition, the
unprecedented volume and novelty of claims would likely cause
payment delays and denials, requiring hospitals to carry

health care providers or restricted to receiving inadequate and expensive care in
emergency rooms."); Phil Galewitz & Mary Ellen Klas, The State of Health Insurance:
How Did It Get This Bad?, PALM BEACH POST, Oct. 12, 2003, at 14A, available at 2003
WLNR 2803326 ("People who don't have insurance often wait until they have an
emergency to seek care and then rely on hospital emergency rooms. This causes a
financial drain on hospitals, which raise rates for paying patients.").
31. See DRANOVE, supra note 24, at 25 ("The idea that hospitals could raise prices to
their privately insured patients to generate the revenues necessary to pursue their
[nonprofit] mission became known as 'cost-shifting.' "); FOLLAND ET AL., supra note 24, at

406-08 (discussing uncompensated care costs and third-party payer discounts being shifted
to other patients); Ray Carter, Lower Reimbursement Rates Lead to More Cost-Shifting, J.
REC. (Okla. City, Okla.), July 30, 2003, at 1 (describing practice of shifting uninsured
patient care costs to increased insured patients' charges; noting trend of declining
reimbursement).
32. See Ruth E. Bergognen and Tyler J. Curiel, After the Storm-Health Care
Infrastructure in Post-Katrina New Orleans, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1549, 1550 (2006)
(quoting hospital CEO in response to question regarding government relief: "We have
asked and asked [authorities] for fair compensation, and perhaps we will get it eventually,
but we cannot go on indefinitely providing uncompensated care.").
33. See David Gratzer, Health of the Union, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2006, at A10 (citing
recent American Hospital Association study); see also AM. HOSP. ASS'N, CRACKS INTHE
FOUNDATION: AVERTING A CRISIS IN HOSPITALS 7 (2002), http://www.aha.org/aha/
content/2002/pdf/cracksreprint08-02.pdf [hereinafter CRACKS IN THE FOUNDATION]
(noting that every hour of emergency department care requires "one hour of
preparation"). Medicare hospitals must comply with at least five distinct reimbursement
methodologies, not to mention other payers' billing requirements. See infra Part I.C
(describing Medicare payment system).
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unreimbursed costs for extended periods of time. Hospitals may be
unable to float those losses on typically thin operating margins.34

Consumers require convenient physical access to health care
providers. For emergency care, access and proximity are even more
important because the urgency of the patient's condition demands

immediate attention and minimal travel time.

Recent corporate

reorganization trends have resulted in fewer local, independent
hospitals and increasing numbers of large corporate conglomerates.35
But even national conglomerates need local markets for their hospital

business.36 If a community hospital closes, patients are constrained to

consider geographic proximity in choosing another hospital, whereas
if a hometown airline, insurance company, or car manufacturer goes
out of business, consumers may replace that local supplier on a
national market. For health care, the relevant market is necessarily
local, not national.37 If patients cannot readily receive medical care
close to home, they may forego treatment, exacerbating their
underlying medical conditions.
Therefore, maintaining a local
infrastructure of easily accessible health care providers should be a
central objective of a government relief program.3 8

34. See Rosenbaum et al., supra note 1, at 65-66 (discussing potential conflicts
between insurance and public health and noting that certain services "may be either
completely excluded or covered only with higher cost-sharing or the prior approval of the
insurer"); cf. Belmont et al., supra note 2, at 547-54 (describing cash flow, billing, and
patient-coverage challenges during emergencies and offering practical suggestions).
35. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE

430-36 (1982) (discussing hospital consolidation trend and rise of for-profit operations).
36. One approach to the locality problem is certificate of need, or "CON," laws,
which were introduced in the 1940s to address a recognized shortage and misdistribution
of hospitals. See MARK A. HALL ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW & ETHICS 1082-83 (6th ed.

2003) (discussing history of CON regulation). Before opening a new facility, CON laws
require a showing of community need, "financial feasibility, and other criteria." Id; see
also Clark Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Services by "Certificate of
Need," 59 VA. L. REV. 1143, 1153 (1973) (critiquing CON regulation of health care
markets).
37. See FOLLAND ET AL., supra note 24, at 409 (discussing problem of rural hospital
closings and challenges of maintaining access for rural populations); cf. FUCHS, supra note
16, at 87 (noting rural areas' lack of nonprofits but markets for small, proprietary
hospitals); STARR, supra note 35, at 420-49 (discussing decline in local control of health

care delivery).
38. Kalb & Murr, supra note 4, at 66 (quoting LSU hospital executive as saying,
"[w]e're a bus wreck or a plane crash away from another catastrophe"); cf KAISER
REPORT 7387, supra note 4, at 2-3 (discussing hospital closures in New Orleans and
overflow demand in localities such as Houston); id. at 8-9 (proposing federal grants to
repair health care infrastructure).
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Emergency Medical Care Burden
Even before certain post-9/11 legislation increased the burden on

hospital "first responder" roles,39 emergency departments struggled
with high patient demand and financial strain under existing laws. In
particular, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
("EMTALA") imposes a duty to provide treatment, with no promise
of payment.4" EMTALA was enacted in 1985 in response to reports

of widespread "patient-dumping," or denying treatment to patients
needing emergency services, especially indigent and uninsured
patients.41
Rather than bear the considerable cost of treating
uninsured or indigent patients, some hospitals immediately diverted

them, without even a cursory medical examination, to public or
charity hospitals that provide free care.42 Patients were transferred in
unstable, even life-threatening, conditions.4 3
Under EMTALA, Medicare-participating hospitals are required
to provide appropriate, nondiscriminatory medical screenings to all
individuals presenting with emergency medical conditions, without
regard to the patients' ability to pay, insurance status, or Medicare
eligibility.44
Specifically, hospitals must screen "any individual
39. See infra Part I.D.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
41. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272,
100 Stat. 164 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000 & Supp. III 2003)); H.R.
REP. No. 99-241, pt. 3, at 27 (1986) (discussing "increasing number of reports" of hospitals
refusing to provide treatment or transferring patients in unstable conditions); see also
Maria O'Brien Hylton, The Economics and Politics of Emergency Health Care for the
Poor: The Patient Dumping Dilemma, 1992 BYU L. REV. 971, 1013 (noting dumping of
underinsured, including patients discharged when insurance runs out and AIDS patients);
Bleys W. Rose, Emergency Rooms Get FederalRelief- Relaxation of 1986 Rules Intended
To Help Hospitals Deal with Financial Burden of Uninsured May Cut Losses, PRESS
DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, Cal.), Nov. 3, 2003, at D1 (noting EMTALA enactment "in
response to allegations, chiefly from public hospitals, that for-profit facilities were
'dumping' uninsured patients on their emergency rooms").
42. See EMTALA IMPLEMENTATION & ENFORCEMENT ISSUES, supra note 29, at 1;
Robert Schiff et al., Transfers to a Public Hospital, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 552, 552 (1986)
(analyzing transfer of patients in Chicago area and concluding transfers were made for
economic reasons).
43. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Overcrowding Crisis in Our Nation's Emergency
Departments: Is Our Safety Net Unraveling?, 114 PEDIATRICS 878, 879 (2004) [hereinafter
Overcrowding Crisis] (citing EMTALA legislative history). Various factors, including
incentives built into the new Medicare Inpatient Prospective Payment System ("IPPS"),
caused increased patient-dumping. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-241, pt. 3, at 27 (1986) (noting
impact of new payment system); see infra Part I.C (describing Medicare payment
methodology).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1) (2000); see Medicare Program; Clarifying Policies
Related to the Responsibilities of Medicare-Participating Hospitals in Treating Individuals
with Emergency Medical Conditions, 68 Fed. Reg. 53,222, 53,222 (Sept. 9, 2003) (to be
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regardless of diagnosis (e.g., labor, AIDS), financial status (e.g.,
uninsured, Medicaid), race, color, national origin (e.g., Hispanic or
Native American surnames), handicap, etc."45 EMTALA defines an
"appropriate" screening examination as one reasonably calculated to
determine whether an emergency medical condition exists.46 The
hospital must provide screening and stabilizing treatment in a
nondiscriminatory manner, meaning that services must be the same as
the hospital would provide to any patient, "within the capability of
the hospital's emergency department, including ancillary services
routinely available to the emergency department."4 7 EMTALA does
not require hospitals to provide more or different care than they
otherwise would, but they cannot provide less. Consistent with
EMTALA's antidiscrimination mandate, implementing regulations
expressly prohibit hospitals from delaying screening or stabilization
services to inquire about payment method or insurance status. 48 After
screening a patient, the hospital must provide stabilizing treatment or
an appropriate transfer to another facility. 49 Transfer is permitted if

codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 413, 482, 489) (summarizing EMTALA requirements); Sara
Rosenbaum & Brian Kamoie, Finding a Way Through the Hospital Door: The Role of
EMTALA in Public Health Emergencies, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 590, 590 (2003)
("EMTALA imposes on all Medicare-participating hospitals a singular, legally
enforceable duty of care, entitling all individuals who seek care at hospital emergency
departments to an appropriate (i.e., nondiscriminatory) examination and to either
stabilizing treatment or a medically appropriate transfer if an emergency medical
condition is identified.").
45. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STATE OPERATIONS MANUAL,
APPENDIX
V-INTERPRETIVE
GUIDELINES-RESPONSIBILITIES
OF
MEDICARE

PARTICIPATING HOSPITALS IN EMERGENCY CASES, pt. II, tag A406 (2004), http://
cms.hhs.gov/manuals/Downloads/soml07ap-v-emerg.pdf
[hereinafter INTERPRETIVE
GUIDELINES]; see Tiana Mayere Lee, An EMTALA Primer: The Impact of Changes in

the Emergency Medicine Landscape on EMTALA Compliance and Enforcement, 13
ANNALS HEALTH L. 145, 151 (2004).
46. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(a) (2005); see Rosenbaum & Kamoie, supra note 44, at 592
(summarizing "appropriate medical screening" requirements).
47. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(a); see INTERPRETIVE GUIDELINES, supra note 45, at pt. II, tag
A400 (suggesting conditions, such as HIV, which might subject patients to discriminatory
treatment).
48. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(c)(3); INTERPRETIVE GUIDELINES, supra note 45, at pt. II, tag
A400. But see infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text (summarizing EMTALA
amendments).
49. Rosenbaum & Kamoie, supra note 44, at 590 (regarding medically appropriate
transfers); Joan M. Stieber & Linda J. Spar, EMTALA in the '90s-Enforcement
Challenges, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 57, 59-60 (1998) (noting that EMTALA "requires
hospitals to do three basic things": screening examination, stabilizing treatment, and
medically appropriate transfer).
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the benefits of the transfer outweigh the risks or if the patient makes
an informed written request for transfer."
EMTALA imposes significant financial burdens on hospitals and

physicians. Providing the statutorily required screening, treatment,
and transfers involves considerable direct costs in terms of
professional services and medical supplies. In addition, the statute
imposes significant liability, management, and administrative burdens
on hospitals.5 1 EMTALA requires hospitals to maintain on-call lists
of physicians, including specialists, available to respond to
emergencies on a twenty-four-hour basis. 5 Both the hospital and
50. Medicare Program; Clarifying Policies Related to the Responsibilities of
Medicare-Participating Hospitals in Treating Individuals with Emergency Medical
Conditions, 68 Fed. Reg. 53,222, 53,223 (Sept. 9, 2003) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 413,
482, 489) (preamble to final rule amending EMTALA regulations).
51. Rosenbaum & Kamoie, supra note 44, at 590 (discussing costs); Overcrowding
Crisis, supra note 43, at 879 (suggesting that "[n]ationwide, EMTALA requirements are
estimated to cost emergency care professionals more than $425 million annually" and that
"direct expense for emergency physician services provided to uninsured patients
approximated $1 billion" in 1998); id. at 883 (urging that "[e]xcessive clinical demands on
an already saturated [emergency department] often lead to medical errors and poor
outcomes" and that overcrowding through increased capacity has led to "increased
utilization of hallways and other suboptimal, poorly equipped locations as patient
treatment areas, challenging patient comfort, care satisfaction, and confidentiality and
adding additional risk for error").
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(1)(I)(iii) (2000) (requiring hospitals "to maintain a list
of physicians who are on call for duty after the initial examination to provide treatment
necessary to stabilize an individual with an emergency medical condition"). The on-call
requirement creates tension between hospital management, staff, and physicians. See, e.g.,
Letter from John Horty, Horty, Springer & Mattern, P.C., to Tommy G. Thompson, Sec'y
of Health & Human Servs. (Apr. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Horty Springer Letter], available
at http://www.hortyspringer.com/Data/Misc/HSM-EMTALAComments.htm (comments
to proposed rule, noting that EMTALA "pits physicians against hospitals" and imposes
"unreasonably burdensome on-call requirement"). Physicians object to on-call duty
because, like hospitals, they may not receive compensation for providing emergency care.
The management struggle arises, in part, because EMTALA does not require physicians
to accept call duties but requires hospitals to maintain on-call lists, leaving the
enforcement burden on hospitals. See Medicare Program; Clarifying Policies Related to
the Responsibilities of Medicare-Participating Hospitals in Treating Individuals with
Emergency Medical Conditions, 68 Fed. Reg. at 53,251 (summarizing comments and
declining to adopt proposed on-call changes); Horty Springer Letter, supra (proposing
amendment requiring Medicare-participating physicians to take call). To secure an
adequate roster of physicians and specialists, hospitals employ various strategies, including
conditioning medical staff privileges on physicians' agreeing to take call or paying them
for on-call coverage. Those strategies further strain hospitals' limited resources. See
Medicare Program; Clarifying Policies Related to the Responsibilities of MedicareParticipating Hospitals in Treating Individuals with Emergency Medical Conditions, 68
Fed. Reg. at 53,251 (discussing burdens on hospitals, including physician compensation for
call coverage); id. at 53,225 (regarding trend of specialty physicians, severing staff
privileges, resulting in hospitals having no specialty physician coverage); Rosenbaum &
Kamoie, supra note 44, at 590 (noting that EMTALA is "major contributor to hospital
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physician face sanctions up to $50,000 per EMTALA violation if they
fail to provide the required screening and stabilization or, for
physicians, if they fail to respond to call. 3 In addition, the statute
provides a private cause of action to patients injured by EMTALA
violations. 4 One recent source estimated that EMTALA costs health
care providers more than $425 million annually. In 1998, total direct
expense for emergency physician services provided to uninsured
patients approached $1 billion, and hospital facility costs exceeded $2
billion. 5 Responding to emergency calls also distracts and takes time
away from physicians' own patients.
Health care providers may be left holding the bag for
uncompensated care if third-party payers retrospectively deny
payment for enrollees on the grounds that emergency treatment was
not medically necessary. 6 Even when reimbursement comes, it may
be inadequate to cover the costs of care. Hospitals complain that the
EMTALA burden, among other pressures, place them in the red and
force unavoidable emergency room closures.57 Some commentators
suggest that EMTALA operates as an "unfunded mandate" and
advocate government subsidies or grants to cover the costs of
providing emergency care."
emergency department overcrowding and cost"); Horty Springer Letter, supra (describing
pressure on hospitals to compensate physicians for call coverage).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1) (2000) (providing sanctions up to $50,000 on hospital
and physician for negligently violating EMTALA requirements).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2) (2000) (providing patients' cause of action for
EMTALA noncompliance).
55. See Overcrowding Crisis, supra note 43, at 879; see also Lee, supra note 45, at 155
(discussing problem of managed care retrospective denial of claims for emergency medical
treatment); Horty Springer Letter, supra note 52 (describing same concern); Am. Coll. of
Emergency Physicians, Costs of Emergency Care, http://www.acep.org/webportal/Patients
Consumers/critissues/CostsofEmergencyCare/default.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2006)
(citing American Medical Association May 2003 study finding that emergency physicians
lost average $138,000 revenue annually providing EMTALA care). Under most thirdparty compensation arrangements, hospitals and physicians each receive reimbursement
for services provided to emergency room patients.
56. See Lee, supra note 45, at 155; see also EMTALA IMPLEMENTATION &
ENFORCEMENT ISSUES, supra note 29, at 12 (citing American Hospital Association report
that uncompensated care represented approximately 6.2% of total hospital expenses in
1999); id. at 9 (noting that emergency department visits rose from 90.5 million to 94.8
million, or about 5%, from 1994 to 1998).
57. See Rubin, supra note 11, at n.1 (citing Joseph A. Barbera et al., Ambulances to
Nowhere: America's CriticalShortfall in Medical Preparednessfor CatastrophicTerrorism,
J.HOMELAND SECURITY (Mar. 2002)); see also CRACKS IN THE FOUNDATION, supra
note 33, at 4 (suggesting that 62% of hospitals and 79% of urban emergency departments
are "at" or "over" capacity and numbers continue to rise).
58. See Lee, supra note 45, at 166 (noting that hospital industry is facing financial
crisis); id. at 170 (proposing increase in disproportionate share hospital ("DSH") subsidy
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Recent regulatory amendments mitigate some of the EMTALA
burdens, including on-call coverage, prior authorization, and other
requirements. 9
Those amendments relieve some EMTALA
compliance challenges, but preserve the core requirement to provide
screening, stabilization, and appropriate transfer to any patient who
requests emergency services regardless of payment or insurance
status. EMTALA and other financial pressures place hospital
emergency departments in dire straits even before enlisted as first
responders for a major terrorist strike or natural disaster.6" Post-9/11

and additional federal subsidy to fund EMTALA mandate); Overcrowding Crisis, supra
note 43, at 879 ("EMTALA poses a profound economic challenge for hospitals and
emergency care professionals, because this mandate for care does not carry with it a
mandate for reimbursement for services rendered."); see also STARR, supra note 35, at 436
(quoting hospital representative regarding patient who died one day after transfer:
"These freebies [EMTALA services] cost $2000 or $3000 a day. Who's going to pay for
them?").
59. Regulators suggest that the amendments clarify hospitals' responsibilities under
EMTALA and improve quality and access to care. Other clarifications relate to
EMTALA's restriction on inquiring about patients' insurance status. See Medicare
Program; Clarifying Policies Related to the Responsibilities of Medicare-Participating
Hospitals in treating Individuals With Emergency Medical Conditions, 68 Fed. Reg.
53,222, 53,224 (Sept. 9, 2003) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 413, 482, 489) (background
to proposed EMTALA amendments); Press Release, Ctr. for Medicare and Medicaid
Servs., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Medicare Announces Final Rule on
Hospital Responsibilities to Patients Seeking Treatment for Emergency Conditions (Aug.
29, 2003), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?counter=837
(quoting
CMS Administrator: "The rule will improve people's access to emergency care by
encouraging physicians to be on call and by permitting hospitals to take the most effective
steps for getting emergency treatment for patients who need it."). In response to
proposed amendments, hospitals and other constituents pointed out that patients may be
unaware that insurers or hospitals will charge them for emergency room treatment. As
those costs can be substantial, the commenters urged that patients have a right to know
about the possibility of charges before receiving treatment. See Medicare Program;
Clarifying Policies Related to the Responsibilities of Medicare-Participating Hospitals in
Treating Individuals with Emergency Medical Conditions, 68 Fed. Reg. at 53,227; see also
id. at 53,225-27 (codified at 42 C.F.R. §489.24(d)(4) (2005)) (regarding prior
authorization provisions). The final rules affirm that a hospital cannot delay treatment to
inquire about a patient's ability to pay or to seek prior authorization. See 42 C.F.R.
§ 489.24(d)(4) (2005). But they may follow reasonable registration processes, including
asking whether a patient is insured, as long as the inquiry does not "delay screening" or
"unduly discourage" individuals from receiving emergency medical treatment. See id.
§ 489.24(d)(4)(i)-(ii) (regarding treatment or examination delay to inquire about payment
or insurance status); id. § 489.24(d)(4)(iv).
60. See Ambulances Find Overwhelmed ERs "at Breaking Point," WALL ST. J., June
15, 2006, at D6 (describing Institute of Medicine study, noting that the "nationwide crisis
comes from just day-to-day emergencies. Emergency rooms are far from ready to handle
the mass casualties that a bird-flu epidemic or terrorist strike would bring."); Inst. of Med.
of the Nat'l Acad., The Future of Emergency Care in the United States,
http://www.iom.edu/?ID=16107 (last visited Nov. 13, 2006) (reporting results of three
related studies).
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homeland security legislation helped to equip hospitals to respond to
victims' medical needs but did little to help them recover payment
and resume normal operations after the crisis has passed.
C.

Reimbursement for Emergency Care

The September 11, 2001, attacks and September 2005 Katrina
flooding tested the Nation's emergency response capabilities,
revealing the need for substantial improvements.
Katrina in
particular showed that, especially for health care providers, remaining
challenges extend beyond responding to the initial crisis to resuming
normal operations after the episode. The existing approach to
hospital reimbursement is technical, time consuming, and resourceintensive. The policy choices and competing concerns that underlie
the design of those payment systems, such as ensuring adequate
payment without creating moral hazard or perverse incentives for
unnecessary care, lose salience under disaster scenarios. 61 Costcontainment and efficiency concerns must yield to the exigencies of
crisis response. Accordingly, the disaster response payment approach
should emphasize prompt, adequate financial support with minimal
administrative costs.6"
The following description of the Medicare program exemplifies
the complexity typical of hospital reimbursement. Health insurers
use a broad array of strategies and methodologies to pay hospitals for
medical care provided to subscribers. An exhaustive description of
the various payment arrangements exceeds the scope and purpose of

61. See David M. Frankford, The Medicare DRGs: Efficiency and Organizational
Rationality, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 273, 293-96 (1993) (disputing purported efficiency and
cost-containment improvements under Medicare DRG system); Elizabeth A. Weeks,
Gauging the Cost of Loopholes: Health Care Pricingand Medicare Regulation in the PostEnron Era, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1215, 1267-68 & n.255 (2005) (describing intended
and unintended incentives created by Medicare IPPS methodology); see also Deborah
Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, in EMBRACING RISK:
THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 52, 63-67 (Tom Baker

& Jonathan Simon eds., 2002) (noting that insurance coverage may stimulate increased
provision of services); id. at 69 (discussing Medicare coverage for home health services, as
an example: within five years, "[tihe number of Medicare-certified agencies almost
doubled," and within ten years, "home health care had become the new 'cost crisis' in
health"). Compare Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 24, at 637 (discussing difficulty
controlling costs in third-party payment arrangement because both patients and providers
are shielded from direct costs), with Malcom Gladwell, The Moral-Hazard Myth, NEW
YORKER, Aug. 29, 2005, at 44 (disputing moral hazard as cause of health care crisis).
62. See DIXON & STERN, supra note 19, at xxi-xxii (describing post-9/11 other

compensation schemes and importance of "economic efficiency," meaning "making sure
that benefits are distributed with low administrative and other transaction costs").
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Understanding the challenges hospitals would face

receiving timely, adequate reimbursement following a mass casualty
or other demand surge, under even a single payment system, such as
Medicare, amply demonstrates the need for an alternative approach.
Medicare is a particularly relevant example because virtually all full-

service hospitals accept Medicare patients. Government health care
program payments comprise a substantial portion of most hospitals'
total revenue. 64 In addition, the EMTALA duty is tied to Medicareprogram participation.6 5

1. Inpatient Services
Under Medicare, hospital emergency room services may be
considered "Part A" services and reimbursed under the Inpatient

Prospective Payment System ("IPPS"). 66 Under IPPS, hospitals
receive predetermined, fixed payments for Medicare patients, based
on the diagnosis, or "diagnosis related group" ("DRG") assigned at

discharge. 67 The DRG "bundled" payment accounts for all hospital
services and supplies provided during the patient's stay, including but
not limited to room and board, nursing and other health services,
laboratory and diagnostic. testing, operating room expenses, and
medications.6 8 Also, outpatient diagnostic services furnished to
patients during the three days preceding the hospital admission are

included in the DRG payment for the inpatient stay.69

63. See generally KAISER REPORT 7329, supra note 26, at 4-6 (describing typical
public hospital payer mix for inpatient and outpatient services).
64. The U.S. government is the single largest purchaser of health care services in the
world. See, e.g., Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
Statements for the Record to the House Budget Committee Health Care Task Force,
Medicare Program: Improper Payments & Fraud. (July 12, 2000), http://www.oig.hhs.gov/
reading/testimony/2000/00712fin.htm (describing Health Care Financing Administration
as the largest health care purchaser in the world); see also Thomas R. McLean, Crossing
the Quality Chasm: Autonomous Physician Extenders Will Necessitate a Shift to Enterprise
Liability Coveragefor Health Care Delivery, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 239, 255 (2002) (Federal
Government is the largest purchaser of health care services).
65. See supra Part I.B (describing EMTALA requirements).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh (2000 & Supp. III 2003); 42 C.F.R.
§ 412.60 (2005).
67. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1395hh; 42 C.F.R. § 412.60. See generally Inpatient Hospital
PPS, 1 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
4202-4299 (2006) (explaining IPPS
methodology).
68. HALL ET AL., supra note 36, at 1009 (defining DRGs).
69. 42 U.S.C. §8 1302, 1395hh; 42 C.F.R. § 412.2(c)(5); see Services Subject to PPS, 1
Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
4210 (Mar. 28, 2006) (discussing three-day, or
seventy-two-hour payment rule).
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An "inpatient," for purposes of IPPS, is a patient formally
admitted to the hospital with the expectation of occupying an
inpatient bed and remaining at least overnight, even if the patient is
later discharged or transferred to another hospital and does not
actually occupy an inpatient bed.7 ° Any part of a day, including the
admission day, counts as a full day.71 If a patient is admitted and dies,
or is discharged on the same day, the day counts as an inpatient day.72
If a patient is transferred to another hospital, the transferee hospital
receives the DRG payment, while the transferring hospital is paid a
per diem rate for each day of the patient's stay.73

2. Outpatient Services
Some emergency services provided to victims of a terrorist attack
or natural disaster might be considered outpatient, or "Part B,"
services.74 Part B services are reimbursed under the Medicare
Outpatient Prospective Payment System ("OPPS").75 OPPS has
distinct fixed payment rates from IPPS, based on "ambulatory

70. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., PUBL'N No. 100-02, MEDICARE BENEFIT POLICY MANUAL ch. 1, § 10.1 & ch. 3,

§ 20.1.3, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/Manuals/IOM/list.asp (follow "100-02" hyperlink) (last
visited Nov. 26, 2006) [hereinafter MEDICARE BENEFIT POLICY MANUAL] (providing
subregulatory interpretive guidance on Medicare regulations and policies); see Definition
of "Inpatient," 1 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) $ 1209 (May 24, 2005).
71. see Definition of "Inpatient," supra note 70.
72. Id.
73. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1395hh; 42 C.F.R. § 412.4; see Discharges and Transfers, I
Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 4235 (Oct. 3, 2006) (explaining distinction between
discharges and transfers and transfer payment methodology). Normally, Medicare will not
pay for services at nonparticipating hospitals. To participate in the Medicare program, a
hospital must sign a participation agreement and comply with Medicare conditions of
participation ("COPs") and other regulations. But Medicare will pay for emergency
services provided to Medicare beneficiaries at nonparticipating hospitals if the services
otherwise would be covered by Medicare and the nonparticipating hospital signs a special
payment agreement. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(d)(1) (2000); 42 C.F.R. § 424.103 (2005)
(listing conditions for payment for emergency services by nonparticipating hospitals and
terms of election to claim payment); see Emergency Inpatient Services in Nonparticipating
Hospitals, 1 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) $ 1239 (May 9, 2006) (summarizing
same). To qualify for payment, the hospital must be the most accessible hospital available
equipped to furnish services that the patient requires. Services at the nonparticipating
hospital are covered only during the period of time the patient could not be safely
discharged or transferred to a Medicare-participating hospital. For purposes of the special
payment rule, "emergency services" are inpatient services necessary to prevent death or
serious impairment of the health of the patient. 42 C.F.R. § 424.103(a)(4); see Emergency
Inpatient Services in NonparticipatingHospitals,supra.
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1395hh; 42 C.F.R. § 424.103.
75. Ambulatory Payment ClassificationSystem, 1 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
4310 (Nov. 22, 2005).
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payment categories" ("APCs"), instead of DRGs.76 APCs are
groupings of various Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System
("HCPCS") or International Classification of Diseases ("ICD-9CM") codes.
Hospital payment rates and patient coinsurance
amounts are based on the APC to which the codes are assigned.77 An
emergency room patient who receives same-day services, such as
sutures to close a wound or a cast to stabilize a broken bone, is billed
as an outpatient, using the appropriate HCPCS or ICD-9-CM code,
which is then keyed to the appropriate APC to determine the
payment amount.78 OPPS also applies to day patients, meaning
patients admitted with the expectation of receiving same-day hospital
services, including specific services such as renal dialysis treatment.7 9
Another aspect of the Medicare payment methodology
implicated in emergency care is "evaluation and management" ("E &
M") services.8" Often, emergency rooms evaluate patients and hold
them for observation before making a final disposition. 81 For patients
evaluated in the emergency room and admitted to the hospital for
treatment, surgery, or testing, E & M services are bundled into the
DRG payment.82 In certain cases, however, patients receiving only E
& M services are billed as outpatients under OPPS. Recent Medicare
regulations authorize payment for E & M services for particular
conditions, including chest pain, asthma, and congestive heart failure,
using special HCPCS codes.83
Those conditions, especially

76. Id.
77. 42 C.F.R. §§ 419.31, 419.32; see Ambulatory Payment Classification System, supra
note 75.
78. Ambulatory Payment Classification System, supra note 75.
79. See MEDICARE BENEFIT POLICY MANUAL, supra note 70, at ch. 6, § 20.1; CTRS.
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
PUBL'N NO. 100-04, MEDICARE CLAIMS PROCESSING MANUAL, ch. 8, § 10, http://

www.cms.hhs.gov/Manuals/IOM/list.asp (follow "100-04" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 26,
2006) [hereinafter MEDICARE CLAIMS PROCESSING MANUAL]; Definition of "Inpatient,"

Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)

1209.74 (May 9, 2006) (describing exceptions).

80. See ANNE B. CASTO & ELIZABETH LAYMAN, PRINCIPLES OF HEALTHCARE

REIMBURSEMENT 38-39 (2006) (discussing "Evaluation and Management Facility coding
in the Emergency Department").
81. Id. at 203.
82. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text (describing DRGs and same-day
admission and transfer policies).
83. CMS, Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Outpatient Prospective
Payment System for Calendar Year 2002, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,855, 59,856 (Nov. 30, 2001) (to
be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 413, 419, 489); Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital
Outpatient Prospective Payment System and Calendar Year 2003 Payment Rates and
Changes to Payment Suspension for Unfiled Cost Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. 66,717, 66,718
(Nov. 1, 2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405,419); MEDICARE CLAIMS PROCESSING
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nonspecific chest pain, could be prevalent during terrorist incident or
sudden calamity, such as Katrina, due to stress and anxiety.
Hospitals with limited experience with the intricate Medicare
reimbursement methodology, or even experienced hospitals facing
unprecedented patient demand, would likely experience delay,
confusion, and errors in filing claims for disaster response. Some
emergency patients would be considered inpatients, while others
would be considered outpatients, calling billing personnel to follow
separate, distinct payment rules.
Moreover, appropriate DRG,
HCPCS, or ICD-9-CM codes may not exist or may inadequately
describe patients with novel or unprecedented clinical presentations.
Coding system deficiencies could increase the inevitable payment
delays and produce inadequate reimbursement or claims denials.
3. Physician and Ambulance Services
Under Medicare regulations, physicians and ambulances are
reimbursed separately from hospitals, requiring providers to interpret
and apply additional sets of regulations during the chaos of disaster
response. Physicians' professional services are not included under
Medicare Part A. Instead, they submit separate claims and receive
separate reimbursement under Medicare Part B, based on the
Medicare Physician Fee Schedule ("PFS"). 84 The PFS is a uniform
list of Medicare rates for physicians' professional services." The PFS
is based on a "relative value scale" ("RVU") that rates the value of a
particular physician service relative to other services, based on the
resources (i.e., physician work, practice expense, and malpractice
expense) required to provide the service.86
Medicare pays the lesser of the physician's actual charges or the
PFS amount. Medicare-participating physicians may "balance bill,"
or collect additional payment from, Medicare beneficiaries up to
fifteen percent above the Medicare allowable charge.87
Some
physician services not directly related to patient care, such as
teaching, research, supervision, and committee service are considered
MANUAL, supra note 79, ch. 4,
note 75 (describing observation
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(b)(4)
1 Medicare & Medicaid Guide
of physician services).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(a)

§ 290.4; Ambulatory Payment Classification System, supra
services and requirements for OPPS claims and payment).
(2000); see Exclusion of Physicians' ProfessionalServices,
(CCH) 1281 (May 24, 2005) (discussing IPPS treatment
(2000). See generally Physician Fee Schedule, 1 Medicare

& Medicaid Guide (CCH) [ 3401-3473 (2006).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(c)(2) (2000); see Relative Values, 1 Medicare & Medicaid
Guide (CCH) 3408 (Jan. 31, 2006) (explaining physician fee schedule and RVUs).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(g)(2)(C) (2000).
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hospital costs and included in hospital reimbursement.
Also,
professional services of interns and residents participating in an
approved graduate medical education ("GME") program are covered
under Part A and included in hospitals' DRG payments.88
Disaster response could also call for ambulances to transport
victims from the scene of attack or injury to appropriate medical
facilities.
Generally, emergency transportation, or ambulance
services, are reimbursed under Medicare Part B, separately from
hospital and physician services.89 Medicare pays for both ground and
air transportation, as long as medically necessary.90 Ambulance
providers are paid the lower of their actual charges or the applicable
Medicare ambulance fee schedule amount.9 1 Ambulance fee schedule
payments are based on HCPCS codes, similar to OPPS.92 If a patient
is transferred to another hospital after admission, the transportation
services are included in the hospital's DRG inpatient payment and
may not be billed separately by the ambulance provider.9 3
The Medicare reimbursement methodology is complex,
cumbersome, and filled with potential pitfalls even for savvy
providers filing routine levels of claims. 94 Emergency services fall
under various rules depending on the service and service provider.
Despite the complexity, Medicare-participating hospitals are

88. See MEDICARE BENEFIT POLICY MANUAL, supra note 70, at ch.1, § 60; Exclusion
of Physicians' Professional Services, supra note 84; Interns and Residents-in-Training,1

Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 9 1235 (May 9, 2006) (discussing GME coverage).
89. 42 C.F.R. § 414.610 (2005); Ambulance Service, 1 Medicare & Medicaid Guide
(CCH) 9 3148 (Nov. 16, 004) (summarizing coverage and payment for ambulance services
under Medicare); see also CASTO & LAYMAN, supra note 80, at 148-52 (describing
reimbursement for services).
90. 42 C.F.R. §§ 414.605, 414.610(a) (2005); Ambulance Service, supra note 89
(summarizing coverage and payment for ambulance services under Medicare).
91. 42 C.F.R. § 414.610(a) (2005); Ambulance Service, supra note 89 (summarizing
coverage and payment for ambulance services under Medicare).
92. 42 C.F.R. § 414.610; Medicare Program; Fee Schedule for Payment of Ambulance
Services-Update for CY 2003, 67 Fed. Reg. 70,442, 70,443 (Nov. 22, 2002) (to be codified
at 42 C.F.R. pts. 414); see Ambulance Service, supra note 89 (summarizing coverage and
payment for ambulance services under Medicare).
93. MEDICARE CLAIMS PROCESSING MANUAL, supra note 79, at ch. 15, § 10; see
Ambulance Service, supra note 89. Similarly, transfers of patients in Medicare-certified
skilled nursing facilities or other sites to or from the hospital, or to another Medicare
facility, are included in the appropriate facility's payment and may not be billed separately
by the ambulance supplier. Id.
94. Cf Stephenson v. Shalala, 87 F.3d 350, 356 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Medicare and
Medicaid are enormously complicated programs. The system is a web; a tug at one strand
pulls on every other.").
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accustomed to receiving relatively prompt payment.95 But the huge
volume of claims likely to accumulate from a major catastrophe
would hamper the system's normal functioning. Also, emergency
response may require enlisting volunteer medical professionals and
administrative staff inexperienced with Medicare and other payment
requirements.9 6
Those volunteers' unfamiliarity with system
requirements could increase incidences of coding and claims-filing
errors.
The Medicare program is just one of various reimbursement
systems with which hospitals must comply to collect payment for
emergency medical treatment. Hospitals face similar complexity
complying with Medicaid and other government programs, not to
mention an array of private insurance and patient self-pay
arrangements, each with unique billing challenges. The potentially
high volume of claims in the event of a major disaster would severely
tax the present reimbursement scheme. As the patient demand surge
moves up the line into billing and payment demand surges, thirdparty payers, including private insurers and government health care
programs, would also be burdened in processing the claims through
existing channels. Meanwhile, hospitals could fall into financial
distress awaiting payment.
D. HospitalFirstResponders
Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, Congress quickly
passed several measures to prepare the country to better predict and
respond to future homeland terrorist attacks.
The Homeland
Security Act of 2002 ("HSA") radically reorganized the Federal
Government and created a new agency to coordinate a wide range of
functions. The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness
and Response Act of 2002 ("Bioterrorism Preparedness Act")
specifically aimed at health care preparedness.9 7 Project BioShield of
95. MEDICARE CLAIMS PROCESSING MANUAL, supra note 79, at ch.1, §§ 80.2.1.1,
80.2.2; see Claims Processing Timeliness, 2 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
$ 10,195.01 (July 11, 2006); see also Thomas H. Stanton, The Administration of Medicare:
A Neglected Issue, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1377-78 (2003) (noting that "Medicare

is required to pay virtually all claims within thirty days").
96. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,

EMERGENCY SYSTEM FOR
ADVANCE REGISTRATION OF VOLUNTEER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS (ESAR-VHP)-

LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES 24 (2006) (draft report) [hereinafter ESAR-VHP
DRAFT], available at ftp://ftp.hrsa.gov/bioterror/May-06-Legal-Report.pdf (outlining

recommendations for volunteer response during public health emergencies).
97. Public Health Security Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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2004 addressed the threat of chemical, biological, radiological, or
nuclear attacks. 8 At the state and local level, a comprehensive Model
State Emergency Health Powers Act ("MSEHPA") was drafted by
the Centers for Disease Control ("CDC") and public health experts.9 9
Those laws explicitly define hospitals' first responder roles in a
terrorist attack or other public health emergency, prepare them to
meet the patient demand surge, and ease certain compliance burdens
to facilitate the response. But after the crisis has passed, as hospitals
attempt to resume normal operations, nothing in the laws assures
hospitals that they will recoup the overhead and direct-care costs of
providing essential emergency care to unprecedented numbers of
disaster victims. Without compensation, disaster response hospitals
may be unable to recover, creating a crisis for the health care
infrastructure, much as occurred in the Gulf Coast following
Hurricane Katrina.
1. Federal Legislation
The events of the fall of 2001 highlighted the need for
coordinated emergency planning and preparedness for future
terrorist attacks. Authorities had already committed resources to
bioterrorism preparedness before the September 11 attacks but made
substantial additional appropriations following the airline hijackings
and bioterrorism threats that followed."° In 2001, Congress passed
the Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act, allocating $500
million to the Department of Defense ("DOD") for grants and
cooperative agreements with states and local governments for
emergency and bioterrorism preparedness. 1 In addition, the CDC's
bioterrorism preparedness funding jumped from negligible to $194
million in fiscal year 2001. In October 2001, President Bush signed
the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act
98. Project Bioshield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
99. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (Ctr. for Law & the Public's
Health, Discussion Draft 2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/
MSEHPA2.pdf.
100. See James G. Hodge, Jr., Bioterrorism Law and Policy: CriticalChoices in Public
Health, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 254, 254 (2002) (noting previous commitments).
101. Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 106-505, § 319C, 114
Stat. 2314, 2317-18 (2000); see also NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, AFI
HEALTH COMMITTEE SUMMARY: PUBLIC HEALTH THREATS & EMERGENCIES ACT

(2002), http://www.ncsl.org/statefed/health/PHTEAS.htm

505).

(summarizing Pub. L. No. 106-
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("PATRIOT Act"), aimed at preventing and prosecuting terrorism. 102
In addition to increasing the federal surveillance authority, the
PATRIOT Act contained the First Responders Assistance Act, which
designated ambulance companies and hospitals as "first responders,"
eligible for federal preparedness grants. 1°3 Also, in January 2002,
President Bush signed a $2.9 billion bioterrorism appropriations bill,
providing $1.1 billion to states to improve terrorism-related public
health emergency response preparedness. 1'
The central piece of post-9/11 legislation was the HSA, which
brought more than 100 agencies, including some functions of the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"), the Federal
Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA"), and DOD, under the
10 5
new cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security ("DHS").
HSA involved the largest restructuring of the Federal Government
since the creation of the DOD in 1947.106 DHS oversees the Nation's
preparedness and defense initiatives for future terrorist attacks.
Hospitals, public health agencies, and other health care entities
receive funding for response planning. 1 7 In addition, drills and mass

102. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 50 U.S.C., 47 U.S.C., 2 U.S.C., and
31 U.S.C.).
103. See id; Edward F. McArdle, Survey of New York Law: Health Law, 53 SYRACUSE

L. REV. 629, 633 (2003) (describing PATRIOT Act provisions relevant to health care
providers).
104. See Hope Reeves, School Gets BioterrorGrant, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2002, at B4

(summarizing federal responses to 9/11); see also Lee, supra note 45, at 173-74 (discussing
post-9/11 priorities, including food safety and hospital capacity).
105. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 503, 201, 116 Stat. 2135,
2145, 2213 (codified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 121(g), 313 (Supp. III 2003)); see Wendy K. Mariner,
Law & Public Health: Beyond Emergency Preparedness,38 J. HEALTH L. 247, 263 (2005)

("After September 11, 2001, as part of the war on terror, the federal government has
asserted even greater influence in matters that affect public health-as a matter of
national security."); see also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 18, at 1
(describing FEMA's performance during hurricane Katrina and raising questions
regarding Agency's organizational placement).
106. See Kristi L. Koenig et al., The Evolution of Protectingthe U.S.: Transitionfrom
Civil Defense to Homeland Security, June 8, 2005, http://www.acep.org/webportal/Member

Center/Templates/DefaultPrimary.aspx?NRMODE=Published&NRORIGINALURL=
%2fwebportal%2fMemberCenter%2fSectionsofMembership%2fDisasterMedicine%2fNe
wsletterArticles%2tTheEvolutionofProtectingtheUSTransitionFromCivilDefense%2ehtm
&NRNODEGUID=%7b18F10303-B24-F1B-A7EE-10C210092AC2%7d&NRCACHEH

INT=NoModifyGuest (last visited Sept. 3, 2006) (describing legislation and impact); see
also WHITE HOUSE, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM 7 (2003),

available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/progress/progress _report0903.pdf.
107. See 6 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 2004) (defining "emergency response providers");
Homeland Security Presidential Directive No. 8, § 2(d) (Dec. 17, 2003) [hereinafter
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destruction exercises were conducted in major cities to test the
response readiness of public health and other essential services."
HSA calls for the creation of a fully integrated national
emergency response system, or National Response Plan ("NRP"),
adaptable to any domestic terrorist attack or natural disaster.1"9 The
NRP is to include a National Incident Management System ("NIMS")
to allow coordination among federal, state, and local authorities'
prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans.110 The
President's declaration of an "Incident of National Significance"
would invoke special federal powers and coordinated assistance
under the NRP."' For example, in the case of a public health
emergency ("PHE"), as declared by the HHS Secretary, local
hospitals could draw staff from other hospitals, including Federal
Veterans Affairs facilities, and other states, as state licensing
requirements would be waived."l 2 Although not providing any
payment for medical care, the NRP envisions memoranda of
understanding ("MOUs") to allow cross-reimbursement among
emergency responders and governmental entities." 3
In addition to HSA, Congress passed legislation aimed directly at
The Bioterrorism Preparedness Act
health care preparedness.
appropriated $1.6 billion in federal grants to state and local
governments to implement state plans and conduct preparedness
activities." 4 Specifically, local authorities and first responders were
encouraged to improve communications infrastructure, train
Presidential Directive], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/
20031217-6.html (including hospitals within "first responders").
108. See Presidential Directive, supra note 107, at §§ 1-9 (regarding "Training and
Exercises"); Thomas May, Political Authority in a Bioterror Emergency, 32 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 159-63 (2004) (describing May 2000 "TOPOFF" exercise for "top officials,"
simulating bioterrorism attack in Denver, Colorado); Cynthia P. Schneider & Michael D.
McDonald, "The King of Terrors" Revisited: The Smallpox Vaccination Campaign and Its
Lessons for Future Biopreparedness,31 J.L. MED & ETHICS 580, 581-82 (2003) (describing

2001 "tabletop" exercise and "Dark Winter" simulated smallpox attack). See generally
Christian W. Erickson & Bethany A. Barratt, Prudence or Panic? PreparednessExercises,
CounterterrorMobilization, and Media Coverage-Dark Winter, TOPOFF I and 2, 1 J.
HOMELAND SEC. & EMERGENCY MGMT. 1 (2004) (describing various exercises).

See Presidential Directive, supra note 107.
Id.
Id.
Id.
113. Id. (describing NRP); U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL
PLAN
5
(2004),
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NRPFullText.pdf
RESPONSE
(implementing NRP, based on Presidential Directive).
114. See Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, § 143(a), 116 Stat. 594, 627 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5
109.
110.
111.
112.

(Supp. III 2003)).
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laboratory and other health care professionals to screen for novel
medical conditions, enhance surveillance and detection activities,
stockpile medical equipment and supplies, and develop bioterrorist
countermeasures or antidotes.115
The Bioterrorism Preparedness Act expressly authorizes federal
authorities, in an emergency area, during an emergency period, as
defined in the Act, to waive or modify for sixty days certain health
care laws and requirements on health care providers." 6
An
"emergency period" must be declared by either the President, under
the Federal Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance authority, or the Secretary of HHS, under section 319 of
the Federal Public Health Service Act ("PHSA").117 Secretary of
Health and Human Services Michael Leavitt acted under section 319
to declare a PHE in the Gulf Region states of Alabama, Florida,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas after Hurricane Katrina.1 8 A
federal emergency declaration allows authorities to waive or modify
Medicare and Medicaid COPs, including EMTALA requirements
and sanctions; state licensure requirements for professionals and
facilities; and limitations on payments for certain Medicare
enrollees." 9 But the Act does not waive or relax billing procedures or
115. See id. (ensuring "sufficient health care items and services" and waiving sanctions
for "furnish[ing] such items and services in good faith," even if "unable to comply with one
or more requirements" under EMTALA); Jason W. Sapsin, Introduction to Emergency
Public Health Law for Bioterrorism Preparednessand Response, 9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J.
387, 398-99 (2003) (summarizing Bioterrorism Preparedness Act).
116. See Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act
§ 143(a) (authorizing HHS Secretary "to temporarily waive or modify" certain laws,
ensuring "to the maximum extent feasible ... that sufficient health care items and services
are available to meet the needs of individuals" in "any emergency area and during any
emergency period"); id. (regarding "Duration of Waiver").
117. See id. § 143(g)(1). The Bioterrorism Preparedness Act also amended section 319
of the Public Health Service Act, regarding the Secretary of HHS's authority to declare
and terminate a PHE at the federal level. See id. § 144(a).
118. See Determination that a Public Health Emergency Exists (U.S. Dep't of Health
& Human Servs. Aug. 31, 2005), http://www.hhs.gov/emergency/determination.html
(declaring PHE under section 319 of the Public Health Services Act in Alabama, Florida,
Louisiana, and Mississippi as a consequence of Hurricane Katrina); Determination that a
Public Health Emergency Exists (U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. Sept. 4, 2005),
http://www.hhs.gov/emergency/determinationl.html (declaring same in Texas).
119. See Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act
§ 143(a) (authorizing HHS Secretary to waive or modify certain laws); Project Bioshield
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, § 9, 118 Stat. 835, 863 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320b-5(b)) (amending Social Security Act § 1135(b) on EMTALA sanctions, and
adding Social Security Act § 1135(b)(7), on Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA") privacy provision); see also 42 C.F.R.
§ 489.24(a)(2) (2005) (providing that sanctions "for inappropriate transfer... do not apply
to a hospital with a dedicated emergency department located in an emergency area").
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assure reimbursement for the cost of care provided to victims of the
public health emergency. 120
Hospitals expressed concern that certain preparedness laws may
be inconsistent with EMTALA responsibilities. 2 ' EMTALA would
hamper coordinated community response plans. For example, to
contain an infectious disease outbreak, a community might agree to
confine all infected patients at a single hospital. But EMTALA's
requirement to screen and stabilize all patients before diverting them
would seem to preclude immediate transfers to a designated
infectious disease facility, thereby undermining efforts to control the
outbreak. In response to those and similar concerns, federal
regulators confirmed that, "in the event of a national emergency or
crisis (e.g., bioterrorism) State or local governments may develop
community response plans that designate specific entities (hospitals,
public health facilities, etc.) with the responsibility of handling certain
categories of patients during these catastrophic events."' 2 Similarly,
the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act waives EMTALA sanctions and
other laws to facilitate community response plans.123 Although they
provide flexibility in community response plans and patient diversion,
the preparedness laws do not alleviate the demand surge and essential
EMTALA burden to treat emergency patients irrespective of
payment or insurance status.
Project BioShield, jointly administered by DHS and HHS, aims
to improve pharmacological interventions against chemical,

120. See Rosenbaum, supra note 16, at 100 (noting that the Bioterrorism Preparedness
Act "authorize[d] a federal legal framework for planning and executing public health and

medical care activities" but "did not specify provisions for funding reforms on a
mandatory basis").
121. See Medicare Program; Clarifying Policies Related to the Responsibilities of
Medicare-Participating Hospitals in Treating Individuals with Emergency Medical
Conditions, 68 Fed. Reg. 53,222, 53,257 (Sept. 9, 2003) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 413,
482, 489) (summarizing comments).
122. INTERPRETIVE GUIDELINES, supra note 45, at pt. II, tag A406 (emphasis

omitted); see also id. (suggesting that hospital could transfer patient to specified
community screening site without violating EMTALA); Medicare Program; Clarifying
Policies Related to the Responsibilities of Medicare-Participating Hospitals in Treating
Individuals with Emergency Medical Conditions, 68 Fed. Reg. at 53,257 (clarifying
EMTALA policies under Interpretive Guidelines); Ambulances Find Overwhelmed ERs
"at Breaking Point," supra note 60 (describing IOM report recommendations for
overburdened ERs, including directing hospitals "not necessarily to the nearest ER, but to
the one best equipped to treat each patient's condition").
123. See Medicare Program; Clarifying Policies Related to the Responsibilities of
Medicare-Participating Hospitals in Treating Individuals with Emergency Medical
Conditions, 68 Fed. Reg. at 53,257 (describing Act's impact on EMTALA).
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biological, radiological, or nuclear attacks.12 4
The legislation
authorized $5.6 billion over ten years and streamlined government
procurement processes for purchasing and stockpiling of vaccines and
drugs to treat anthrax, smallpox, botulism, and other biological agents
as well as radiation and chemical weapons exposures. 1 5 Grants for
biodefense medical research, including $1.5 billion per year for
National Institutes of Health studies on treatments for smallpox,
anthrax, Ebola, and other pathogens, were made available.2 6 Project
BioShield also creates incentives for pharmaceutical companies to
research and develop new vaccines and treatments, including
professional or expedited Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
new drug approval. In addition, pharmaceutical companies and
health care providers are authorized, under certain conditions, to
distribute "best available" drugs and devices before final FDA
approval. 27
The law also supports improved surveillance,
intelligence, and law enforcement methods, environmental detectors,
1 28
and disease surveillance techniques.
2. Model State Emergency Health Powers Act
Policymakers and academics urge that emergency preparedness
requires more than funding. Public health authorities also need
29
special, broader powers to respond adequately to emergencies.1
With that goal in mind, the CDC initiated the Model State
Emergency Health Powers Act ("MSEHPA" or "Model Act"),
drafted in collaboration with scholars, governors, legislators, public
health commissions, and attorneys general, in consultation with major
124. See Project Bioshield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6); Press Release, White House, President Bush Signs Project
Bioshield Act of 2004 (July 21, 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/07/
20040721-2.html.
125. See Project Bioshield Act §§ 1-3 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6a, 6 U.S.C.
§ 320) (listing policies and strategies and amending section 319F of the Public Health
Service Act and section 510 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002).
126. See Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: Progress on the War on Terror,
(July 21, 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/07/20040721-9.html; Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., HHS Fact Sheet-Project Bioshield (July
21,2004), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2004pres/20040721b.html.
127. See Project Bioshield Act § 4 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3) (amending
section 564 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and authorizing use of medical
products in emergencies).
128. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., supra note 126
(summarizing key provisions).
129. See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin and James G. Hodge, Public Health Emergencies
and Legal Reform: Implicationsfor Public Health Policy and Practice, 118 PUB. HEALTH
REP. 477, 477-79 (2003) (explaining need for Model Act).
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stakeholders, including businesses, civil liberties organizations, and
medical practitioners. 3 0
MSEHPA expands state and local
authorities' powers to protect the public's health during public health
emergencies.
MSEHPA incorporates five basic public health powers:
"preparedness, surveillance, management of property, protection of
persons, and public information and communication."''
The Model
Act grants the state governor the power to declare a state of "Public
Health Emergency," defined broadly as "an occurrence or imminent
threat of an illness or health condition that ... is believed to be
caused by bioterrorism or the appearance of a novel or previously
controlled or eradicated infectious agent or biological toxin" that
poses a high probability of a large number of deaths or serious
disabilities in the population.'32 The governor may terminate the
declaration by executive order, and the declaration terminates
automatically after thirty days, unless renewed. 33 In addition, the
state legislature may terminate the declaration by a majority vote in
1 34
both houses.
The public information and communication provisions of
MSEHPA are intended to facilitate authorities' ability to detect and
track public health emergencies. 35 Health care providers, coroners,
and medical examiners are required to collect and report, within
twenty-four hours of an encounter, detailed patient information,
including name, date of birth, sex, race, occupation, home and work
addresses, and "any other information needed to locate the patient
for follow-up."' 3 6 MSEHPA attempts to safeguard individual privacy
and liberty interests, providing that information-sharing "shall be
restricted to the information necessary for the treatment, control,
investigation, and prevention of a public health emergency."' 3 7 But
130. Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health Law in an Age of Terrorism: Rethinking

Individual Rights and Common Goods, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 79, 83
(summarizing MSEHPA). The Center for Law & the Public's Health at Georgetown &
Johns Hopkins Universities, of which Lawrence 0. Gostin is the director, spearheaded the
drafting effort.
131. See id. at 83.
132. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 104(m) (Ctr. for Law &
the Public's Heath, Discussion Draft 2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/
MSEHPA!MSEHPA2.pdf.
133. Id. § 405(b).
134. Id. § 405(a)-(c).

135. Id. §§ 301 (reporting), 302 (tracking), 303 (information sharing).
136. Id. § 301(c) (regarding manner of reporting).
137. Id. § 303(c) (regarding information sharing on "reportable illnesses, health
conditions, unusual clusters, or suspicious events").
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that "necessary" language may provide little assurance against
improper disclosure.
As of July 15, 2006, thirty-eight states and the District of
Columbia enacted statutes incorporating at least some MSEHPA or
similar provisions. 3 ' Despite wide acceptance, the Model Act has
been sharply criticized.' 39 The proposed laws implicate constitutional
questions about the degree to which governmental power should
intrude on individual rights. 4 '
Various constituents, including
physicians, public health authorities, and civil libertarians, suggest

that MSEHPA "treats American citizens as if they were the
enemy."'' Provisions authorizing the governor to possess or destroy
private property, including medical facilities, implicate property
rights. Authorities may conscript medical providers and other
emergency workers into service against their will, implicating liberty
interests. 142 The Model Act also includes strict law enforcement
138. CTR. FOR LAW AND THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH, THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY
HEALTH POWERS ACT (MSEHPA) STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY, http://www.public

healthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA%20Leg%20Activity.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2006)
(maintaining information about MSEHPA).
139. See Daniel M. Fox, Populations and the Law: The Changing Scope of Health
Policy, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 607, 611 (2003) (discussing objections to broad public
health powers); Edward P. Richards et al., Legislative Alternatives to the Model State
Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA) (LSU Program in Law, Sci., & Prob. Health,
White Paper No. 2, 2003), available at http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/bt/MSEHPA
review.pdf. See generally Lawrence 0. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health: How
Far Are Limitations on Personaland Economic Liberties Justified?, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1105,
1106 (2003) (noting that the issue is "politically charged because it affords the state
enhanced powers to restrict personal and economic liberties").
140. See Daniel S. Reich, Modernizing Local Responses to Public Health Emergencies:
Bioterrorism, Epidemics, and the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, 19 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 379, 388 (2003) (discussing "balance between individual's
legitimate expectation of privacy and the public health benefits to society as a whole").
But see Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Public
Health & Civil Liberties in a Time of Terrorism, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 3, 25 (2003)
(disagreeing that MSEHPA threatens civil liberties and could be triggered for any
epidemic, such as HIV/AIDS); Hodge, supra note 100, at 259 (discussing individual
liberties and bioterrorism); Ken Wing, Preparingfor the Next Public Health Emergency, 13
HEALTH MATRIX 71, 75-77 (2003) (suggesting that governors need broad powers to act in
previously unimaginable scenarios).
141. See, e.g., Ass'n of Am. Physicians and Surgeons, Inc., AAPS Analysis: Model
Emergency Health Powers Act (MEHPA) Turns Governors into Dictators, (Dec. 3, 2001),
http://www.aapsonline.org/testimony/emerpower.htm
(quoting
George
Annas);
Naturodoc, The Emergency Health Powers Act Turns Governors into Dictators,
http://www.naturodoc.com/library/News/MEHPA.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2006) (urging
readers to sign petition against MEHPA).
142. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 608(a) (Ctr. for Law & the
Public's Health, Discussion Draft 2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/
MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf (authorizing state "[t]o require in-state health care providers to
assist").
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provisions, authorizing threats or use of deadly force to take property
and compel vaccination or quarantine, despite the firmly rooted
constitutional and common law rights to refuse medical treatment.143
Opponents charge that MSEHPA, "in effect, empowers the Governor
to create a police state by fiat" and "[u]nder this Act, any governor
could appoint himself dictator by declaring a 'public health
emergency' "'I Specifically, MSEHPA gives governors broad powers
to declare and terminate an emergency, with only limited checks on
that power from the state legislature. 45 Adding potential for abuse,
public health authorities acting under MSEHPA are immune from
14 6
liability in state courts.
State laws modeled on MSEHPA increase health care providers'
financial and administrative burdens, including information
collection,
patient
tracking,
electronic
recordkeeping,
communications, and community response planning. In addition,
MSEHPA authorizes states to compel treatment and seize medical
facilities during an emergency. 147 A governor's executive order might
even compel physicians and other medical professionals to assist in a
disaster.141 If the government employs all these strategies, hospitals
would experience increased patient volume and demand for medical
care. Despite its comprehensive delineation of emergency powers,
MSEHPA does not address state budgetary powers or authorize
governors to compensate providers for the additional preparedness
and direct patient care costs they will incur in meeting the demand
surge. Model law drafters next should turn their attention to
developing a compensation plan to ensure that hospitals and other
health care providers are not left with the unsustainable financial
burden of disaster response.

143. See Reich, supra note 140, at 401-02 & nn.103-04 (citing cases). But see Jacobson
v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 37-38 (1905) (upholding state law on mandatory
vaccination).
144. Ass'n of Am. Physicians and Surgeons, Inc., supra note 141.
145. See Gostin, supra note 130, at 87 (rebutting concerns).
146. See MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 804(a) (Ctr. for Law &
the Public's Health, Discussion Draft 2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/
MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf (providing immunity for governor, public health authority, or
any other state official, expect in cases of "gross negligence or willful misconduct").
147. Id. §§ 501, 603(b).
148. See ESAR-VHP DRAFT, supra note 96, at 24 (noting that states adopting
MSEHPA framework for public health emergencies, e.g., District of Columbia, may
"require health care providers within the District to reasonably assist with the emergency
response").
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II. LESSONS LEARNED

Even after federal and state lawmakers have enacted a broad
package of laws designed to prepare the Nation to respond to the
next major attack or natural disaster, questions remain whether we
are any better prepared than we were pre-9/11. In addition, we do
not yet know how the operation of those laws will affect the Nation's
economy, infrastructure, and essential services, not only during the
disaster but afterwards, as the Nation regroups and tries to return to
normal. For hospitals, simply keeping doors open to patients may be
a major challenge. It is impossible to predict the timing, scope, and
impact of the next episode and, therefore, to tailor plans or legislation
precisely. But one of the lessons of Katrina is that we cannot afford
to wait and see, developing a response ex post as the crisis unfolds
and throwing money and personnel at whichever problem seems to be
bleeding most profusely. 4 9 Instead, we should take advantage of
calmer times to think through the range of problems that are not only
likely but certain to arise, both during and after the catastrophe.15 °
In 2003, the U.S. General Accounting Office ("GAO") surveyed
over 2,000 urban hospitals' preparedness for bioterrorism, including
the status of planning activities, staff training, and response
capacity. 51
The GAO report suggested that, despite additional
funding and special legislation, hospitals remained inadequately
prepared for homeland security, bioterrorist threats, or other public
health emergencies.152 Although most hospitals had conducted basic

149. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 18, passim (raising
questions regarding FEMA's Katrina response); Robert Block, Hearings To Shape
FEMA's Future, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2005, at A12 ("FEMA has become synonymous
with the government's bungled response to the hurricane, with a number of politicians
saying part of the problem is that the agency is no longer cabinet-level but rather a small
cog in the mammoth Department of Homeland Security."); Walker Letter, supra note 18
(suggesting need for clear, decisive leadership, in single individual accountable to the
President); Fessler, supra note 18.
150.

Cf GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBIrIr, TRAGIC CHOICES 21 (1978) (asking

"why, for instance, the United States will spend a million dollars to rescue a single,
downed balloonist but will not appropriate a similar sum to provide shore patrols" and
concluding that "[b]y making the choice seem necessary, unavoidable, rather than chosen,
it attempts to convert what is tragically chosen into what is merely a fatal misfortune").
151. See HOSPITAL PREPAREDNESS, supra note 10, at 20-24.
152. Id.; see also Borenstein, supra note 25 (summarizing GAO findings and quoting
emergency room doctor: "I liken the SARS problem right now to a two-acre fire in a
tinder-dry forest ....We don't have the capacity in any city in my mind to handle a real
outbreak of the disease."); Hodge, supra note 100, at 254 (noting lack of "infrastructure,
resources, knowledge, or tools to effectively respond to mass exposure to diseases");
O'Connor, supra note 10 ("[Area hospitals] acknowledge being woefully unprepared to
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response planning and coordination activities, they lacked adequate
staff and specialized medical equipment (e.g., ventilators and
isolation facilities) required to handle significant increases in patient
volume and prevent the spread of infectious disease.15 3
Most
hospitals reported that they provided some staff training in disease
identification and diagnosis, but fewer than half had conducted drills
or response simulations.
The GAO report and other sources
suggested that legislative efforts failed to ready the Nation's
emergency health care providers to respond to a homeland security
emergency. Katrina made that reality painfully clear. 154 Additional
funding and support for preparedness is needed to improve hospitals'
ability to fulfill their essential first responder roles, but lawmakers
also need to address post-disaster financial recovery.
A.

Cost of Catastrophes

Given the severity and devastation of recent disasters, it is almost
unthinkable to imagine what catastrophe we might next face. It is
equally difficult to estimate the potential costs in human life, insured
losses, and government expenditures for various disaster scenarios. A
natural disaster impacts society and the economy differently than a
terrorist attack. A sudden, single-strike attack imposes different costs
and burdens than an emerging or episodic crisis, such as on infectious
disease outbreak. Moreover, the effect on society depends on the
particular financial, government, and public health resources of the
affected geographic area. Although cold numbers may not have the
same salience as the tragic images of the World Trade Towers or the
Ninth Ward, a brief survey of economic figures for recent disasters
gives some context for thinking about the potentially severe costs of
the next catastrophe.
Hurricane Katrina and the flooding of New Orleans was an
unprecedented catastrophe, resulting in more insurance claims than
any other United States disaster. Initial loss estimates in the days
immediately after the storm were as high as $26 billion. 15 5 Later
deal with a mass-casualty incident, especially in the first hours .... The lack of resources,
training, and personnel mean some victims will die from a lack of adequate treatment.").
153. See Laura Landro, The Informed Patient: Hospitals Step Up DisasterPreparedness,WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2006, at D4 ("But for all the progress in improving
readiness, experts warn there is still a long way to go.").
154. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (citing sources describing results of
disaster response drills).
155. See, e.g., Mike Comerford, Allstate Mobilizes Adjusters for HurricaneClaims, CHI.
DAILY HERALD, Aug. 30, 2005, at B1 (citing initial storm damage estimates, before levees
broke, ranging from $10 billion to $26 billion); Scott Miller, Katrina Damages Piling Up;
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estimates ranged from $70 billion to $130 billion. 5 6 Even the early,
grossly underestimated $26 billion figure would have exceeded the
costs of any previous U.S. natural disasters. Combined with the losses
of Hurricane Rita, Katrina's financial toll far exceeds that of
Hurricane Andrew (the costliest hurricane previously on record) the
9/11 terrorist attacks, and the Northridge earthquake. 57
Other recent natural disasters, including the Asian tsunami and
Pakistani earthquake, produced staggering losses in terms of human
life. But the estimated financial impact of those catastrophes was far
lower than similar U.S. disasters, given those regions' weak
economies. The tsunami that struck eleven countries in South Asia
on December 26, 2004, caused a devastating human toll of 300,000
dead or missing but only $8.4 billion in damages) 58 Six hundred
ninety hospitals and health care clinics were destroyed. 5 9 The
relatively modest economic loss figure reflects the fact that the
insurance market in the region is relatively underdeveloped, and
many of the property owners were uninsured."6 The death toll from
Some Estimates as High as $16 Billion; State Farm Ready, PANTAGRAPH (Bloomington,
I1.), Aug. 30, 2005, at C1 (reporting various estimates, from low of $4 billion to high of $16
billion).
156. After the Hurricanes: Impact of Hurricaneon 2007 Budget: HearingBefore the H.
Comm. on the Budget, 109th Cong. 10 (2005) (statement of Douglas Holtz-Eakin, CBO
Director) [hereinafter Hurricane Hearing]; see also Jesse Westbrook, Hurricane Could
Cost Insurers $60 Billion, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 10, 2005, at Cl (citing estimates);
David Wyss, A Second Look at Katrina's Cost, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Sept. 13, 2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/sep2005/nf20050913_8975_db082.htm
("The damage done by Katrina ... is still unknown, but it's clearly more than first
expected, with estimated costs now as high as $200 billion.").
157. Westbrook, supra note 156 (comparing previous disaster costs, including
Hurricane Andrew in 1992, $20.8 billion; 1994 Northridge earthquake, $16 billion; and
2004 Central Florida hurricanes, $22 billion). See HurricaneHearing,supra note 156, at 15 (statement of Douglas Holtz-Eakin, CBO Director) (noting that total insured and
uninsured losses from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita approach $140 billion, which far
surpasses recent disasters, even converted to today's dollars).
158. See Michael VanRooyen & Jennifer Leaning, Perspective: After the TsunamiFacing Public Health Challenges, 352 NEw ENG. J. MED. 435, 435 (2005) (noting that "the
devastation wrought by the tsunami was catastrophic-more than 150,000 people dead,
tens of thousands of people missing, thousands of miles of destroyed coastline, and loss of
livelihood for millions of distraught survivors"); Amy Waldman & James Brooke,
Disaster's Damage to Economies May Be Minor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2005, at Al.
159. See Peter Fritsch, Cleaning Up After the Tsunami, an ACEH Surprise: Good
Government, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2005, at Al (regarding tsunami aftermath); Denise
Gracy, Even Good Health System Is Overwhelmed by Tsunami, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2005,
at 10 (discussing public health outreach following destruction of clinics and hospitals).
160. See Insurance Information Institute, Catastrophes: Insurance Issues, INS. ISSUES
UPDATE, Aug. 2006, available at 1995 WL 628905 (noting that Indonesians spent average
of $8 per capita on non-life insurance in 2003, compared to $1,980 per capita in the United
States).
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the Pakistani earthquake in October 2005, initially as low as 16,000,
increased to 73,000 in the following month. 16' The Pakistani Prime
Minister estimated rebuilding costs at $5 billion.162

Until Katrina, the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks were the
costliest U.S. disaster. 163 Total costs of the'World Trade Center
attack alone are estimated between $33 billion and $36 billion,
including lost earnings, property damage, and Ground Zero cleanup
Close to 3,000 people lost their lives in the
and restoration. 1"
attack. 165 Tragically, direct health care costs were negligible because
there were no survivors of the attacks. Some disaster-related medical

costs were incurred for rescue workers, including smoke inhalation,
abuse treatment for
treatment and mental health and substance
166
victims' families, rescue workers, and others.
Biological, chemical, or other infectious disease-causing agents
bring different challenges than a single-episode natural disaster or
terrorist attack. Data on the health care financial impact for a
bioterrorism scenario were compiled following the recent SARS
outbreak in Ontario, Canada. 167 The 108-day outbreak in the summer
161. See Quake Toll Jumps, HERALD SUN (Melbourne, Austl.), Nov. 4, 2005, at 47
available at 2005 WLNR 17766911 (citing current estimate and noting that "officials
warned it was likely to rise further as relief supplies fail to reach thousands of stranded
victims"); see also Pakistan Predicts Sharp Jump in Quake Toll, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 17,
2005, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-10/17/content_48551
7.htm (quoting official statement: "Some people fear that the death toll could be 100,000
and they might be right.").
162. See Post-Quake Reconstruction To Cost 5 Bin USD: PakistaniPM, XINHUA GEN.
NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 15, 2005; see also Farhan Bokhari, Pakistan to Plead Special Exports
Case After Quake, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2005, at 2 (citing $5 billion estimate and quoting
Pakistani cabinet member on plans to seek preferential access to U.S. and European
markets: "We want to build our case on the ground that there are sudden new pressures
on our economy following the earthquake, and the reconstruction task ahead is
gigantic.").
163. See Westbrook, supra note 156 (comparing disasters and describing 2004
hurricanes as most costly pre-9/11 disaster, with insured property loss at $20 billion).
164. See Jason Bram et al., Measuring the Effects of the September 11 Attack on New
York City, FRBNY ECON. POL'Y REV., Nov. 2002, at 5 (estimating losses as of June 2002).
165. See id. at 14 (summarizing loss estimates by Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
"Privately insured losses [from the terrorist attacks] are estimated to total $35.2 billion and
include $11.9 billion in business-interruption losses, $10.4 billion in property losses, $3.8
billion in aviation liability, $1.9 billion in workers' compensation benefits, and $1.1 billion
in life insurance payments." See HurricaneHearing,supra note 156, at 16.
166. See DIXON & STERN, supra note 19, at xxiv (estimating that approximately 425
emergency responders were killed or seriously injured in 9/11 attacks); Bram et al., supra
note 164, at 12 (identifying "[a]ttack-related productivity effects," including "increase in
post-traumatic stress disorder and alcohol and drug use three months after attack").
167. Ontario Presses Ottawa To Foot SARS Bill, CBC NEWS, June 27, 2003,
[hereinafter
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2003/06/27/sars-compensationO30627.html
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of 2003 cost Ontario's health care facilities $945 million, according to
the Minister of Health. 168 Those costs included $395 million in
hospital costs, including staff and supplies; $330 million in health care
worker costs, including wage replacement for quarantined workers;
and $100 million in lost revenues to hospitals affected by the SARS
outbreak. 69 In addition, $120 million was spent on disease-tracking,
rapid-response teams, and other preparedness for future attacks. 70
The Canadian Government initially provided only $150 million
to offset the Province's costs. 71 Ontario authorities sought a national
compensation.17 2
additional
and
declaration
emergency
Subsequently, the Federal Government approved $330 million in
compensation for the outbreak, based on a separate report and
reexamination of Ontario's books, lowering the total health care cost
estimate to $660 million.1 73 But costs of a full-blown, sustained
chemical or biological attack or infectious disease pandemic could be
much higher. With that possibility in mind, the Bush administration
in 2005 committed $7.1 billion over three years for avian flu
7 4 The international community pledged $1.9 billion in
preparedness."
1 75
international aid to prepare for an avian flu pandemic.

Ontario Presses Ottawa] (tabulating recovery costs, including quarantine compensation,
job recovery, and tourism).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.; see also ONTARIO MINISTRY OF FIN., QUARTERLY ONTARIO FINANCES:
FIRST QUARTER 2003-2004 (2003), http://www.fin.gov.on.ca/english/finances/2003/ofin
031.html (reporting financial impact of SARS at Can. $1,073,000,000); Kristin Choo, The
Avian Flu Time Bomb, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2005, at 36, 39 (comparing emerging avian flu
threat to SARS, which was contained due to quick action by public health authorities in
affected countries and noting that "SARS, unlike most human influenza viruses, was not
very contagious").
171. Ontario Presses Ottawa, supra note 167.
172. See id. (quoting Ontario Minister of Health: "Every hour we have waited for help
and for every hour that we have had to waste, begging the federal government to help the
people it is supposed to serve and protect, is an hour wasted in the battle against SARS.").
173. Ottawa Ups Ontario SARS Aid, LONDON FREE PRESS, Nov. 19, 2003, at A3
(noting figure was higher than government's initial $250 million offer but still below $1
billion request).
174. See Choo, supra note 170, at 36 (suggesting that avian flu outbreak "is likely to be
a lot worse" than World War I, which killed 10 million people in four years of fighting and
1918 Spanish flu outbreak, which killed 40 million people"); Sarah Lueck & Anna Wilde
Mathews, Bush Proposes $7.1 Billion Outlay To Fight Pandemic-Flu Threat, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 2, 2005, at A6 (discussing administration's plan, including stockpiling, international
monitoring, and local response plans); Santora, supra note 11 (comparing avian flu threat
to 1918 smallpox epidemic and describing New York City preparedness plan); Bush
Unveils $7.1 Billion Plan To Prepare for Flu Pandemic, CNN.com, Nov. 2, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/HEALTH/conditions/11/01/us.flu.plan (noting that Bush plan
includes $251 million for detection and training, $1.2 billion for vaccines, $2.8 billion for
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The above survey of recent catastrophes shows that all types of
catastrophes wreak economic devastation on affected individuals and
nations, the effects of-which should be considered in advance. But

the precise impact varies widely, making it difficult to anticipate the
extent and nature of financial relief that might be required to stabilize
particular industries, markets, or economies. Accordingly, any ex
ante government disaster relief plan should be broadly defined and
adaptable to a range of scenarios.
B.

Katrina

Hurricane Katrina and the New Orleans levee collapse tragically
and starkly demonstrate the Nation's inadequate disaster
preparation.'7 6 The catastrophe provides still-emerging lessons for
health care response and recovery. Authorities quickly authorized
emergency funding and waivers to assist health care providers in
responding to health care needs during and immediately after the
catastrophe. Federal authorities debated and eventually enacted
additional financial and other assistance for patients and providers.
But the impact on the region's economy generally, and on the health
care system specifically, will be severe and lasting.'7 7 Hospitals as far
away as Houston and Atlanta struggled to collect payment, return to
normal operations, and remain solvent after the flood water
receded.'7 8

vaccine production "crash program," and $1 billion for stockpiling existing antiviral
drugs); see also CAL. DEP'T OF HEALTH SERVS., DRAFT PANDEMIC INFLUENZA
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLAN (2006), http://www.dhs.ca.gov/ps/dcdc/izgroup/pdf/

update/Mini%20(0206).pdf; Dorsey Griffith & Edie Lau, State Readies Pandemic
Response, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 19, 2006, at Al, available at http://dwb.sacbee.com/
content/news/ongoing/flu/story/14090823p-14920808c.html
(describing
California's
proposed avian flu plan).
175. Playing Chicken with Bird Flu, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at A18.
176. See Choo, supra note 170, at 39 ("Anyone looking for lessons about the value of
preparedness does not need to look far. A good place to start is the U.S. Gulf Coast, still

reeling from the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina when it hit on Aug. 29.").
177. See generally Kalb & Murr, supra note 4, at 66 (discussing effects on region's
health care system); New Orleans' Emergency Rooms Overtaxed, supra note 4 (same);
KAISER REPORT 7538, supra note 6, at 19-35 (describing lasting health experiences of
low-income Katrina survivors).
178. See KAISER REPORT 7387, supra note 4, at 3 (noting that "[hiospitals located in
communities receiving large inflows of individuals displaced by Katrina are facing
increased demand"; Houston's Harris County hospital district, in particular, has assumed
care of 23,000 evacuees living in the Astrodome, and Baton Rouge's population has
doubled); Andy Miller, Evacuees' Access to Medicaid Eased, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 7,
2005, at 4F (noting public health official's "warn[ing] that treating Katrina's victims on top
of metro Atlanta's perennially packed emergency rooms may finally break the system").
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After the levees broke, the Federal Government quickly
appropriated $62.3 billion in emergency assistance funds, most of
which went to FEMA.'7 9 Soon, concern arose that the FEMA money
was being put to questionable use.' 80
Both Democrats and
Republicans called for an investigation into spending of the hurricane
relief funds, and subsequent relief packages were scaled back under
budget and other pressures.'
As far as health care providers were
concerned, FEMA offered little assistance. 82 The federal disaster
relief program pays only for the cost of rebuilding disaster-damaged
facilities and expressly excludes direct-care and administrative
costs. 18 3 Some New Orleans hospitals that were physically damaged
may qualify for FEMA funds for rebuilding. In addition, under
certain circumstances, FEMA authorizes up to $26,500 per patient to
cover health care costs, but the amounts are paid directly to patients
and still would have to be collected from patients by health care

providers. 184
179. See Congress Responds to Hurricane Katrina, U.S. FED. NEWS, Sept. 12, 2005,
(reporting Katrina relief appropriations); HurricaneHearing, supra note 156, at 21.
180. See Angie C. Marek & Edward T. Pound, A Flood of Money, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Oct. 10, 2005, at 24 (describing $236 million, six-month contract with
Carnival cruise lines to shelter and feed evacuees and emergency workers, and $2 billion
contract to buy 120,000 trailers as emergency housing for flood victims).
181. See id. (describing DHS response, establishing Office of Hurricane Katrina
Oversight, and appointing former FEMA top official, Matthew Jadacki, as auditor); David
Rogers, White House To Trim KatrinaSpending Request, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2005, at A8
(reporting plans to scale back "Katrina spending requests to keep the next relief package
in the $20 billion range and offset the costs with equivalent savings"); see also Block, supra
note 149 (reporting on Congress's FEMA hearings).
182. Fla. Hosp. Ass'n, FHA Primer on FEMA Assistance for Hospitals 3,
http://www.fha.org/fliafemaprimer.doc (last visited Nov. 26, 2006) (noting that "FEMA
generally does not reimburse" medical facilities in disaster area for costs of increased
patient loads and operating costs); Health Workers Struggling To Meet Needs a Year After
Katrina, NATION'S HEALTH, Oct. 2006, at 1.
183. See 42 U.S.C. § 5172(a)(1)(A) (2000) (authorizing President to make contributions
to state or local governments to help repair, restore, reconstruct, or replace public facilities
belonging to such state or local governments which were damaged or destroyed by a major
disaster); id. § 5133(c) (authorizing funding for rebuilding costs). But see Medical Care
and Evacuations, Response and Recovery Directorate Pol'y No. 9525.4, § 7(B)(2) (Fed.
Emergency Mgmt. Agency, (Aug. 17, 1999)), in FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY,
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE:
POLICY REFERENCE MANUAL [hereinafter Response and
Recovery Directorate Pol'y No. 9525.4, § 7(B)(2)], available at http://www.fema.gov/
government/grant/pa/policy.pdf (defining facilities' "ineligible costs" as "[c]ost of
emergency medical treatment of any kind," "[clost of follow-on treatment of disaster
victims," "[i]ncreased administrative and operational cost to the hospital due to increased
patient load," and "[closts associated with loss of revenue").
184. See 42 U.S.C. § 5172(a)(1)(A) (authorizing President to make contributions to
state or local governments to help repair, restore, reconstruct, or replace public facilities
belonging to such state or local governments which were damaged or destroyed by a major
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Consistent with the post-9/11 legislation, the administration's
focus after Katrina was ensuring that providers could meet the

immediate health care needs of the victims. But the relief package
stopped short of providing lasting financial stabilization to the fragile
health care infrastructure. Between August 31, 2005 and September
4, 2005, Secretary Leavitt declared a state of public health emergency
in six states. 85 The declaration authorized the affected states to waive
certain Medicare, Medicaid, State Child Health Insurance Program
("SCHIP"), and Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability
186
("HIPAA") patient privacy requirements.
HHS promised full payment and exemption from noncompliance
sanctions for providers furnishing medical services in good faith but
unable to fully comply with government program requirements due to
the hurricane.18 7 CMS pledged to pay hospitals the DRG rate plus a
special add-on payment for treatment provided until appropriate
transfer could be arranged.' 88 EMTALA sanctions were waived for
patient transfers to less hazardous locales. Standard preauthorization
requirements for Medicaid, Medicare, and SCHIP were waived.189
Medicare and Medicaid claims processors were instructed to
disaster). But see Response and Recovery Directorate Pol'y No. 9525.4, § 7(B)(2), supra
note 183 (defining facilities' "ineligible costs" as "[clost of emergency medical treatment
of any kind," "[c]ost of follow-on treatment of disaster victims," "[i]ncreased
administrative and operational cost to the hospital due to increased patient load," and
"[c]osts associated with loss of revenue"). For FEMA's description of individual
assistance, see Press Release, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Emergency Assistance
Flowing to Gulf Coast: FEMA Distributes $450 Million to Victims of Hurricane Katrina
(Sept. 9, 2005), available at http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=18738
(reporting initial household payments for "emergency needs of food, shelter, clothing,
personal necessities and medical needs" of $2000 each and maximum of $26,500).
185. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
186. See Waiver Under Section 1135 of the Social Security Act (U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs. Sept. 4, 2005), http://www.hhs.gov/katrina/ssawaiver.html (listing waivers
under section 1135 of SSA); Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
Hurricane Katrina Bulletin: HIPAA Privacy and Disclosures in Emergency Situations
(Sept. 2, 2005), http://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/pdf/HurricaneKatrina.pdf (regarding
policy on patient information sharing in disaster relief situations); Press Release, Ctrs. for
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. CMS Takes
Emergency Steps To Ease Health Care Access to Katrina Victims, (Sept. 9, 2005),
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?Counter=1551
(reporting SCHIP
and Medicaid changes).
187. See Thomas Dowdell, Fulbright & Jaworski, Client Alert: Hurricane Katrina;
HHS Policy (Sept. 7, 2005) http://www.fulbright.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.
detail&pub-id=2010&site id=494&detail=yes.
188. Id. Crisis services provided to qualified beneficiaries receiving treatment in
nonqualified facilities and ambulance transfers were covered by Medicare and Medicaid.
Id.
189. Id.
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prioritize disaster response hospitals' requests for accelerated or
In addition, state professional and facility
interim payments. 9 '
licensing requirements and some HIPAA rules were waived.
Like government payers, private health insurers took steps to
reduce coverage interruption for their enrollees.1 9' Private health
plans extended due dates or granted grace periods for premium
payments and waived certain medical and pharmacy refill restrictions.
Many plans suspended prior authorization, precertification, referral,
or notification requirements for hospital admission. Some companies
deemed all physicians caring for affected members as in-network
providers regardless of their actual status. Other plans allowed
patients early refills of prescription medications and facilitated mailorder refills to replace damaged or lost medications."9
Accommodations by public and private insurers partially
addressed patients' treatment and access-to-care concerns and
But the
providers' emergency response and payment needs.
measures failed to fully address the health care crisis resulting from
Katrina. Storm-damaged facilities and evacuation of health care
providers exacerbated existing access-to-care challenges. 193 Chronicdisease patients could not find providers to provide necessary care, or
patients themselves could not be located.'94 Mental health needs rose
for victims facing loss of homes, life, property, and employment. 195
For providers, the problems were likewise multifaceted. 196 In
addition to damaged facilities and increased patient demand, Katrina
had a unique financial impact on health care providers by
190. Id.
191. Gloria Gonzalez, Health Insurers Waive Rules for Katrina Victims, BUS. INS., Sept.
12, 2005, at 51, available at 2005 WLNR 14499470 (listing insurers providing coverage
despite nonpayment).
192. Id.
193. KAISER REPORT 7387, supra note 4, at 2 ("The capacity of primary care providers
to serve low-income populations.., has been reduced or eliminated.").
194. KAISER REPORT 7538, supra note 6, at 7.
195. See id. at 9 (describing impact on low-income victims); Berggren & Curiel, supra
note 4, at 1550 (describing post-Katrina health care infrastructure); Kalb & Murr, supra
note 4, at 66 (noting region's "nickname: 'the stroke belt' " and describing chronic
disease, mental health, and public health needs of Gulf Coast residents).
196. See KAISER REPORT 7538, supra note 6, passim (describing impact on low-income
victims of pre-Katrina health and poverty problems, physical damage to health care
facilities, staffing shortages, lost medical data, disaster-related health and mental health
care needs, and other factors); see also KAISER REPORT 7387, supra note 4, at 3
(discussing effects of "Big Charity" closing, which "served as the primary safety net
hospital for thousands of New Orleans residents," with 51% uninsured and 32% Medicaid
patients); Two New OrleansHospitals Beyond Help, supra note 3 (reporting that two main
public hospitals were damaged beyond repair and will close).
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dramatically increasing the level of uninsured patients in the region.
Many victims' employers, along with their employer health insurance,
were swept away by the flood.'97 The loss of jobs and health

insurance increased the numbers of destitute and uninsured people in
the Gulf Coast region. 9 8 Yet some newly uninsured patients retained
sufficient assets that prevented them from qualifying for federal
health insurance under Medicaid, which has strict income-eligibility

limits.' 99 Other flood victims were sufficiently destitute to qualify for
Medicaid but could not meet residency requirements in the "host"
states to which they temporarily migrated.2"' The increased level of

uninsured patients translates into increased patient-care costs for
which hospitals may never receive compensation.
To address those problems, a U.S. Senate bill proposed a fivemonth disaster relief Medicaid program for all flood victims.2 ' The
Emergency Health Care Relief Act of 2005 sought to ensure
immediate access to medical care and Medicaid coverage.2 ° Income,
residency, and other eligibility requirements were waived, and other
application requirements streamlined and simplified.2 3 In addition,
197. See KAISER REPORT 7387, supra note 4, at 1 ("An estimated 400,000 jobs have
been lost; many of those who lost their jobs have lost not only their source of income but
also the health insurance coverage that their former employees offered."); Miller, supra
note 155 (quoting State Farm employee: "I've had people call and say they're not only
homeless, but they're also jobless because the place they worked is just gone.").
198. See Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, A Long Road to Recovery; Shut Out on Healthcare
After the Storm, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2005, at Al (discussing paradox of workers losing
employer health insurance yet not qualifying for government health care programs, such
as Medicaid); Dana P. Goldman & Mark A. Schuster, RAND Corp., Commentary: Health
Costs of Katrina (Oct. 11, 2005), available at http://www.rand.org/commentary/101005
UPI.html (noting victims "deprived of paychecks and employer-sponsored health
insurance" are "[s]uddenly unable to pay their medical bills"); KAISER REPORT 7387,
supra note 4, at 1 ("Katrina has raised both the number of people in poverty and the
number of uninsured living in the States hit by Katrina as well as in the States of refuge");
Health Workers Struggle To Meet Needs a Year After Katrina, supra note 182 ("Already
home to a large poor and uninsured population before the storm, Hurricane Katrina
altered the health care landscape in New Orleans, exacerbating the problem.").
199. See Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 198 ("Under present rules for Katrina victims, if
you are destitute, the government will pay your medical bills .... But if you're an adult
who had a job that included health benefits and you lost the job because of the storm, the
government can't seem to help.").
200. See Rosenbaum, supra note 3, at 438 (describing Medicaid's lack of portability).
201. Emergency Health Care Relief Act of 2005, S. 1716, 109th Cong. (2005); S.
Comm. on Fin., Grassley-Baucus Emergency Health Care Relief Package Summary (Sept.
14, 2005), http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2005/prgO91405asumm.pdf; see Zwillich,
supra note 4.
202. See Zwillich, supra note 4.
203. See MH Coalition Supports Health Care Bill for Katrina Survivors, MENTAL
HEALTH WKLY., Sept. 26, 2005, at 1 [hereinafter MH Support]; Editorial, Katrina Care;
Speedy Coverage for Evacuees, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Oct. 8, 2005, at 18A

2006]

DISASTER RELIEF FOR HOSPITALS

the Federal Government would pick up the entire tab for the special
Medicaid coverage, unlike traditional Medicaid, which is jointly
2 ° Similar emergency
funded by states and the Federal Government.
20 5
victims.
9/11
to
extended
was
Medicaid
The Bush administration, however, implemented an alternative
approach, authorizing states in the flood region and neighboring
states facing an influx of victims to apply individually for Medicaid
waivers. 2 6 The White House opted to negotiate "directly with
governors, one state at a time," believing it more efficient to support
the state programs already in place rather than build major new
systems. °7 Critics suggested that requiring individual negotiations
was inefficient and would delay coverage to needy beneficiaries.2 8
The Medicaid waiver programs eventually allowed displaced and
newly uninsured victims of the flood to obtain Medicaid in the states
20 9
to which they evacuated under streamlined application processes.
The waivers were temporary and not intended to become a
permanent, new federal entitlement.2 10 Six states' waivers include
[hereinafter Editorial, Katrina Care]; Zwillich, supra note 4 (quoting Grassley: "You're
entitled to Medicaid regardless of your income .... Don't worry about your healthcare.").
204. Editorial, Katrina Care, supra note 203 (noting full federal reimbursement to
states); MH Support, supra note 203, at 6 (detailing Grassley proposal to assist Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama by paying 100% of Medicaid and State Child Health Insurance
Program costs through 2006).
205. See DIXON & STERN, supra note 19, at 94-95 (describing disaster relief Medicaid
necessitated by damage to New York City's Medicaid computer system and eligibility
records, which program eased eligibility cutoffs); Rosenbaum, supra note 16, at 99
(describing post-9/11 emergency health care funding).
206. See Rosenbaum, supra note 3, at 439 (describing Bush plan).
207. Editorial, Katrina Care, supra note 203 (noting that "negotiating waivers state by
state is crazy," time-consuming, "risks wild variation," and imposes unsustainable costs on
states); see also David S. Broder, Waiting for Action; Right Words but Little PracticalHelp
for Poor,WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2005, at A25 (quoting CMS official: "The best and fastest
way to provide help to evacuees is to support the state programs in place and support the
local health care providers already in place, not to take time to build new systems.").
208. See Broder, supra note 207 (suggesting that "the Bush Administration, rather than
backing this simple and effective measure, is insisting on a slower, more cumbersome
approach, requiring each state to negotiate its own waiver from the rules limiting eligibility
for Medicaid benefits"); Editorial, Katrina Care, supra note 203 (summarizing GrassleyBaucus bill as "call[ing] for a fast, streamlined application process").
209. See Press Release, supra note 186 (discussing temporary Medicaid and SCHIP
eligibility and application); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
Estimates Show More than 40 Percent of Hurricane Evacuees Now Receiving HHS
Benefits or Services (Sept. 29, 2005), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2005
pres/20050929a.html (listing states receiving waivers); KAISER REPORT 7420, supra note 8,
at 1 (describing approved waivers and details of enrollment and coverage).
210. See Editorial, Katrina Care, supra note 203 (noting that the Grassley-Baucus plan
is temporary, suggesting that "[a]nyone can understand the administration's reluctance to
create a big new federal entitlement, especially in the costly field of health care").
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block-grant uncompensated care pools of funds, in addition to
temporary Medicaid. 1 '
Temporary emergency Medicaid was intended to address both
the uninsured patient coverage and provider payment problems.
Compensation was tied to the patient, rather than paid directly to
states or health care providers, leaving providers to track patients'
bills and collect Medicaid reimbursement through existing claimsfiling procedures. 2 2 But details have not been developed regarding
funding levels or sources for the pools or methodologies for
prioritizing or paying providers.213
The Nation remains unprepared to respond to a major disaster,
as evidenced by post-9/11 reports and drills, and, most saliently,
actual experience with Hurricane Katrina. It is difficult to predict the
timing, nature, and impact of the next major catastrophe. But the
dire threat to the health care infrastructure in the aftermath of a
large-scale disaster calls for anticipatory planning. To that end, this
Article proposes a government relief program that assures short-term
cash assistance and long-term financial stability to emergency medical
care providers.
III. DESIGNING THE SOLUTION
To develop a proposed hospital disaster relief plan, this Part
considers four pieces of legislation that addressed similar industry
insolvency, disaster relief, or compensation concerns. First, the
package of financial assistance and loan guarantees to airlines
following September 11 is a useful model of immediate cash grants
211. KAISER REPORT 7420, supra note 8, at 2 (noting that pool funds are available for

expenses incurred between August 24, 2005, and January 31, 2006).
212. See KAISER REPORT 7387, supra note 4, at 7 (advocating temporary Medicaid

because funds "follow the person" and such an approach is "the most accurate mechanism
for targeting federal assistance to the areas, providers, and low-income individuals who
most need it"); Rosenbaum, supra note 3, at 437-38 (noting that "[f]or decades the Gulf
Region population has lived daily with the consequences of the nation's gap-ridden
approach to health care financing" and "[djespite Medicaid's strengths, it lacks Medicare's
nationwide, uniform coverage potential and interstate portability").
213. See KAISER REPORT 7420, supra note 8, at 2 (noting that "critical components,"

including funding and payment mechanisms for uncompensated care pools, are not
specified); Editorial, Health Care for Katrina Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2005, at A26
("The White House has said it will reimburse health care providers who treat victims who
are not covered by Medicaid. But it has not said how much the payments would be or how
providers could access the so-called uncompensated care fund."); see also Berggren &
Curiel, supra note 4, at 1550 (quoting New Orleans Oschner Clinic CEO, when asked what
government had contributed: "Nothing. We have asked and asked [authorities] for fair
compensation, and perhaps we will get it eventually, but we cannot go on indefinitely
providing uncompensated care.").
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effectively stabilizing a vulnerable, essential industry.1 4 The second
model is the 9/11 Victims' Compensation Fund ("VCF"), which
replaced traditional tort liability with a no-fault administrative
compensation scheme. 215 A third useful example is the Medicare
Modernization Act's provision for paying hospitals for emergency
care to undocumented immigrants." 6 Finally, useful lessons emerge
from the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act ("TRIA"), which establishes
a government reinsurance program for property and casualty
insurers. 1 7
A.

Air TransportationSafety and System StabilizationAct

Within days of the 9/11 attacks on the Pentagon and World
Trade Center, Congress passed the Air Transportation Safety and
System Stabilization Act ("ATSSSA"),215 providing financial
assistance to the entire airline industry and shielding the airlines used
in the hijackings from tort liability arising out of the episode.2 91 There
is precedent for the Federal Government bailing out major, single
companies on the brink of bankruptcy. 220 But the ATSSSA was
unprecedented in two ways.
First, the government promised
assistance in anticipation of financial distress, even before airlines
faced insolvency. Second, government assistance was extended to an
entire industry, not just a single troubled company.22 1
214. See infra Part III.A.
215. See infra Part III.B.
216. See infra Part III.C.
217. TRIA is analytically distinct from the other three models in that it does not
compensate or reimburse insurers for costs resulting from a disaster that has already
struck. Instead it provides a government backstop to insurance industry exposure in the
next catastrophe. Accordingly, insurers are better able to manage risks and continue
providing coverage for terrorism, without fearing massive, unpredictable exposure.
Likewise, the plan proposed in this Article would assure hospitals before the next episode
that they would not be left holding the entire bag of disaster response costs, ensuring their
continued operations.
218. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 10742, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (Supp. 112002)).
219. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act §§ 101, 408. Airline
industry lobbyists initially sought a broad package of legislation, including immunity from
liability, low-interest loans, antitrust relief, additional compensation for Department of
Defense contracts, and fuel tax relief. See Robert S. Peck, Victim Compensation Fund:
Born from a Unique Confluence of Events Not Likely To Be Duplicated, 53 DEPAUL L.
REV. 209, 216 (2003).
220. See Margaret M. Blair, The Economics of Post-September 11 Financial Aid to
Airlines, 36 IND. L. REV. 367, 382-84 (2003) (comparing ATSSSA to Chrysler bailout).
221. See id. at 369-70 (listing prior bail-outs, including Lockheed, Chrysler,
Continental-Illinois Bank, Amtrak, the savings and loan industry, and long-term capital
markets).
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The ATSSSA package included $10 billion in federal loan

guarantees and $5 billion in direct compensation to stabilize the
already struggling U.S. airline industry.2 For three days following
the September 11 attacks, the government closed U.S. airspace and
grounded all flights, resulting in considerable loss of revenue. In

subsequent months, business and vacation travel remained slow
because of travelers' fears and alternative travel arrangements. 2 3
Also, the increased airport security and passenger screening costs fell

heavily on airlines. 224 The Iraqi war further exacerbated the
industry's crisis, with passenger bookings in early 2003 down twenty
to thirty percent from the previous year.2

The first line of ATSSSA support to the battered airline industry
was cash payouts.
Those payments were made quickly and
generously to offset losses and prevent the collapse of air travel.2 6
Immediate, post-disaster cash infusion to hospitals likewise would
ensure that the emergency health care system remains operational
and able to respond to victims' urgent medical needs.
The second line of ATSSSA support was government loan

support to ensure long-term stability. Airlines found that part of the
relief package much less accessible and harder to qualify for than the
cash grants. To access government loans, airlines had to meet several

222. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 101(a) (loan
assistance and direct compensation provisions); see also DIXON & STERN, supra note 19,
at 119-21 (describing post-9/11 airline loans and grants); Peck, supra note 219, at 216 &
n.42 (identifying rising oil prices and declining business travel as contributing factors to
"worst losses in a decade" (quoting Marilyn Adams, Airlines Edge Near Bankruptcy, Cut
Flights, USA TODAY, Sept. 17, 2001, at Bi)); Scott McCartney et al., As War Deepens
Airline Crisis, a Split over Federal Rescue Plan, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2003, at Al
(identifying labor costs and noting that "[t]he industry, already swimming in red ink, fears
losses will widen by $10 billion this year because of the war").
223. See Peck, supra note 219, at 216 (suggesting that holiday travelers avoided flying
and businesses used video conferencing); see also Richard P. Campbell, The September
lth Attack on America: Ground Zero in Tort and Insurance, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 51, 53
(2002) ("Without passengers and cash flows, the resultant dislocations from the attack
credibly threatened to bring the entire commercial airline industry down in an apocalyptic
crash like the four aircraft that disintegrated in New York, Washington and
Pennsylvania.").
224. See Amy Schatz & Susan Carey, Airlines Take Their Problems to Congress, WALL
ST. J., June 3, 2004, at B2 (discussing airlines' share of passenger screening costs and
inability to pass costs onto passengers due to fervent price competition).
225. See McCartney et al., supra note 222.
226. See Blair, supra note 220, at 380 (reporting that government paid over $2 billion to
ten largest airlines within twenty days of attacks and $3 billion additional over next few
months); see also id. at 379 (noting that air travel was halted entirely for only four days but
resumed very gradually, with domestic travel down thirty-four percent by end of
September 2001).
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prerequisites: substantial importance to the air transportation system,
necessity of financial support to remain operational 2
a viable
business plan 22 8 inability to obtain commercial credit, 229 and losses
caused directly by the September 11 attacks.230 In essence, the airline
had to be "sick" enough to not qualify for commercial loans but
"well" enough to remain a going concern after government support.
After witnessing the hurdles that some of the first applicants faced,
only a handful of small carriers even bothered to apply. The few
airlines that managed to navigate the application process received
assistance only after substantial concessions.23' Ultimately, only $1.5
billion of the $10 billion appropriation was tapped. 32 One lesson to
be drawn from the ATSSSA for a proposed hospital relief program is
that an overly arduous application process and administrative or
claims-filing burdens could threaten the effectiveness of the entire
program.

227. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization, Pub. L. No 107-42,
§ 102(c)(1)(C), 115 Stat. 230, 231 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (Supp. II
2002)) (requiring that "such agreement is a necessary part of maintaining a safe, efficient,
and viable commercial aviation system in the United States").
228. Blair, supra note 220, at 385-86 (suggesting that America West's "precarious
financial position" made it more difficult to receive financial aid under the ATSSSA and
quoting airline representative: "The message was: You need to prove you have a viable
business plan and need to be willing to pay taxpayers for the risk they are taking."); see
also Schatz & Carey, supra note 224 (discussing Frontier Airline's financial situation post9/11).
229. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 102(c)(1)(A)
(requiring that "obligor is an air carrier for which credit is not reasonably available").
230. See id. § 101(a) (listing actions President shall take "to compensate air carriers for
losses incurred by the air carriers as a result of the terrorist attacks on the United States
that occurred on September 11, 2001"); see also Schatz & Carey, supra note 224
(discussing factors for federal loan backing).
231. See Blair, supra note 220, at 385 (listing America West, Frontier, Vanguard, and
Spirit as applicants and detailing America West's concessions, including reducing $400
million request by $20 million, granting compensation in form of common stock to
government and vendors, and instituting labor cost controls, payment schedules, and
executive compensation limits); Schatz & Carey, supra note 224 (on Frontier and America
West approvals).
232. See Blair, supra note 220, at 384-87 (recounting America West's arduous path and
noting that other airline companies watched as a "rough guide" and "[didn't] like what
they saw" (quoting Micheline Maynard, Airlines Shy Away from Loan Guarantees by U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2002, at Cl)); see also Susan Carey et al., UAL Again Fails To Get
Loan Aid, Hurting Airline's Chapter 11 Plan, WALL ST. J.,June 29, 2004, at A3 (noting
that United's third denial "effectively closes the book on the loan-guarantee program"
after only $1.56 billion was paid out).
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Victims' CompensationFund
In addition to the cash and loan support, the ATSSSA also

provided relief to the airline industry through the Victims'
Compensation Fund ("VCF" or "the Fund").233 Airlines feared that
their already precarious financial stakes would be toppled by civil

liability for the massive loss of life, personal injury, and property
damage resulting from the hijackings.3 4 Trial lawyers eventually
called a moratorium on all 9/11-related lawsuits.23 5 But the potential
exposure was massive and real.236 The VCF shielded airlines from

private lawsuits while providing government compensation to victims
for physical injury or death resulting from the terrorist attacks.237

The VCF was unique among government compensation schemes
for mass torts, natural disasters, or similar episodes because payments
were made directly to victims by the Federal Government, rather

than as grants to states to be distributed to victims by the state. The
233. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act §§ 401-407; Peck,
supra note 219, at 217 (noting plaintiffs' lawyers' urging that victim compensation "had to
be a part of any relief package Congress might enact for the airlines"); see also DIXON &
STERN, supra note 19, at 20-21 (describing political backdrop for VCF provision of
ATSSSA); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Grief, Procedure, and Justice: The September lth
Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 460 (2003) (discussing impetus for
victims compensation); Georgene Vairo, Remedies for Victims of Terrorism, 35 LOYOLA
L.A. L. REV. 1265 (2002).
234. See Peck, supra note 219, at 214 (noting some victims' families immediately sought
legal representation for claims based on airline security or safety lapses that allowed
hijackers to commandeer aircraft); see also Josh Romero, A Victim's Eye View of the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 71 DEF. COUNS. J. 64, 66-67 (2004) (noting
victims could prevail on negligence theory that airline failed to take adequate measures to
prevent hijackers from boarding or provoked them once on board); Jack B. Weinstein,
Compensation for Mass Private Delicts: Evolving Roles of Administrative, Criminal and
Tort Law, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 955 (suggesting that Congress enacted ATSSSA in
response to "likelihood of tens of thousands of suits in state and federal court with tens of
billions of dollars in potential recoveries").
235. See Peck supra note 219, at 214-15 (citing statements by Association of Trial
Lawyers of America); see also Campbell, supra note 223, at 56 & n.13 (quoting the
President of the Association of Trial Lawyers: "After all, 9/11 was a mass murder, not a
mass tort.").
236. By July 2004, 450 families filed notices of intent to sue. See DIXON & STERN,
supra note 19, at 19.
237. See id. at 20-21 ("The program was the result of a political compromise that
balanced aid to victims with billions in aid to the airlines and set up a quid pro quo for the
liability restrictions."); Romero, supra note 234, at 64; Schneider, supra note 233, at 460
(summarizing ATSSSA as limiting exposure of airlines in civil litigation and providing nofault alternative to litigation for victims); Hillel Sommer, Providing Compensation for
Harm Caused by Terrorism: Lessons Learned in the Israeli Experience, 36 IND. L. REV.
335, 352 (2003) (comparing Israeli terrorism compensation scheme as "primarily intended
to compensate the victims" to VCF scheme as "primarily intended ... to defend the two
major airlines involved in the 9/11 events from lawsuits by victims and their families").
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VCF was criticized, on the one hand, for treating all victims as the
same, by calculating damages from presumed amounts within fixed
parameters. On the other hand, the Fund seemed to treat victims
unfairly by allowing certain individual adjustments such as lost
earnings. The general approach to compensating victims was to
replace the time-consuming disputes over and damages characteristic
of civil litigation with less than perfect but assured compensation.
Despite the criticism, the "rough justice" approach is a useful
approach to efficiently and fairly process a high volume of claims and
protect a key industry from insolvency. Accordingly, the VCF
analogy to hospitals is apt.
Under the VCF, 9/11 victims and their survivors had two options
for recovery: private litigation with caps on recovery or Fund
compensation. Under the first option, the ATSSSA created an
exclusive federal cause of action for all injuries "arising out of the
hijacking and subsequent crashes" of September 11.238 Jurisdiction
for those lawsuits was vested in the Southern District of New York,
and choice of law principles from the state in which the crash
occurred applied. 3 9 Victims who chose litigation would bring a
traditional civil lawsuit and bear the burden of proving all elements of
capped
the claim against the airline. Recovery in any civil lawsuit was
40
at the defendant-airline's pre-9/11 liability insurance limit.
Under the second option, victims could forfeit all rights to
recover in tort against the airlines and receive Fund compensation
instead. 4 ' Fund claimants were not required to prove fault by the
airline.2 4 They merely had to state the "factual basis for eligibility for
compensation" and provide support for damages by describing
physical harm suffered and identifying economic and noneconomic
losses. 43 Unlike under traditional tort principles, victims' collateral
sources of compensation, such as private insurance, death benefits,
and pension funds, were applied to offset the Fund compensation

238. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 408(b)(1).
239. Id. § 408(b)(2)-(3).
240. See id. § 408(a) ("liability for all claims, whether compensatory or punitive
damages, arising from the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2002, against
any carrier shall not be in an amount greater than the limits of the liability coverage
maintained by the air carrier").
241. See id. § 405(c)(3)(B)(i) (by submitting claim under this title, claimant waives right
to file civil action in any federal or state court for 9/11-related damages).
242. See id. § 405(b)(2) ("With respect to a claimant, the Special Master shall not
consider negligence or any other theory of liability.").
243. See id.§ 405(a) (requiring Special Master to develop claims form and listing
information required to be submitted by claimant).
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award. 2" A two-year statute of limitations applied to all VCF
claims. 45 The civil liability waiver did not extend to suits against the
hijackers, terrorists, their estates, or any conspirators. 46
Under the VCF, the minimum total compensation per victim,
including economic and noneconomic damages, before collateral
source offsets, was $500,000 for a victim with a surviving spouse or
dependent, or $300,000 for a single victim with no dependents.2 47
Economic loss awards were calculated based on individual
characteristics of the victim and the claimants, similar to damages
calculations in traditional tort suits. 248 Specifically, the special master
could consider the victim's age, life expectancy, marital status,
number of dependents, lost earnings, and medical costs and then
applied those factors to the presumed damages to calculate the
award.2 49 The VCF's reliance on individualized factors to determine
economic loss awards drew criticism because younger or higherearning victims received larger awards than older or lower-income
victims who suffered though the same disaster.
Variability of
244. Id. § 405(b)(6); see Kenneth P. Nolan & Jeanne M O'Grady, The Victim
Compensation Fund-Looking A Gift Horse in the Mouth, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 231, 24546 (2003) (describing collateral source offset as "the most controversial aspect of the
[VCF] program, and the most damaging to potential claimants"); see also 28 C.F.R.
§ 104.47 (2006) (listing life insurance, pension funds, death benefits, and other government
payments as collateral sources). See generally MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PRINCIPLES OF
TORT LAW 407-08 (2003) (defining collateral source rule, under which "courts have
refused to permit a defendant to subtract from a damages award payments that a plaintiff
received from third parties").
245. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization § 405(a)(3) (providing
two-year statute of limitations from date of final implementing regulations). The statute
of limitations provision also was criticized because it could preclude latent injury claims,
such as exposure to toxic substances. See Graham Rayman & Nia-Malika Henderson,
Controversies Persist; All Not Over for 9/11 Fund, NEWSDAY, June 17, 2004, at A4
(quoting firefighters' attorney seeking compensation for latent respiratory disease:
"Nobody told their lungs to show symptoms of disabling asthma by Dec. 22.").
246. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization § 408(c) ("Nothing in this
section shall in any way limit any liability of any person who is a knowing participant in
any conspiracy to hijack any aircraft or commit any terrorist act."); see also Nolan &
O'Grady, supra note 244, at 235-36 (summarizing same).
247. See 28 C.F.R. § 104.41 (2005) (establishing minimum compensation levels).
248. See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233
(Mar. 13, 2002) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104); 28 C.F.R. § 104.43 (2005) (listing factors);
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Explanation of Process for Computing Presumed Economic Loss
(Aug. 27, 2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/victimcompensation/vc-matrices.pdf.
249. See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233
(Mar. 13, 2002) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104); 28 C.F.R. § 104.43 (2005) (listing factors);
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Explanation of Process for Computing Presumed Economic Loss
(Aug. 27, 2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/victimcompensation/vc-matrices.pdf.
250. See DIXON & STERN, supra note 19, at 31-33 (discussing equities of individually
evaluating economic loss for victims); Nolan & O'Grady, supra note 244, at 240-41
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awards seemed unfair to some, especially because the government,
rather than the purported tortfeasor, was providing the
compensation. It seemed only fair that a no-fault compensation
program, funded with taxpayer dollars, should treat all victims the
same.
Other rules on Fund compensation restricted victims' recovery.
Economic loss was limited to the types and categories of damages that
21
would be compensable under applicable state law in a civil tort suit.
Noneconomic loss compensation was a presumed, fixed amount, not
individualized to victims or claimants. 2 The presumed noneconomic
damages amount was $250,000 for decedents, plus $100,000 for the
spouse and each dependent, with applicable deductions for collateral
sources of compensation. 3
By the special master's account, the VCF was a success of both
administrative efficiency and victim compensation. The deadline for
submitting claims was December 22, 2003. By that date, 98 percent of
eligible claimants had elected Fund compensation over private
litigation.25 4 Fewer than 100 families opted out of the VCF and
proceeded with private lawsuits against airlines and other
defendants. 5 The Fund was shut down on schedule, on June 15,
2004, with all claims paid or authorized for payment within twenty
days of shutdown.256 Over 7,300 claims, totaling $7.1 billion, were

(discussing Cantor Fitzgerald families' compensation and special master's individual
determinations).
251. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42,
§ 402(b), 115 Stat. 230, 237 (2001) (authorizing economic recovery "to the extent recovery
for such loss is allowed under applicable State law"); 28 C.F.R. § 104.42 (2005)
(interpreting statute as not permitting compensation for "those categories or types of
economic losses that would not be compensable under the law of the state that would be
applicable to any tort claims brought by or on behalf of the victim").
252. See 28 C.F.R. § 104.44 (2005).
253. See id. (presumed noneconomic losses); see also DIXON & STERN, supra note 19,
at 34-35 (regarding whether presumed damages were adequate).
254. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Closing Statement from the Special Master, Mr.
Kenneth R. Feinberg, on the Shutdown of September l1th Victim Compensation Fund,
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/victimcompensation/closingstatement.pdf (last visited Nov.
26, 2006) [hereinafter Closing Statement].
255. See Douglas McLeod, September 11 Compensation Fund Closes; Fewer than 100
Suits To Proceed, Bus. INS., June 21, 2004, at 3, available at 2004 WLNR 1765921 (noting
that fewer than 100 civil lawsuits against the World Trade Center's owner, airlines, and
other defendants went forward after 9/11 fund closed); see also Court Partially Grants,
PartiallyDenies Dismissal of Suits Arising from Terrorist Aircraft Crashes, N.Y. L.J., June
21, 2004, at 17 (reporting some plaintiffs waived right to civil suits by not timely
withdrawing VCF claims while others were timely withdrawn and proceeded as lawsuits).
256. Closing Statement supra, note 254.
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processed by the VCF.257 Individual awards ranged from $250,000 to
$7.1 million."' Despite the criticism, the VCF scheme, including
direct compensation and the "rough justice" approach, provides
useful models for a proposed hospital disaster relief plan.
C. Medicare Modernization Act Section 1011
EMTALA's "unfunded mandate" is particularly burdensome on
hospitals that treat high numbers of undocumented aliens. For
example, California hospitals provided an estimated $500 million in
emergency care to undocumented immigrants. Arizona hospitals
spent an estimated $91 million for emergency services to
undocumented immigrants.2 59 Nonlegal residents typically do not
qualify for coverage through employer health plans or most
government health care programs. 26 ° Estimating the proportion of
services provided to undocumented aliens is difficult because
hospitals do not routinely ask patients' immigration status and
undocumented aliens may be reluctant to self-identify. 6'
Until passage of section 1011 of the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 ("Medicare
Modernization Act" or "MMA"),262 hospitals looked to three
257. See id.
258. See McLeod, supra note 255 (citing statistics).
259. See Nathanael J. Scheer, Note, Keeping the Promise: Financing EMTALA's
Guarantee of Emergency Medical Carefor Undocumented Aliens in Arizona, 35 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1413, 1422-24 (2003) (citing United States/Mexico Border Countries Coalition study).
260. See 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (2000); see also Kaiser Comm'n on Medicaid & the
Uninsured, Kaiser Family Foundation, Immigrants' Health Care Coverage and Access 1-2
(Mar. 2001), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/Fact-Sheet-ImmigrantsHealth-Care-Coverage-and-Access.pdf (discussing immigrants' disproportionate lack of
health coverage). But see 8 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1)(A) (2000) (providing Medicaid benefits
for care and services necessary for treatment of emergency medical conditions).
261. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS: QUESTIONS
PERSIST ABOUT THEIR IMPACT ON HoSPITALS' UNCOMPENSATED CARE COSTS 3 (2004)

[hereinafter UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS], available at' http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d04472.pdf (discussing lack of reliable data); Frederick Isasi, New Source of FederalFunds
for Emergency Care Presents Novel Challenges to Providers, J. HEALTH CARE
COMPLIANCE, Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 25, 25-26 (discussing difficulty estimating costs but
reporting "that they have increased steadily over the last decades and may run into the
billions of dollars each year"); cf JOHN HOLAHAN & ALLISON COOK, KAISER FAMILY
FOUND. REPORT, No. 7411, ARE IMMIGRANTS RESPONSIBLE FOR MOST OF THE
GROWTH OF THE UNINSURED? 9, available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/AreImmigrants-Responsible-for-Most-of-the-Growth-of-the-Uninsured-issue-brief.pdf
(concluding that immigration trends are not responsible for increased uninsured in U.S.).
262. Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1011(a)(1), 117 Stat. 2066, 2432-35 (2003) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd (Supp. III 2003)). The MMA attracted considerable attention for certain
major revisions to the Medicare program, including prescription drug coverage
("Medicare Part D") and beneficiary health plan choice. See Press Release, Ctrs. for
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principal sources of federal funding to cover the costs of caring for
undocumented aliens.2 63
First, undocumented immigrants with
serious medical conditions may qualify for short-term, emergency
Medicaid. 4 Second, the federal disproportionate share hospital
("DSH") program provides supplemental payments to hospitals that
treat a disproportionate share of low-income patients. 265 Finally, the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 provided $25 million annually to be
distributed among the twelve states with the highest shares of
undocumented aliens to cover emergency care costs of patients who
are not eligible for Medicaid under state requirements.26 6
Section 1011 appropriated $1 billion over three years to
compensate hospitals and other providers for the costs of emergency
services provided to undocumented and certain other aliens, based on
Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") statistics. 267 The
total $1 billion was divided into $25 million allotments for years 2005
through 2008. Two-thirds of the money was divided proportionately
among all fifty states and the District of Columbia based on relative
percentages of undocumented aliens. The remaining one-third was
divided among the six states with the highest proportion of

Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Proposed
Regulations to Implement the New Medicare Law: The Next Step Toward Prescription
Drug Coverage, Better Benefits and Lower Costs for Medicare Beneficiaries (July 26,
2004),

available

at

http://www.cms.hhs.gov/media/press/release.asp?Counter=1129

(summarizing MMA and implementing regulations).
263. See UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS, supra note 261, at 3; Scheer, supra note 259, at
1422-24.
264. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(2)(A) (2000) (regarding reimbursement for "emergency
medical condition"); see, e.g., Utah Dep't of Health, Emergency Medicaid Services (2004)
(brochure), available at http://health.utah.gov/eol/forms/pdffiles/pm921.pdf;
S.C.
Appleseed Legal Justice Ctr., Emergency Medicaid for Immigrants (brochure), available
at http://www.scjustice.org/pdfs/Emergency%20Medicaid%20brochure.pdf.
265. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-4 (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
266. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4723(a), 111 Stat. 251, 515
("for each of the 4 consecutive fiscal years (beginning with fiscal year 1998) $25,000,000
for payments to certain states"); Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs.,
U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., CMS Implements $1 Billion Program To Help
Hospitals, Others Recoup Unpaid Emergency Room Costs (July 22, 2004), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/media/press/release.asp?Counter=1123
(announcing
"new
program to support all aspects of emergency treatment-including hospital, physician, and
ambulance services-that have been strained by providing uncompensated care for
undocumented immigrants"); see also Scheer, supra note 259, at 1422-23 (citing border
state study on emergency care costs).
267. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-173 § 1011(a)(1), 117 Stat. 2066, 2432 (2003) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd
(Supp. III 2003)).
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undocumented aliens.268 The legislation authorized CMS to establish

the payment methodology and other implementing regulations for
section 1011.269
CMS defined the term "alien" to include undocumented and

certain other immigrants entering the United States under special visa
categories.27 °

Various issues arose regarding how hospitals would

determine patient eligibility and immigration status without violating
other federal statutes and discouraging necessary medical care.27 1
CMS initially proposed that providers make a good faith effort to
verify citizenship status for section 1011 payment purposes.272 That
provision drew sharp criticism because it would have imposed
excessive administrative burdens on hospitals and discouraged
patients from seeking medical treatment.27 3 CMS initially insisted
that documentation was necessary to ensure that section 1011
274

compensation was provided consistently with the statutory purpose.

The Agency reminded providers that under EMTALA they could not

268. See Emergency Clearance:
Public Information Collection Requirements
Submitted to the Office of Management and Budget, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,578, 25,578 (U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs. May 13, 2005).
269. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act
§ 1011(c)(2)(A)(ii) (regarding payment determinations and authority to establish different
methodologies for different providers); see also § 1011(d)(1)(B) (requiring Secretary "to
ensure that inappropriate, excessive, or fraudulent payments are not made from the
allotments"). CMS published the proposed implementation approach and solicited public
input through written comments and two live, open-door forums. See Ctrs. for Medicare
& Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Proposed Implementation
Approach: Federal Funding of Emergency Health Services to Undocumented Aliens:
Federal Fiscal Years 2005 Through 2008 (July 21, 2004) [hereinafter Proposed
Implementation], available at http://www.nilc.org/immspbs/health/lssueBriefs/SeclOll
Reimbrsmnt.pdf. CMS then sought emergency review and approval in compliance with
statutory timeframes.
See Emergency Clearance:
Public Information Collection
Requirements Submitted to the Office of Management and Budget, 70 Fed. Reg. at
25,578.
270. See Proposed Implementation, supra note 269, at 9 (including those authorized to
enter for medical services and "laser visas"); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1011(a)(6) (2000).
271. See Mary Beth Sheridan, Hospitals Won't Have To Ask Immigrant Status, WASH.
POST., Oct. 5, 2004, at B3.
272. See Proposed Implementation, supra note 269, at 17-18 (proposing "patient based
documentation approach" and asking providers "to make a good faith effort to obtain
citizenship information"). Patient information requests could also implicate HIPAA.
273. But see id. at 18 (rejecting view that request "could inappropriately discourage
persons from seeking needed emergency medical services" and suggesting that paperwork
burden "is minimal").
274. See id. at 17 (stating that "section 1011 funds are limited" and noting importance
of ensuring that funds are used for purpose authorized by the statute).
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delay treatment to inquire about citizenship status or otherwise
discriminate against patients based on citizenship status. 75
But CMS later softened its stance and proposed a method for
determining a patient's eligibility for section 1011 coverage through
"indirect documentation. '27 6 Hospitals may inquire about a patient's
eligibility at discharge but only after the patient is identified as selfpay or Medicaid-eligible. If a patient provides a border-crossing card
or other eligible visa, a copy of that documentation may be submitted.
Otherwise, documentation based on a foreign place of birth plus
additional verification, such as a foreign birth certificate, voting card,
passport, driver's license, or other identification card could be used.
Other acceptable documentation includes an expired visa, invalid
border crossing card, or invalid U.S. Social Security number.27 7
Various health care providers, including hospitals, physicians,
and ambulances, may qualify for compensation under section 1011.
Hospitals' EMTALA-required screening and stabilization treatment
is covered along with, in some cases, inpatient or outpatient services
beyond the emergency room. Section 1011 payment eligibility begins
when the EMTALA duty begins, or when a patient presents at the
emergency room or other defined areas requesting emergency care.278
If an undocumented alien requires inpatient admission to stabilize the
emergency medical condition, those additional services are covered,
but only to the extent necessary for stabilization. Ongoing treatment
for any underlying condition is not covered.2 79 CMS "presumes" that
stabilization will occur within two days following the emergency room
275. See id. (suggesting that documentation could be obtained consistent with
EMTALA requirements).
Public Information Collection Requirements
276. See Emergency Clearance:
Submitted to the Office of Management and Budget, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,587, 25,587 (May 13,
2005) (recognizing the burdens of verifying documentation and that "asking a patient to
state that he or she is an undocumented alien in an emergency room setting may deter
some patients from seeking needed care").
277. See id. at 25,586-87 (describing indirect patient-based documentation approach
and acceptable verification methods); Ctrs. for Medicaid & Medicare Servs., U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., Form CMS 10130A Section 1011 Provider Payment
Determination 2 (Jan. 2006), available at http://www.CMS.hhs.gov/cmsforms/downloads/

cms10130a.pdf ("A provider should not ask a patient if he or she is an undocumented
alien. However, if a patient voluntarily informs you that he or she is, [then section 1011
payment is available].").
278. See Emergency Clearance:
Public Information Collection Requirements
Submitted to the Office of Management and Budget, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,583 ("For hospital
services, we are adopting a position that payment will be made for covered services that
would begin when the hospital's EMTALA obligation begins.").
279. See id. ("To be considered stable, a patient's emergency medical condition must
be resolved, even though the underlying medical condition may persist.").

278
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visit and may review all claims extending beyond two days of

inpatient care.28° Similarly, outpatient treatment deemed necessary
for stabilization, such as setting a broken bone or providing sutures,
performed in a hospital outpatient department is covered. Physician
services after discharge are not covered, even if the services are
followup or related to the original emergency. 81 Medically necessary
ambulance transports, including transfers, are covered.282

To qualify for section 1011 reimbursement, Medicareparticipating hospitals and other providers may submit abbreviated
applications. 283 Non-Medicare providers are not required to enroll

fully in Medicare to receive section 1011 payments but must complete
the Medicare enrollment application and meet Medicare COPs. 2 4 In
addition, providers must attempt to collect payment from all other

available payment sources, including private

insurance, other

government health care programs, and patients before claiming

section 1011 reimbursement. 28 5 Any section 1011 overpayments must

be refunded if compensation from other sources is later received.286
Traditionally Medicare rules prohibit hospitals from "balancebilling," or requesting additional payment from patients above the
Medicare-approved amount.
The balance-billing prohibition is

280. Id. (stating that "we believe that most patients are stabilized within 2 calendar
days" and announcing plan "to review inpatient admissions that go beyond 2 calendar
days").
281. Id. at 25,584 (discussing coverage for outpatient and physician services).
282. See id. at 25,584 (describing coverage for ambulance services). The proposed
methodology covered all inpatient and outpatient treatment, as well as treatment
"related" to the emergency medical condition. See Proposed Implementation, supra note
269, at 9-10 (interpreting "related" treatment more broadly than emergency clearance).
283. See Emergency Clearance:
Public Information Collection Requirements
Submitted to the Office of Management and Budget, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,584-85 (describing
enrollment process).
284. Id. at 25,585 (describing process for non-Medicare providers). CMS relied on the
existing Medicare application process to facilitate electronic claims payment and reduce
fraud and abuse. See Proposed Implementation, supra note 269, at 12-14; see also Privacy
Act of 1974: Report of a New System of Records, 70 Fed. Reg. 45,397, 45,397-98 (U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs. Aug. 5, 2005).
285. See Emergency Clearance:
Public Information Collection Requirements
Submitted to the Office of Management and Budget, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,585-86 ("adopting
a position that each provider seek reimbursement from all available funding sources"); see
also Proposed Implementation, supra note 269, at 14-15 (discussing reimbursement from
other payers). Grants and gifts to hospitals do not affect section 1011 reimbursement. Id.
286. See Emergency Clearance:
Public Information Collection Requirements
Submitted to the Office of Management and Budget, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,586 (stating that
"if a hospital or other provider receives a payment from a third-party payer subsequent to
a section 1011 payment[,]" the provider must notify CMS and "overpayment may occur").
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28 7
designed to avoid creating inequities among Medicare beneficiaries.
Under section 1011, by contrast, the legislation requires hospitals to
collect payment from other available sources, including patients,
contrary to the traditional balance prohibition. The change from the
otherwise applicable Medicare reimbursement rule is consistent with
the objective of section 1011 as a government compensation fund for
truly uncompensated, "free" care provided to undocumented
immigrants. 288 A similar "payer of last resort" approach would be
appropriate for a government compensation fund for care provided to
disaster victims.
With respect to the payment methodology, section 1011
generally follows the Medicare methodology to calculate payment.289
CMS elected to use the Medicare payment methodology, tying
funding to specific patients, rather than extending lump-sum
payments to hospitals, similar to DSH funds. Accordingly, providers
must submit claims following the intricate hospital, physician,
ambulance, and other payment methodologies and fee schedules to
recover section 1011 reimbursement.2 0 The traditional Medicare
reimbursement methodology may be workable for section 1011 but is
not appropriate for catastrophe scenarios involving a sudden demand
surge for emergency medical services. The expected patient demand
and related administrative burdens for section 1011 hospitals likely
would be steady and routine, similar to normal patient flow. By
contrast, hospitals responding to a major disaster would face a
sudden, unprecedented demand surge and related difficulty filing
timely and accurate claims for payment. The extraordinary number
of claims would quickly overwhelm government and private
contractor claims processors, resulting in payment delays and

287. See id. at 25,585 (allowing providers to balance-bill eligible self-pay patients "for
the appropriate costs after a section 1011 payment has been made"); HALL ET AL., supra
note 36, at 921-22 (comparing Medicare and Medicaid policies on balance-billing, defined
as prohibition on charging more than program's payment); RAND ROSENBLATT ET AL.,
LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 485-87 (1997) (describing Medicare
mandatory assignment and balance-billing prohibition for hospitals).
Public Information Collection Requirements
288. See Emergency Clearance:
Submitted to the Office of Management and Budget, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,585 (suggesting
approach "is consistent with the statutory intent of this provision and will limit
reimbursement to only those instances where no other reimbursement is likely to be
received").
289. See id. at 25,589.
290. See id. at 25,591 (listing specific, applicable payment rules); see also supra Part I.C
(describing Medicare reimbursement methodology).
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denials."' Meanwhile, hospitals would be left bearing substantial
uncompensated care costs until they eventually were paid.292 A
hospital disaster relief plan, therefore, should rely on a less onerous
payment approach than the existing Medicare methodology.
D.

TerrorismRisk InsuranceAct

The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 ("TRIA") was
enacted a year after the 9/11 attacks, on November 26, 2002.293 TRIA
establishes a government reinsurance program for future terrorism
losses.294 It does not compensate insurers for payments made under
policies in effect at the time of the 9/11 attacks.2 95
TRIA provides a federal backstop for property and casualty
insurers and policyholders by sharing a portion of terrorism losses up
to a fixed cap.296 Health, life, automobile, homeowners', and other
individual consumer policies are not covered. 297 Therefore, patients,
health care providers, and health insurers are not insulated under
TRIA from full losses or costs for medical treatment and services
incurred during a terrorist attack. TRIA was scheduled to sunset on
December 31, 2005, but Congress was urged to extend the deadline or
make the law permanent.298 Those suggestions took on greater force
291. See Stephen Franklin & Bruce Japsen, No Rush To Claim Cash for ER Bills;
Hospitals Cite Ethics, Red Tape as Obstacles, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 17, 2006, at C1 ("The

biggest deterrent to applying for the money, [experts] explain, is concern about timeconsuming paperwork that can offset any money gained.").
292. See Belmont et al., supra note 2, at 538-39, 547 (discussing administrative
challenges of traditional payment arrangements); Rosenbaum et al., supra note 1, at 65-66
(discussing tension in public health emergencies and traditional contract-based insurance).
293. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 101(a)-(b), 116 Stat.
2322, 2322-23 (2002) (regarding enactment).
294. See Saul Levmore & Kyle D. Logue, Insuring Against Terrorism-and Crime, 102
MICH. L. REV. 268, 277 (2003) (explaining that under TRIA "the federal government will
provide reinsurance for ninety percent of all property casualty losses attributable to 'acts
of terrorism' "); Robert L. Rabin & Suzanne A. Bratis, Financial Compensation for
Catastrophic Loss in the United States, in DANIEL A. FARBER & JIM CHEN, DISASTERS
AND THE LAW 195, 195 (2006) (describing TRIA as "exemplif[ying] the federal

government assuming the role of excess liability insurer, in effect providing a cap on the
losses for which the private insurance industry will be responsible in the event of a major
act of terrorism").
295. See Levmore & Logue, supra note 294, at 276 (describing how life and property
insurers were "able to meet their financial obligations arising out of the events of 9/11").
296. See PETER CHALK ET AL., TRENDS IN TERRORISM: THREATS TO THE UNITED
STATES AND THE FUTURE OF THE TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT 5-9 (2005); Robert
J. Rhee, Terrorism Risk In a Post-9/l1 Economy: The Convergence of Capital Markets,
Insurance,and Government Action, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 435, 454-59 (2005).
297. See Levmore & Logue, supra note 294, 306-07 (on exclusions).
298. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 108(a), 116 Stat.
2322, 2322-23 (2002) (regarding sunset provision); see, e.g., William R. Berkley, Expand
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after Katrina and included proposals to expand the program to
natural disasters.2 99 Just days before the scheduled sunset, the
President 30signed
a two-year extension, but limited the coverage to
terrorism. 0
Before 9/11, the insurance industry generally estimated the
probability of a homeland terrorist attack as very remote.
Accordingly, policy premiums reflected little incremental increase to
cover possible terrorism losses. Therefore, when policyholders
sought recovery for terrorist-related losses, the insurance industry
was severely underfinanced to cover the enormous volume and value
of claims, amounting to over $30 billion at the low end of estimates.3 °'
In the aftermath of 9/11, insurers reacted by charging enormous
premiums for new terrorism coverage, limiting coverage, or refusing
to cover terrorism altogether.3 °2 All but five states passed legislation
allowing insurers' to sell policies with terrorism risk exclusions
following 9/11.303 TRIA nullified those state laws and required
insurers to offer property and casualty coverage for loss due to
terrorism that does not "differ materially from the terms, amounts,
and other coverage limitations applicable to losses arising from events

the Terror Insurance Safety Net, WALL ST. J.,Sept. 20, 2005, at B2 (urging TRIA extension
and suggesting that Federal Government should be ultimate responder to terrorism);
Holman Michael Schroeder, Insurers Fight To Save Terrorism Safety Net, Opponents Say
Taxpayers Shouldn't Underwrite Industry's Exposure to Losses from Attacks, WALL ST. J.,
May 5, 2005, at A4 (noting bipartisan divide).
299. See, e.g., Jenkins, supra note 19 (arguing that "[wihat was tolerable government
subsidy for terrorism insurance would be unalloyed madness if extended to natural
disasters"); see also Jeffery R. Brown et al., An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Economic Impact
of Federal Terrorism Reinsurance, 51 J. MONETARY ECON. 861, 867 (2004) (discussing
"differences between terrorism risk and other types of natural and man-made
catastrophes" and justifications for government reinsurance).
300. See Robert J. Rhee, CatastrophicRisks and GovernanceAfter Hurricane Katrina:
A Postscript to Terrorism Risk in a Post-9/11 Economy, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 581, 600 (2006)
(discussing extension and market impact of TRIA); Mark A. Hofmann, Just-in-Time
Extension for Terror Coverage Backstop, BUS. INS., Jan. 2, 2006, at 12 (discussing
controversy over extension and final resolution).
301. See Brown et al., supra note 299, at 868-69 (reporting insurance loss estimates
between thirty billion dollars and seventy billion dollars and industry reaction); Levmore
& Logue, supra note 294, at 269 ("Insured loss estimates range from 30 to 100 billion
dollars ....
");see also Rhee, supra note 296, at 442-59 (describing pre- and post-9/11
insurance markets and government response).
302. See Brown et al., supra note 299, at 871-73 (describing proliferation of terrorism
exclusions by primary and reinsurers following 9/11 and states' reactions).
6
303. See id; Rhee, supra note 296, at 451 n. 9 (citing Jeffery E. Thomas, Exclusion of
Terrorist-Related Harms from Insurance Coverage: Do the Costs Justify the Benefits? 36
IND. L. REv. 397 (2003)).
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other than acts of terrorism. '"" TRIA does not require policyholders
to purchase terrorism insurance, but insurers' participation is
mandatory. °5
TRIA operates prospectively for any future terrorism losses. It
does not provide ex post subsidies for insured losses incurred in the
9/11 attacks or other possible terrorism-related events,3 6 such as the
anthrax episode, prior to the Act's passage. Coverage is activated
when the Secretary of Treasury certifies, with confirmation by the
3 7 resulting
Attorney General, an "act of terrorism""
in insured losses.
The insurance industry is fully responsible for the first $5 million in
annual losses. After the $5 million level is reached, the Secretary of
Treasury is authorized to release TRIA support.3 8 Insurers cover a
portion of the remaining claims as a "deductible," based on a fixed
percentage of each company's direct earned premiums, meaning that
large insurance companies pay a proportionately larger share of the
aggregate deductible than smaller companies.3 9 The deductible was
7% of direct earned premiums in 2003, the first year of TRIA,, 10%
for 2004, and 15% for 2005.310 Above the applicable deductible, the
government bears 90% of the loss up to a maximum $100 billion per
year. 311 The government's portion is paid out of general revenues
and, thus, operates as a taxpayer subsidy to the insurance industry.312

304. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 103(c)(1)(B), 116
Stat. 2322, 2322-23 (regarding enactment); see Levmore & Logue, supra note 294, at 27677 (discussing industry concerns, including widespread reports that "reinsurers were
planning to insert broad terrorism exclusions" in new and renewal policies).
305. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 103(a)(3); Brown et al., supra note 299, at 874
(noting that "[t]hrough the end of 2004, insurers are required to 'make available property
and casualty insurance coverage for insured losses that does not differ materially from the
terms, amounts, and other coverage limitations applicable to losses arising from events
other than acts of terrorism' " (quoting Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 103(c)(1)(B)).
306. See supra notes 294-95 and accompanying text.
307. "[A]n act that is dangerous to human life, property, or infrastructure ...
[committed] to coerce the civilian population of the United States or to influence the
policy or affect the conduct of the United States Government by coercion." Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act § 102(1)(A); see also 31 C.F.R. § 50.5(b) (2006) (providing similar
definition).
308. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 102(1)(B)(ii).
309. See CHALK et. al., supra note 296, at 6 (noting that "[in effect, for large insurance
groups, this deductible can be quite high-well over $1 billion); Rhee, supra note 296, at
455 & n.97 (describing premiums and citing examples).
310. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 102(7) (defining "Insurer Deductible").
311. Id. § 103(e)(1)(A) (regarding ninety percent share); § 103(e)(2) (regarding one
hundred billion dollar cap).
312. See Brown et al., supra note 299, at 865 (describing funding debates and variations
in proposed and finally enacted versions); Rhee, supra note 296, at 456 (characterizing
programs as federal subsidy).
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If annual losses exceed the government's $100 billion cap, the
government will no longer provide any subsidy.313
TRIA also authorizes the government to require insurance
policyholders to subsidize the relief program. Up to specified
thresholds, the government bears all losses and is not allowed to
recoup any payment from policyholders. 14 If annual terrorism losses
exceed the applicable threshold, the government may recoup the
payouts through "surcharges" on individual insurance policies, which
may not exceed 3% of the policy's annual premium.3 15
The first, immediate objective of TRIA was to correct post-9/11
market disruptions and ensure continued availability and affordability
of terrorism insurance. The second, long-term objective was to allow
a transitional period for the market to stabilize, resume pricing, and
build capacity to cover future losses.3 16 A GAO study of TRIA
implementation, presented to the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, on May 19, 2004, suggested that TRIA
had generally met the first goal by ensuring that terrorism insurance
continues to be available and affordable for commercial
policyholders. 3 7 By the end of 2004, nearly half of large and midsize
U.S. insurers carried terrorism property insurance, up 27% from the
previous year. 18

313. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act §§ 102(7), 103(e); see also Brown et al., supra note
299, at 874-75; Levmore & Logue, supra note 294, at 277; Rhee, supra note 296, at 455;
Richard R. Stedman II, Comment, Of Hurricanesand Airplanes: The CongressionalKneeJerk Reaction to September 11, 49 LOY. L. REV. 997, 1009-12 (2003).
314. The threshold was $10 billion in 2003; $12.5 billion in 2004; $15 billion in 2005.
Stedman, supra note 313, at 1011 n.106.
315. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act §§ 103(e)(6)(A), 103(e)(8)(C); see Brown et al.,
supra note 299, at 874-75 (describing "mandatory recoupment of the federal share of
losses up to... $10 billion in the first year of the program" through "a premium surcharge
on property-casualty insurance policies"); Stedman, supra note 313, at 1011-12 & nn.11112 (describing recoupment provisions). For example, annual TRIA-covered losses for
2005 would be fully federally funded (from general revenue and insurer deductibles), with
no policyholder subsidy, up to $15 billion. Between $15 billion and $100 billion, the
Federal Government would pay 90% of the claims. Above $100 billion, insurers would be
responsible for 10% of claims.
316. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 101(b).
317. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TERRORISM INSURANCE: EFFECTS OF THE
TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT OF 2002, at 1 (2004) [hereinafter GAO TRIA
REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04307.pdf (providing statement of
Richard J. Hillman, Director of Financial Markets and Community Investment, before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs).
318. See Schroeder, supra note 298 (citing statistics from the insurance company
Marsh, Inc.).
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TRIA's second goal of encouraging development of a viable
private market has not been as successful.319

Despite increased

availability, most policyholders have not purchased terrorism
insurance, perhaps perceiving a low threat of terrorism relative to
purchase

premiums.3"'

In

addition,

terrorism-risk

insurance

premiums remain high because primary insurers cannot obtain
private reinsurance for their own risks. Reinsurers remain unwilling
to sell terrorism coverage without a federal backstop. In addition, the
uncertainty about the future of TRIA, alleviated somewhat by the
"'
recent two-year extension, undermines industry stability.32
Insurers also expressed concern about the Act's actual operation,
such as the length of time the Secretary of Treasury may take to
certify a terrorist event and potential inefficiencies and time lags in

processing and paying claims.322 Delay in payment of claims "might

seriously impact insurer cash flows or, in certain circumstances,
' TRIA does not specify a timeframe for the Secretary to
solvency."323
certify a triggering "act of terrorism." Most states, however, have
laws requiring prompt payment of insurance claims. Accordingly,
insurers may be required to pay insurers' claims in full while
indefinitely awaiting government reinsurance under TRIA, which
could create a cash flow problem for insurers.324 In sum, TRIA has
received mixed reviews as an insurance industry stabilization effort."
319. See GAO TRIA REPORT, supra note 317, at 15 (concluding that insurance
industry has not yet achieved Congress's second objective); Schroeder, supra note 298
(citing GAO TRIA REPORT observing little industry coordination to establish private
system); see also Rhee, supra note 296, at 456-60 (questioning achievement of either of
Congress's two objectives).
320. See GAO TRIA REPORT, supra note 317, at 3, 9-10 (noting low take-up rates and
high concentration of purchases in urban areas perceived most at risk); CHALK ET AL.,
supra note 296, at 25 (estimating "terrorism insurance take-up rates at approximately onehalf of insured commercial assets" and recommending permanent government program
with "policies that encourage increased purchase ...such as tax subsidies and reduced
deductibles"); Levmore & Logue, supra note 294, at 304 (discussing problems of
noncompulsory program).
321. See CHALK ET AL., supra note 296, at 58 (suggesting that TRIA's sunset would
slow industry recovery); GAO TRIA REPORT, supra note 317, at 12-14 (suggesting that
reinsurers have cautiously returned to market); Schroeder, supra note 298 ("Industry
backers say making the law permanent would lead to more stability in the insurance and
real estate markets.").
322. GAO TRIA REPORT, supra note 317, at 2.
323. Id. at 6.
324. Id. at 6-7.
325. See CHALK ET AL., supra note 296, at 55 (suggesting that TRIA has been
"moderately successful in ...encouraging insurers to reenter the market"); Brown et al.,
supra note 299, at 878-80 (providing empirical results indicating generally negative effect
of TRIA on insurance industry); Mark A. Hofmann, AIA Chief Aims for Consensus;
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Nevertheless, the law provides useful approaches for addressing the
potentially dramatic effects of the next disaster on the health care
industry.
IV. PROPOSED HOSPITAL DISASTER RELIEF PROGRAM

As first responders in the next 9/11, Katrina, or other previously
unimaginable disaster, hospitals play an essential role in providing
emergency treatment to potentially unprecedented numbers of
patients. The Nation's emergency health care system already is on
financially shaky ground, without the added burdens and costs of
preparing for and responding to the next disaster.32 6 Policymakers
have devoted considerable attention and funding to disaster
preparedness but have given little consideration to the challenges
presented after hospitals treat victims and attempt to return to
normal operations. Accordingly, ex ante consideration should be
given those unique administrative and financial pressures to ensure
that hospitals are promptly and adequately compensated for their
crucial first responder roles in the next disaster.
A.

ATSSSA Analogy

The economic pressure that hospitals would likely face
responding to a major public health emergency is similar to the airline
industry's post-9/11 financial crisis.3 27 Hospitals, like airlines before

Public UnderstandingIs Key Goal, BUS. INS., Jan. 2, 2006, at 3, available at 2006 WLNR
365865 (quoting AIA president's comment that extension "is just a temporary solution, so
we will have some significant responsibilities throughout the course of that two-year
period of time addressing from a policy perspective what we do on a permanent basis");
Levmore & Logue, supra note 294, at 269 ("provid[ing] a skeptical view of government
intervention in property-insurance markets generally and of the particular federal
terrorism-reinsurance regime that Congress recently adopted"); Rhee, supra note 300, at
600 (discussing economic impact of TRIA and other government insurance); Schroeder,
supra note 298 (discussing controversy over extending TRIA).
326. See Inst. of Med. of the Nat'l Acad., The Future of Emergency Care in the United
States, http://www.iom.edu/?ID=16107 (last visited Nov. 13, 2006) (reporting results of
three related studies); Ambulances Find Overwhelmed ERs "at Breaking Point," supra
note 60 (describing IOM study and noting that "nationwide crisis comes from just day-today emergencies" and "[elmergency rooms are far from ready to handle the mass
casualties that a bird-flu epidemic or terrorist strike would bring").
327. See Blair, supra note 220, at 379 (noting that "[b]y almost any measure, the airline
industry suffered a huge economic cost in the wake of the events of September 11");
Campbell, supra note 223, at 53 ("The commercial airlines were the first industry brought
to the brink of complete failure. Without passengers and cash flows, the resultant
dislocations from the attack credibly threatened to bring the entire... industry down in an
apocalyptic crash like the four aircraft that disintegrated in New York, Washington and
Pennsylvania.").
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9/11, are already suffering serious financial shortfalls and market
pressures.32 8 The analogy between the airline and hospital industries
is not entirely apt, however. Specifically, the post-9/11 financial
pressures for airlines derived from severely reduced passenger
demand for air travel, whereas hospitals, following a disaster, would
face exploding demand, especially for urgent care.
Hospital
emergency rooms should expect a demand surge, not reduced patient
loads.32 9 That unprecedented utilization creates inherent financial
exposure, especially in the health care industry, in which services
typically are provided upfront with payment expected later.
In both cases, however, the problem is cash flow: for airlines,
revenues were down because passengers were afraid or reluctant to
fly; for hospitals, revenues would be down because unprecedented
demand for care and higher than normal numbers of uninsured
patients would lead to payment delays and under-reimbursement.3 30
Therefore, just as ATSSSA cash grants helped prevent industry-wide
insolvency for airlines, similar immediate cash infusion into the health
care industry would ensure that hospitals would not collapse under
the financial pressures of disaster response. As with airline relief
under the ATSSSA, the government relief should be extended before
hospitals become insolvent, to prevent them from going out of
business.
One justification for government relief to an industry is that the
Government caused or exacerbated the industry's financial straits.33 1
The Government partially caused the airlines' troubles by mandating
a three-day grounding order and increased security requirements.
Likewise, the Government, in part, would be responsible for causing
financial distress for hospitals in disaster response. As a matter of
federal law, hospitals are required to provide emergency screening
328. See supra Part I.B (describing EMTALA burden).

329. See Santora, supra note 11 ("[T]he most significant problem in 1918 [at the height
of the Nation's major smallpox epidemic], as it would most likely be today, was the sheer
inability of hospitals to deal with a sudden surge in patient demand."); see also
Ambulances Find Overwhelmed ERs "at Breaking Point," supra note 60 (quoting Emory's

chief of Emergency Medicine: "If your can barely get through the night's 911 calls, how
on Earth can you handle a disaster?").
330. See Blair, supra note 220, at 380 (noting that initial cash payouts "prevented the
cash flow crisis from turning into a rash of bankruptcies at a number of small airlines and
even a few large airlines"); see also Campbell, supra note 223, at 57 (describing $5 billion
payouts).
331. For a similar argument, see Jeffrey Manns, Insuring Against Terror? 112 YALE
L.J. 2509, 2520 (2003) ("The close interplay between the federal government's foreign
policy decisions and the existence of terrorist threats suggests that the federal government
may be at least partly responsible for 'creating' many of the risks posed by terrorism.").
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and stabilization for any patient on their doorstep, with no assurance
of payment. EMTALA creates an emergency care safety net for the
uninsured, funded by hospitals and insured patients, to the extent
hospitals shift uncompensated care costs.33 2
Certain 9/11
preparedness laws expand hospitals' emergency response duties and,
accordingly, expand their financial exposure to providing
uncompensated care to uninsured patients. To the extent that the
Government's first responder orders contribute to hospitals' financial
strain, government financial support is justified.
The airline analogy also is useful because a terrorist attack
affected the entire industry. Likewise, a major disaster would likely
affect the entire health care industry, or at least a major geographical
region, as volunteer health care workers from outside the disaster
area would be called to respond and patients transferred to distant,
safer hospitals. Therefore, in both cases, it seems appropriate that
government relief should be aimed at the entire industry, rather than
targeted to particular businesses or hospitals.333
Airlines and hospitals are also analogous because they both
provide essential services to the public. Air travel has become an
essential part of modern business and personal interactions. Health
care, to an even greater degree, is an industry that we quite literally
cannot live without. Both industries are key components of the
Nation's economy and provide vital services to consumers. Lack of
access to emergency health care could produce costly externalities
and increase health care costs overall, as patients' conditions become
increasingly acute or infectious disease spreads. Therefore, health
care, like air transportation or national security, may be considered a
"public good," calling for collective response and government support
334
to ensure that essential care continues to be available.
332. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
333. See Blair, supra note 220, at 382-84 (explaining the similarities between the
ATSSSA and the federal bailout of the Chrysler corporation).
334. See id. at 371-72 (discussing economic rationale for airline assistance, including
externalities, "public goods," and highly valued services that the market otherwise would
not adequately provide, such as education); see also Ford, supra note 30, at 133-34
(observing that "current public policy requires assuring that all Americans will receive
adequate medical care" and "[b]ecause medical care is so important" the government
"pays much of the medical expense for selected populations" that lack private health
insurance). But see Priest, supra note 19, at 235 (rejecting view that catastrophic losses
"generate public goods problems" and suggesting "government is particularly ineffective
as an insurance provider and even as a regulator"). See generally Lawrence 0. Gostin,
Preface to PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS: A READER xix, xxiv-xxv (Lawrence 0.

Gostin ed., 2002) (discussing public health externalities, collective goods, and government
responsibility and power).
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The argument for government relief for hospitals is even
stronger than for airlines because hospitals already provide an
uncompensated "public good" under the EMTALA mandate.3 35
Airlines are not similarly compelled to offer free flights to passengers
who claim an urgent need to travel. In that context, government
relief for hospitals could be viewed not as a "bailout" or gratuitous
handout, but as "earned compensation" for public services already
rendered.
The ATSSSA also offers specific implementation lessons. First,
the most successful part of the program, cash grants to shore up a
struggling industry immediately after the disaster, would also be
important to a hospital relief plan. The ATSSSA's long-term loan
support program was not effective, however, in large part due to the
overly rigorous, complex application process.336 Though intended to
ensure the most efficient allocation of scarce government resources,
the prerequisites and other hoops that airlines were required to jump
through ultimately undermined the program.
B.

VCF Analogy

The VCF provides a useful "rough justice" model for balancing
efficiency concerns against payment accuracy. Victims electing Fund
compensation gave up the risks and expense of private litigationeven though successful litigants could enjoy full, "make whole"
compensation-in favor of assured payment under a streamlined,
albeit less individualized, process.337 Similarly, disaster response
hospitals likely would be willing to accept assured government
compensation and reduced administrative burdens, even if the
amount is less than they could have collected by filing individual
patient reimbursement claims.
Doctrinally, the VCF is an awkward analogy for hospital
compensation, in that it replaces tort compensation, which is

335. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text (describing costs of EMTALA
compliance).
336. See Blair, supra note 220, at 394 (suggesting that ATSSSA terms "are nearly as
stringent as (and maybe more stringent than) the airline would face in the private financial
markets"); see also supra Part III.A (describing ATSSSA).
337. See DIXON & STERN, supra note 19, at 6-7 (stating that one compensation system
objective is economic efficiency, which includes "transactional efficiency," or transferring
resources "using the least resources possible"); Sommer, supra 237, at 351 (comparing
Israeli approach of choice between government compensation and rights under other laws
with U.S. "carrot and stick" approach requiring waiver of personal injury claim to opt into
VCF).
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premised on a "wrong" for which the tortfeasor owes damages.33 8
Part of the justification for the government paying VCF awards was
as an expression of sympathy.339 While we were all "damaged," at
least emotionally, by the terrorist attacks, the direct victims suffered
even greater harm. Government compensation, as a collection of
taxpayer contribution to the victims especially affected seemed

appropriate.
Another way of justifying VCF awards is under the tort law
expectation that where there is a wrong, there is a remedy. n With
the terrorists themselves casualties of the plane crashes and the
conspirators' identities unknown, the domestic airlines on which the
hijackings occurred became the most likely defendants in victims'
lawsuits. To protect airlines from insolvency while still allowing
victims to recover for the wrong done to them, the government
stepped in to provide compensation.34 1
Likewise, government compensation for hospitals could be
considered "damages" to the disasters' "victims," in the sense that the
losses and extreme financial exposure would not have occurred if the
government had taken adequate steps to protect us or prevent the
disaster from occurring.342 Moreover, hospitals might be especially
affected "victims," in their essential emergency care capacity. The
"government failure" justification for special compensation might be
338. See Campbell, supra note 223, at 54-55 (comparing traditional tort laws that
"provide compensation for injured people and those who suffer property damage through
normative decision-making by jurors, roughly allocating responsibility along lines of fault
and causation" with VCF, which "will also raise questions about the role of fault, and the
need for lengthy and costly litigation to adjudicate it, in compensating individuals for
injuries and damages suffered in tragic events"). See generally John G. Culhane, Tort,
Compensation, and Two Kinds of Justice, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1027 (2003) (arguing that
VCF confuses theories of corrective justice, i.e., tort law, and distributive justice, i.e.,
allocation of goods in society, and discussing the government's proper role with respect to
the separate theories).
339. See DIXON & STERN, supra note 19, at 20-21.
340. See generally Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403, 403
(1992) ("At private law the sufferers of wrongful harm can recover compensation from
those who have wronged them.").
341. Congress authorized appropriation of "such sums as may be necessary to pay the
administrative and support costs," and specified that this appropriation "represented the
obligation [of] the Federal Government to provide for the payment of the amounts." Air
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-42, §§ 404(b),
406(b), 115 Stat. 230, 238, 240 (2001) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 40101 note (Supp. II 2002));
Campbell, supra note 223, at 61 (quoting same).
342. See Levmore & Logue, supra note 294, at 279 (justifying VCF as government
compensation for national security failure); Manns, supra note 331, at 2521 (suggestirg
that "[t]he rationale that the federal government should internalize the costs from terrorist
attacks that its foreign policies may have helped to provoke has remained unspoken").
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stronger for a terrorist attack rather than a natural disaster, which is
'
less clearly the government's "fault."343
Even if the government is not
at fault for the initial natural disaster, it could be blamed for failing to
adequately warn, predict, or respond, as Katrina starkly illustrates. 3"
Moreover, the public collectively experiences the economic and
emotional impact of major disasters, no matter who is to blame. This
shared loss justifies government response.345
Alternatively, government relief for hospitals perhaps is more
analogous to contract than to tort law. Perhaps they are not "victims"
of a disaster, but rather providers of services that "unjustly enriched"
the government and the public. The government would provide
compensation to hospitals not as injured "victims" deserving
damages, but as government contractors providing a service for which
payment is due. The government has a preexisting obligation under
Medicare, Medicaid, and other government health care programs to
pay for the services provided to program beneficiaries.3 46 The

343. See Brown et al., supra note 299, at 867-68 (comparing terrorism and natural
disasters to justify government response, including magnitude of loss, ability to predict
occurrences, and government's role in preventing and mitigating magnitude of losses);
Levmore & Logue, supra note 294, at 278-79 (suggesting that public reaction and demand
for government relief may be stronger for terrorist attack than natural disaster because the
former "draws in the entire nation in a way that natural disasters do not" whereas "natural
disasters typically hit only a well-defined fraction of the country and of the economy,
creating the quintessential concentrated and politically effective interest group"). "In
Israel, where every restaurant and bus has become a potential frontline in terror's war,"
government compensation for terrorism is justified on the same grounds as benefits to
victims of the armed forces and their families, i.e., viewing civilian victims of terrorism as
"involuntary soldiers." Sommer, supra note 237, at 339.
344. See, e.g., Levmore & Logue, supra note 294, at 299 (suggesting government may
have superior information-gathering capabilities than private industry); Spenser S. Hsu,
Chertoff Vows To 'Re-Engineer' Preparedness,WASH. POST, Oct..20, 2005, at A2.
345. See Levmore & Logue, supra note 294, at 288 (describing Winston Churchill's
argument for government compensation for World War II property damage as
"reflect[ing] the conviction that the entire nation was joined in the struggle as one");
Deborah M. Mostaghel, Wrong Place, Wrong Time, Unfair Treatment? Aid to Victims of
Terrorist Attacks, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 83, 86 (2001) (noting that Congress justified an
Oklahoma City memorial since survivors' "losses and struggles" were "shared with a
community, a Nation, and the world").
346. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395g (2000) (regarding Medicare payment), id. § 1396b (2000)
(regarding Medicaid grants and payment to providers under state plans). See generally 42
C.F.R. § 482 (2005) (Medicare conditions of participation); U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., Medicare Enrollment for Institutional Providers (May 2006), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareProviderSupEnroll/downloads/providers.pdf;
U.S. Dep't
of Health & Human Servs., Form CMS-855A Medicare Enrollment Application:
Institutional Providers (June 2006), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/cmsforms/
downloads/cms855a.pdf. Medicaid enrollment varies under state-specific plans. Despite
Medicare and Medicaid programs' social welfare origins, they are increasingly operated
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exigencies of the disaster situation would not change or nullify that
standing contractual agreement to pay. Likewise, private insurers are
contractually obligated to pay for medical services provided to plan
enrollees. 3 47 But for uninsured or underinsured patients, there is no
preexisting promise to pay hospitals.348 Hospitals typically bear the
cost of providing care to the uninsured and offset the losses through
cost-shifting or other strategies. 349 But a terrorist attack or natural
disaster is anything but "typical." The extraordinary circumstances
justify extraordinary government financial support for hospitals."'
The contract analogy also makes sense in a broad "social contract"
sense, in that health care may be considered a community need
appropriately and most effectively provided by the central
government.35 1 If securing the Nation's health is appropriately a
government function, then the government should pay hospitals that
provide those services for the community on the government's behalf.
Setting aside the tort or contract rationales for government
compensation, the VCF provides other useful ideas for a hospital
disaster relief plan. First, the VCF demonstrates the merits of a
under commercial insurance and contract principles. See Rosenbaum, supra note 16, at
97-98 (comparing private insurance arrangements and government programs).
347. See Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 24, at 635 (describing private health
insurance transaction as "a reimbursement payment from insurance plan to provider" and
third-party payment agreement); Ford, supra note 30, at 11-15 (tracing history of health
insurance and noting that "hospitals developed programs in which they agreed to provide
certain services in exchange for a set annual fee"); Rosenbaum et al., supra note 1, at 64
(describing private insurers' obligations as "contractually defined and limited to enrolled
members and sponsors" and that "[p]ublic insurers such as Medicare and Medicaid ... are
governed by laws that operate in a manner similar to the insurance contract").
348. For limited exceptions, see supra Part I.C (listing government funding for
uninsured care). See also KAISER REPORT 7329, supra note 26, at 8 (suggesting that a
bigger problem than uncompensated care is "unreimbursed [care], meaning the payments
received for services provided do not cover the full costs of providing these services" and
that "hospitals often lose money on Medicare and Medicaid patients").
349. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing "cost-shifting"); Brad
Delong's Semi-Daily Journal, Problems with the Market for Health Insurance, http://econ
161.berkeley.edu/movable-type/ (Nov. 15, 2005 14:19 EST) (quoting Paul Krugman and
noting that patients unable to obtain private health insurance or qualify for Medicaid may
"receive 'uncompensated' treatment, which ends up being paid for either by the
government or by higher medical bills for the insured").
350. Public hospitals face a similar crisis under economic downturn and funding cuts.
See KAISER REPORT 7329, supra note 26, at 12 ("As the number of uninsured in the
country climbs, our safety net hospitals ... will continue to be called on to fill the gaps,
stretching resources and services that are already nearly stretched to the breaking point.").
351. See Michael Walzer, Security and Welfare, in PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS,
supra note 334, at 69, 69-76 (positing that government forms to serve community needs
and that health care, like security and welfare, is a community need); see also Levmore,
supra note 16, at 30 (suggesting that "the subset of citizens in need of extensive health care
is more difficult to organize").
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rough justice or quid pro quo approach, i.e., trading payment
accuracy for efficiency.352 Most 9/11 victims readily gave up the risks
of tort litigation and the potential for full compensation in favor of
speedy, certain less-than-make-whole awards. Likewise, hospitals
would likely be willing to forgo intricate, highly technical claim-byclaim filing requirements in exchange for prompt, assured payment,
even if the amount was less than they might otherwise have received
under normal circumstances.
The VCF also instructs that different circumstances may call for
different rules. For example, under traditional tort law, victims'
recovery is not reduced for collateral sources whereas Fund awards
were.35 3 The different approach served as an effective way to ration
limited government funds and ensure that payments were made only
for losses not otherwise compensated.3 54 Similarly, a workable plan
for hospital compensation should relax the traditional, cumbersome
approach to provider reimbursement. Complexity and accuracy
should yield to flexibility to ensure that hospitals respond quickly to
unforeseen circumstances. 55
C.

Section 1011 Analogy

Section 1011 is a close analogy for a hospital disaster relief fund
in purpose, if not in operation. Both programs are designed to
alleviate the financial burden of providing emergency care to
uninsured patients. A significant portion of the U.S. population lacks
health insurance or is inadequately covered. 6 Even if hospitals fairly
352. Workers' compensation is another example of a no-fault, quid pro quo
compensation scheme. See MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND
ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 793 (7th ed. 2001) (noting that the "heart of

workers' compensation is a basic quid pro quo," in which employers provide workers
medical and income benefits for workplace injuries and illnesses, regardless of fault, and

employees treat workers' compensation benefits "as their exclusive remedy ... and give
up any common law tort claims").
353. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
354. See Robert A. Katz, Too Much of a Good Thing: When CharitableGifts Augment
Victim Compensation, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 547, 548 (2003) (discussing rationale for VCF
collateral source reduction and whether VCF awards should be reduced similarly by
amount of charitable gifts claimants received); see also Campbell, supra note 223, at 62
(characterizing special master's attitude towards the "Fund as precious government
monies that should be controlled and dispersed with caution and circumspection" and
Department of Justice's view that "society generally and the bar specifically should not
look at the Fund as it would ordinary tort recoveries").

355. See Rosenbaum et al., supra note 1, at 64 (discussing private insurers' response to
public health emergencies).
356. See John Holahan & Allison Cook, MarketWatch: Changes in Economic
Conditions and Health Insurance Coverage, 2000-2004, HEALTH AFF. (web exclusive),
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may be expected to bear the costs of providing uncompensated
emergency care under routine circumstances, section 1011 and the
proposed disaster relief program recognize that they should not have
to bear the entire burden when the demand for uncompensated care
is unusually high.357 The unusual financial burden on hospitals in
disaster relief areas and locales with high levels of undocumented
immigrants justifies government relief.
The section 1011 compensation approach, like the VCF, reflects
a policy decision that government, as opposed to private, funds
should be available only to the extent that other funding sources are
exhausted. Just as the VCF changes the traditional collateral source
rule, section 1011 changes the traditional "balance-billing"
prohibition, preserving government funds as a "last resort" for
hospitals unable to collect from other insurers or payment sources.358
Likewise, the proposed disaster relief plan should be a last resort
fund. Hospitals should be required to collect from all other available
sources, including private insurance, government health care
programs, DSH adjustments, workers compensation, and private
charity pools before receiving government disaster relief.35 9 Hospitals
that receive upfront government funding for care provided to disaster
victims, for which they are subsequently reimbursed through other
sources, should refund the government assistance "overpayment."
Despite the close analogy between section 1011 compensation
and disaster relief for hospitals, one key feature of the section 1011
approach should be rejected. Section 1011 adopts the complex

Nov. 1, 2005, at W5-498, W5-498, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.
498v1 (citing 2005 Census Bureau data on 45.8 million uninsured Americans, an 850,000
person increase from 2003 to 2004); Rosenbaum, supra note 16, at 96 & n.9 (citing a 2003
Congressional Budget Office report finding that "40 million Americans are uninsured on a
full-year basis" or "60 million if a point-in-time measurement system is used"). But see
CATHERINE HOFFMAN & JOHN HOLAHAN, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., REPORT No. 7384,
WHAT IS THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY TELLING US ABOUT THE NUMBER OF
UNINSURED? 1 (2005), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7384.pdf
(critically examining census bureau statistics on levels of uninsured and suggesting

numbers may be lower than indicated).
357. See supra notes 277-90 and accompanying text (discussing allocation of section
1011 funds); cf Rosenbaum et al., supra note 1, at 64-65 (describing commercial insurers'
lack of coverage, exclusions, denials, and delays for public health emergencies). See
generally Levmore & Logue, supra note 294, at 281, 291-94 (stressing importance of
limiting assistance to uninsured losses).
358. See supra Part III.B-C (describing VCF and section 1011).
359. See Levmore & Logue, supra note 294, at 291 ("[The terrorism relief program
should] provide only for uncompensated or uninsured losses. This structural spine of any
relief system-the limitation of benefits to uninsured losses-is what sustains public
sympathy for the relief effort, even as it serves the function of reducing moral hazard.").
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determine

undocumented

provider

immigrants.36 °

Borrowing that approach for the disaster relief fund would not
address the essential challenge of responding to a sudden demand
surge and obtaining prompt payment on the massive numbers of
claims.361 A disaster relief fund would be more effective in the form
of block grants, rather than compensation tied to individual patients.
For similar reasons, states' Medicaid programs failed to provide
adequate coverage for patients or payment for providers in the wake
of Katrina.362 Instead, direct grants or lump-sums to providers,

similar to the uncompensated care pools included in some states'
Medicaid waiver programs, would be better suited to assist hospitals
struggling to remain operational after responding to a major
catastrophe.363
D.

TRIA Analogy

TRIA, like the ATSSSA, was a government program aimed at
industry-specific stabilization after 9/11.
Property and casualty
insurers, like airlines, faced potential insolvency following the
terrorist attacks.3" But the financial threat for insurers was not loss of

customers, like airlines, but unprecedented demand for collections on
terrorism insurance policies and requests for new coverage. Likewise,
hospitals' financial burden following a disaster is not loss of business
but increased demand.

360. See supra notes 289-90 and accompanying text.
361. See Berggren & Curiel, supra note 4, at 1550 (describing demand surge and
reimbursement challenges post-Katrina). But see Franklin & Japsen, supra note 291
(suggesting that paperwork burdens have also deterred providers from enrolling in section
1011).
362. See supra notes 202-13 and accompanying text (describing disaster relief Medicaid
waiver programs).
363. See Rosenbaum et al., supra note 1, at 65 (noting that "government may elect to
bypass the issue of coverage and directly bear the costs, out of general or dedicated
revenues"); Rosenbaum, supra note 16, at 99-100 (comparing expanded public insurance
approach to direct financing approach); supra note 211 and accompanying text (describing
uncompensated care pools under Katrina Medicaid waivers). Another option would be
for the government to "subsidize through a demand-side deduction, credit, or direct cash
transfer, all property insurance that covers terrorism risk." Levmore & Logue, supra note
294, at 309.
364. See Brown et al., supra note 299, at 868-69 (noting that while the industry vowed
that they "would not invoke 'acts of war' exclusions" after 9/11, it also asserted that it was
"not in a position to continue to insure additional large terrorism losses going forward,
and that some form of federal assistance was needed"); cf. Levmore & Logue, supra note
294, at 277 (suggesting that insurance industry may have overstated financial impact of
9/11).
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September 11 represented the largest insured losses from a single
event in the Nation's history,365 causing concern that the industry was
undercapitalized to cover the magnitude of losses resulting from
future major terrorist attacks. Although virtually all of the claims
were paid, insurers were anxious to avoid similar exposure in the
Insurers needed government assistance not as
future.366
compensation for costs or losses already incurred, as in the three
foregoing models, but rather, as prospective market stabilization to
ensure continued availability of terrorism insurance. Similarly, health
care providers would benefit from ex ante assurance that government
support will protect them from insolvency resulting from the high
demand for services in the next disaster, so that they can keep their
doors open to patients.367
Health care providers' major task in disaster response is
responding to victims' immediate medical needs. But they also face
serious challenges during recovery resuming normal operations and
providing essential care to the affected community. Various post-9/11
terrorism laws extend some financial support for hospitals' disaster
preparedness efforts, in terms of staffing, stockpiling, and
Other laws allow federal, state, and local
communications.
authorities to invoke special powers to ensure that essential medical
care is available by waiving licensing requirements, taking control of
health care facilities, and, in some cases, conscripting medical
professionals into emergency service.3 6 The laws allow, and may
compel, hospitals to meet the patient demand surge but do not
address the cost of providing care to those unprecedented numbers of
patients. Like insurers, hospitals are understandably concerned about
365. See Brown et. al., supra note 299, at 868 (citing insured loss estimates from $30
billion to $70 billion).
366. See CHALK ET AL., supra note 296, at 1-2 (noting that TRIA "was intended to
stabilize insurance markets reeling from the enormity of claims" after 9/11 and to address
the industry's concern that "they would not be able to cover additional strikes"); Brown et
al., supra note 299, at 865-68 (discussing challenges predicting "low frequency, high
severity events" but suggesting that government intervention in terrorism insurance may
not have been necessary); Levmore & Logue, supra note 294, at 276 (noting that
"[d]espite the vast magnitude of the insured life and property losses, there seems to be
little doubt that most life insurers and property insurers will be able to meet their financial
obligations arising out of the events of 9/11"); Rhee, supra note 296, at 463 (suggesting
that the industry could "absorb as much as a $100 billion loss").
367. See Rosenbaum, supra note 16, at 100 (suggesting that TRIA model "could be
adapted to health care through legislation that combines broadened coverage with federal

reinsurance guarantees" and "financed through a combination of special premium fees
and [government] stop-loss coverage"); cf Sommer, supra note 237, at 343 (describing an
Israeli system that includes state-funded medical care for injured victims).
368. See supra Part 1.D (describing federal preparedness laws and MSEHPA).
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how to recover those costs, as they balance their books in the relative
calm that follows the storm.
TRIA assured the insurers that they would not have to bear the
cost of terrorism coverage without a backstop. That assurance
allowed the industry to stabilize and continue providing terrorism
coverage without fear of unlimited exposure. Similarly, stability in
the health care industry would be well served by enacting a relief plan
before the next disaster, assuring hospitals that federal financial
support would be available to backstop the extraordinarily high
uncompensated care costs.
Ex ante assurance of payment also could prevent hospitals from
taking steps to plan for the disaster response financial exposure in
ways that could be harmful to patients and the public. Without
assurance of government support, hospitals might try to build up
reserves or otherwise "self-insure" against the potential losses. For
example, through the typical cost-shifting strategy, they might
increase charges for insured patients now to build up revenue
reserves to cover uninsured patient losses later.369 To prevent their
own profit margins from being depleted by providers' higher charges,
insurers, in turn, likely would increase subscribers' premiums. As
health care premiums rise, fewer people could afford insurance,
exacerbating the country's existing uninsured crisis.37 A TRIA-style
government backstop for hospitals facing unprecedented demand
surge could avert such a spiral.37 t
In addition, ex ante assurance of financial support would
encourage health care providers to continue providing essential
medical services despite the mounting financial toll. As the Gulf
Coast Region experienced in Katrina, a major catastrophe could
result in emergency room closures as hospitals facilities are damaged
or destroyed, medical personnel residing in the disaster area are
forced to seek refuge elsewhere, and financial losses become

369. See generally Weeks, supra note 61, at 1255-65 (describing market and regulatory
incentives and restrictions on hospital charge inflation).
370. See supra note 356 (citing studies and statistics on current level of uninsured in
U.S. population). See generally Rhee, supra note 296, at 461 (tracing economic "domino
effect" of a potential failure to provide insurance for future terrorist attacks, including
rising costs, "prohibitively expensive" premiums, higher prices elsewhere in economy, and
overall "damaged economy").
371. Cf Katherine Swartz, Government as Reinsurer for Very-High-Cost Persons in
Nongroup Health Insurance Markets, HEALTH AFF. (web exclusive), Oct. 23, 2002, at

W380, W381-82, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2.380v1 (discussing
merits of government health care reinsurance and describing precedent in other contexts,
including catastrophe reinsurance and secondary mortgage markets).
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unsustainable. Even if hospitals were not legally obligated to provide
emergency care, we might hope that altruism, patriotism,
communitarian values, or other moral or nonlegal considerations
would prevent them from refusing to treat disaster victims despite
economic losses. But the staggering costs, liability exposure, fear of
infectious disease, or other injuries could rationally limit the amount
of voluntary free care extended by even the most altruistic
providers.3 72 After Katrina, private charities and churches sought
FEMA reimbursement for the extensive aid provided to flood
victims.373 Despite strong criticism, the government extended FEMA
funds to many charity rescue organizations. 374 To the extent that the
unprecedented demand and staggering uncompensated costs threaten
charitable, health care, and other facilities' financial solvency, ex ante
372. See ESAR-VHP DRAFT, supra note 96, at 17 (proposing comprehensive approach
to issues facing volunteer health care providers with goal of ensuring adequate response);
James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Volunteer Health Professionalsand Emergencies: Assessing and
Transforming the Legal Environment, 3 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE
STRATEGY, PRAC. & SCI. 216, 216-17 (2005) (explaining background and need for ESARVHP).
373. Joyce Howard Price, Keep the Faith, and They Will Come; Religious Folk Step
Forward To Clean Up After Katrina,WASH. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2005, at Al, available at 2005
WLNR 17408153 (reporting on charities' aid and FEMA reimbursement).
374. Charities expressed concern that government compensation was incompatible
with charitable purposes and would discourage private donations. Civil rights advocates
suggested that financing faith-based charities violated separation of church and state. See
Baird Helgeson & Gretchen Parker, Emergency Officials Plan To Get Religion: Churches,
Others Asked for Help, TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 9, 2005, at 1, available at 2005 WLNR 16796685
(FEMA plans "for the first time [to] use taxpayer money to reimburse churches and other
religious organizations that provided shelter, food and supplies); see also Alan Cooperman
& Elizabeth Williamson, FEMA Plans To Reimburse Groups for Hurricane Aid, WASH.
POST, Sept. 27, 2005, at Al (explaining that some civil liberties groups "accept the need
for the government to coordinate with religious groups in a major disaster, but not to 'pay
for their good works' "); Annie Laurie, As Usual, Churches Get Credit, Taxpayers Get the
Bill; FEMA Church Give-Away Sets Egregious Precedent, FREETHOUGHT TODAY, Nov.
2005, at 3 ("FEMA's messy plan to reimburse churches is financially and constitutionally a
river of no return."); Richard Walden, Too Much Generosity Goes to Red Cross,
NEWSDAY, Sept. 26, 2005, at A42 (Red Cross continued to collect private donations while
receiving government compensation). But see The Bad Samaritan, INVESTOR'S BUS.
DAILY, Oct. 3, 2005, at A18 ("To some liberal groups, separation of church and state
means churches and faith-based groups shouldn't be paid back for helping hurricane
evacuees. How is aiding flood victims an establishment of religion?"); Linda Chavez,
Reimburse Faith GroupsAiding Hurricane Victims, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Sept. 29, 2005,
at A17 ("[W]hat really angers the anti-religion Left is how much more effective private
and religious groups are in getting things done than Big Government ever can be.");
Paying for Charity; FEMA Storm Aid Is Justified, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR-TRIB.,
Oct. 1, 2005, at A16 ("[G]iven the extraordinary human needs generated by the disasters,
this one-time compensation program is demonstrably necessary."). For an argument for
"supercharged subsidy for charitable gifts over direct government relief," see Levmore &
Logue, supra note 294, at 308-09.
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promise of compensation assures that they do not hesitate to respond
to victims' needs the next time around.375

Additional lessons from Katrina suggest the importance of an ex
ante approach. We saw that the government, when compelled, can
act quickly to provide necessary financial and other support.376 Ex
post programs, however, may be cluttered by political special
interests, sympathy, and overestimation of risks.377 In addition, a

program implemented in haste may not coordinate effectively with
existing laws.378 Moreover, laws driven by sympathy in the wake of a
catastrophe, rather than by cooler heads in calmer times, might work
injustice by extending compensation for persons or entities affected
by one particularly dramatic or salient catastrophe while denying
similar compensation to victims of a less dramatic or more localized
event.3 79 Accepting the rationale that the government, rather than
health care providers alone, should bear some of the costs of disaster

375. See Levmore & Logue, supra note 294, at 291-95 (discussing merits of permanent
versus episodic government relief and moral hazard, sympathy, delays, and uncertainty).
376. See supra Part II.B (describing post-Katrina response).
377. See Levmore & Logue, supra note 294, at 296 (describing "apparent, or perhaps
opportunistic, panic in the insurance industry following the attacks of 9/11 and the claim
that those attacks had rendered terrorism risks

. .

. 'uninsurable' "); Rhee, supra note 296,

at 440 (suggesting that one ex post drawback, is that it is "often subject to a mix of political
motivations, sympathy, and perceived (if not always correct) economic needs"); Sommer,
supra note 237, at 335 (describing U.S. approach as "ad hoc quick fix arrived at under
severe time constraints in the emotional aftermath of major terrorist attacks and causing
multiple issues of inequity"); see also Brown et al., supra note 299, at 864 (stating that
"government intervention ... results primarily from rent-seeking behavior of special
interest groups" and programs such as TRIA "may be viewed as opportunistic attempts to
secure an ex ante wealth transfer for taxpayers"); id. at 877 (suggesting that life insurers
were left out of TRIA because of less active lobbying).
378. See Mostaghel, supra note 345, at 83 (suggesting that Congress tends to pass
terrorism legislation in response to individual episodes and that in "emotional aftermath,"
lawmakers "are not necessarily concerned with how, or even whether, these laws
coordinate with other similar laws"); Sommer, supranote 237, at 359-60 (discussing ad hoc
versus permanent compensation systems).
379. See Levmore & Logue, supra note 294, at 282-86 (describing factors prompting
greater government relief for 9/11 than previous attacks, such as earlier World Trade
Center bombing, Oklahoma City bombing, or attack on U.S.S. Cole); Sommer, supra note
237, at 360 (advocating permanent terrorism compensation and noting the "first and most
intriguing problem in the American scheme of case-by-case legislation is the evident
inequality between victims similarly situated"); Posting of Saul Levmore to The University
of Chicago Law School Faculty Blog, http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2006/01/
katrina_a_cash_.html#more (Jan. 26, 2006 09:25 CST) (discussing problems with ex post
aid allocation and suggesting that "[p]oliticians take the temperature of the country's
taxpayers and send more money to a desperate locality the more the people are
sympathetic"); Rosenbaum, supra note 16, at 99 (discussing how the "sheer magnitude" of
9/11 disaster minimized political disputes about financing emergency).
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response, the relief should be available in all instances, regardless of
380
magnitude, scope, or source.
E. Proposed HospitalDisasterRelief Plan
Drawing lessons from four legislative models that addressed
similar industry financial pressures, my proposed hospital relief plan
includes three parts: First, hospitals should receive immediate cash
grants to ensure that they remain operational both during and after
the disaster. This aspect of the plan could be modeled on the
ATSSSA airline cash assistance program. The funds should be
available without unduly burdensome procedural requirements that
would delay, deter, or undermine hospitals' access to the funds.
Second, the plan should provide funding, in the form of block
grants, to cover direct care costs for treating disaster victims. Even
though many patients may carry insurance, the volume of claims and
other administrative demands on providers, billing clerks, and claims
processors working in a disaster scenario would likely cause payment
delays and denials. Hospitals struggle to "float" unreimbursed costs,
even at normal volumes, much less the unprecedented volumes to be
expected in a major disaster. Therefore, they would benefit from
government "loans," until payment is made from other sources. If
payment is forthcoming, the government funds that were advanced
should be returned as an overpayment. Government compensation
would be a "last resort," as under the VCF's collateral source offset
rule or section 1011's balance-billing allowance. The loan assistance
should be provided as grants or subsidies, directly to the provider, not
as reimbursement that is tied to the patient, because one of the
central problems for hospitals in a demand surge situation would be
compliance with traditional, complex reimbursement methodologies.
The third part of the plan should provide a government pool of
funds for uninsured care. This uncompensated care "backstop,"
modeled on TRIA, would be triggered only in a declared public
health emergency when uninsured losses reach a specified,
catastrophic level. Hospitals would be expected to bear some routine
level of uncompensated care, even in a disaster. But the government
380. See supra note 334 and accompanying text (describing "public goods" notion of
health care); supra note 343 and accompanying text (suggesting that "government failure"
justifies intervention); see also Sommer, supra note 237, at 360 ("If we are to accept a
rationale that the society, rather than the individual innocent victim, should bear some of
the cost of the terrorist attack, this rationale should apply to all victims of terrorism,
regardless of the number of victims in a specific attack, and regardless of the external
motive to bail out the airline industry.").
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should share the burden during major disasters, when the numbers
become staggeringly high.
The proposed hospital disaster relief program should be
temporary, with its aim to provide financial relief from the immediate
crisis. Although many of the challenges health care providers face in
disaster response exist even in normal operating circumstances, this
program should not be extended as a permanent approach to fill the
gaps and flaws in health care financing. 81 Disaster response planning
provides insights into those larger issues but should not be used as a
quick fix to address a more complex problem, which is well beyond
the scope of both this proposal and Article.
CONCLUSION

Existing federal law requires Medicare-participating hospitals to
provide emergency medical services to the community without regard
to payment. Homeland security preparedness laws enacted following
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks define hospitals as "first
responders" and expand their responsibilities in providing emergency
services to the disaster-affected community. Post-9/11 laws addressed
the costs of disaster preparedness but not the costs of disaster
recovery. And measures have not been implemented to ensure
compensation and industry stability following the crisis.
Emergency medical care for victims of a national catastrophe or
major public health emergency is an essential community service.
Therefore, it should be expected that the government would bear at
least some of the cost of providing that care, rather than leaving
health care providers bearing the costs of disaster relief. Moreover,
government support is essential to ensure that hospitals do not buckle
under the financial strain. If hospitals cannot bear the costs and are
forced to close, the immediate challenge of responding to disaster
victims' needs could spiral into a lasting access-to-care crisis. To avert
those results, this Article examines four different government
programs that provided financial support and stabilization to essential
service industries threatened by unusual demands. The Article then
draws on those models to develop the broad outlines of a government
relief plan for hospitals, to be enacted before the next disaster.

381. See Brown et al., supra note 299, at 869 (noting concerns that TRIA "would turn
into a permanent fixture in the insurance industry"); Sommer, supra note 237, at 364
(noting drawback of permanent system is creating "untouchable rights," which, once in
place, are "very hard, politically, to reduce"); see also Levmore & Logue, supra note 294,
at 287-91 (comparing permanent compensation systems in Israel and Great Britain).

